In the previous part we studied the dispute between the approach of the Rambam and the approach of the Maharal of Prague regarding what the Creator's attributes actually mean. According to the Maharal, every attribute defines and therefore composes, and so the Creator brought into being the very concept of chochmah as well; and although chochmah comes from Him, it is not a part of Him and it is not what defines Him.
The strength and the weakness of each approach:
We have before us, then, two schools, two different approaches: the Rambam and the Maharal. Now, so that the matter should be clear, let us examine what is gained and what is lost in each one:
The Maharal's approach: Its strength is enormous. It elevates the Creator, who is utterly simple, beyond every category and above everything. This is the most exalted relationship one can ascribe to the Creator. But there is a corresponding weakness: according to this view, all the middos and all the sefiros are something He created and are not Him, so that one who connects to them has not connected to Him Himself but to something He made.
The Rambam's approach: The Maharal's weakness is the Rambam's strength. The Rambam says that He is the Knower and He is the Comprehender, and His hashgachah over every existing being and creature is He Himself, for His knowledge of each and every detail is He Himself. This is unlike the Maharal, who would say that yes, He knows everything, but that He created a reality in which everything is known, and that reality is not Him. Here, though, there is a weakness of another kind: the Creator is being defined within a particular definition, and as the Maharal argues, the very act of defining Him is itself the problem.
How Chassidus resolves this:
How can one hold on to both advantages at once: the Maharal's advantage, that the Creator is abstracted from everything, together with the Rambam's advantage, that the Creator is present within everything? Here comes the resolution of Chassidus. This resolution already begins with the Arizal, and in Chassidus it is taught right here in Tanya. In essence it makes peace between the two approaches, for they are not arguing with one another at all; each one is speaking about a different level. This is the concept of tzimtzum (the Divine self-contraction) that we have been studying here in Tanya: there is the Creator as He is in Himself before the tzimtzum, and there is the Creator as He has contracted Himself:
Before the tzimtzum and above the tzimtzum: there is no definition whatsoever, utterly simple, the very simplicity of simplicity. This is the Maharal's description. Even though one may say «infinite», infinite is simply infinite, and there is no definition there at all.
After He contracted Himself: here there is definition, and this is the Rambam's approach. And this too is from His side, since the tzimtzum itself is a Divine tzimtzum in the plain sense, as we have learned.
What is fascinating is that Chassidus, having resolved the matter this way, then says something that goes beyond the Rambam as well. The Rambam himself distinguishes between definitions of knowledge and intellect and definitions that belong to emotion. But Chassidus says that once we know the concept of tzimtzum, we can speak about the Creator in terms of the emotions and the sefiros in exactly the same manner and to exactly the same degree, with no difference between them. It turns out that Chassidus takes hold of all the extremes, and everything fits together without any contradiction at all.
A question that was asked in the shiur:
Our language would seem to be limited, and the tools we have for describing anything are limited tools; if so, we have no way of describing anything except in that very language.
Answer: We are citing definitions that are written in the Torah, and since the Holy One Himself revealed His own definitions to us in the Torah, there is something to hold on to in them. Even so, it is certainly still limited and contracted. These very words appear almost verbatim in the closing lines of the first page of the chapter before us.
The purpose of this general introduction was to give us a grasp of the different views so that we can make the distinctions properly, and from here we will begin learning the chapter from within. The Alter Rebbe mentions the Rambam here by name, whereas the Maharal he mentions neither by name nor explicitly by view; but as we learn the words we will see his approach standing behind them.
[Someone learning the chapter on the simple level, for example in the sefer «Shiurim BeSefer HaTanya», may well go through the entire chapter without noticing at all that there are two approaches here, since everything looks like the words of the Rambam. Other «melamdim» do notice it and set out the point, and the material can be learned at depth and then at greater depth still. Likewise, as we mentioned in the previous shiur, in Derech Mitzvosecha the mitzvah of emunas Elokus is treated at length, and this very foundation, the differences between the approaches, is found there far more expansively.]
Chapter 8:
“והנה מה שכתב הרמב״ם ז״ל שהקב״ה מהותו ועצמותו ודעתו הכל אחד ממש, אחדות פשוטה ולא מורכבת כלל” - «Now, as for what the Rambam wrote, that the Holy One, blessed be He, His essence and His being and His knowledge are all literally one, a simple unity and not composite at all.» These words of the Rambam have already been cited here in Shaar HaYichud VehaEmunah, and as we read, their source is in the Rambam, chapter two. There the Rambam used the expression «one from every side and every angle», while here the words are brought as «literally one», and the Alter Rebbe adds a definition of what this means: «a simple unity», and also in the negative: «and not composite at all».
At first glance we have here a pile of expressions that repeat one another: «literally one», «a simple unity», «and not composite at all». What is the meaning of all this length? First let us understand the plain sense of the words. The description «one» can be said even of something made up of many details, as in the example we brought: one person is one, and nevertheless he is composed of limbs and sinews. More than that: within the concept of «one» one can ascend from level to level, and the higher level is called, relative to the lower one, a «simple unity», while the lower one is called «composite». But if we climb higher still, what was previously called simple now counts as composite, and the simple is higher than it.
An analogy from the powers of the soul:
Every one of us has soul powers, and in general terms let us take the power of understanding and the power of emotion. How do they stand in relation to the soul itself: are they something composite laid upon it, or an integral part of it? Is the essence of the soul to understand and to love, or is the soul abstract and simply possesses a power to study and understand and a power to love? The truth is that the soul itself is simple, free of any attribute, and the Holy One clothed within it powers to understand, to study, to love, and so on.
Now let us take a power that sounds far more like the «soul» itself, one which, compared to the powers we just mentioned, is not composite but integral and essential: the power of ratzon, will. Let us note the difference between will and intellect or understanding, a simple and interesting difference:
Intellect: when we speak of a particular idea, whether one plus one equals two or far deeper ideas, one can think about the idea on its own, with no connection to the person thinking it. There is such an idea, and there is a person who is now thinking that idea. When the person takes the idea, he is clothing it upon himself, and one sees tangibly that there are two things here: the idea, and the person who has mounted it upon himself.
Will: this is not an abstract concept that a person clothes upon himself. What is will? The soul is drawn in a certain direction. There is no free standing concept of going to such and such a place that the person then clothes upon himself; if he wants, he wants, and if he does not want, the concept simply does not exist. The concept cannot be described as a concept without the person, without the soul that wants. Will is an expression of the soul itself.
A proof of this from the Torah: in Bereishis, when Avraham Avinu speaks with the Bnei Ches and seeks to bury Sarah, he says, “אם יש את נפשכם לקבור את מתי מלפני...”, «If it is your soul's wish to bury my dead from before me...» And Rashi explains, “אם יש את נפשכם - רצונכם”, «if it is your soul, meaning your will.» So the word «soul» and the word «will» are one and the same, because will is the drawing of the soul to a particular place, which is not the case with the other powers.
Based on this, one might have said that will is not a composite power at all but part of the soul itself. In truth, however, this is not so, and the proof is simple: there is a state of before he wants, and a state of after he wants. That is a sign that the soul exists in its own right even without the will, and now it wants. If so, the will is not an integral and necessary part of it.
So we have before us an example from the definitions of particular powers: on the one hand one can say of a given power that it is higher and more abstract relative to what is beneath it, but when we climb higher it emerges that even what was considered abstract is itself composite, and in this way one can keep ascending further and further.
And this is what the Rambam is saying: that with the Holy One, He and His knowledge are literally one, a simple unity and not composite at all. Do not think that by the Creator there is composition, that there is «He» and now «His knowledge» is added on; rather, literally one, with no composition here whatsoever. And is it within our power to grasp such a thing, that there is a definition and yet it is literally one? The Rambam himself says that the mouth has no strength to express it. We have no ability to understand it, but so it is. And were we to say otherwise, it would come out that the Creator is composed of parts, and in the Rambam's words, “היו שם אלוקות הרבה”, «there would then be many deities»: He, and His life, and His knowledge. Rather He is one, meaning He is not composite, and all these appellations are Him, one. And this is what the Alter Rebbe brings here in Tanya in his own words: “אחדות פשוטה ולא מורכבת כלל”, «a simple unity and not composite at all». Thus far the words of the Rambam.
In summary: in this part we reviewed the two approaches: the Maharal, who elevates the Creator as utterly simple and sees chochmah and the middos as creations that are not Him; and the Rambam, who holds that He is the Knower and He is the Comprehender and that His knowledge is He Himself. We noted the strength and the weakness in each approach, and the resolution of Chassidus by means of the concept of tzimtzum: before the tzimtzum it is as the Maharal says, and after the tzimtzum as the Rambam says, and even beyond that, that there is no difference between definitions of intellect and definitions of the sefiros and middos. We then opened Chapter 8 with the words of the Rambam, that His essence and His being and His knowledge are all literally one, and we explained, through an analogy from the powers of the soul (understanding, emotion and will), the difference between a composite «one» and «a simple unity, not composite at all».
In the next part we will continue with the Alter Rebbe's own words in Chapter 8 and see how he goes on to explain the matter.