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Chapter 8 · Introduction

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We have arrived at chapter 8 of Shaar HaYichud VehaEmunah, on daf 85a (page 169). With this chapter we enter a whole new level within the general subject of yichud and emunah: everything we have learned until now was one approach, one level, and from here on we climb to a higher one.

Until now we have been explaining the oneness of Hashem, “Shema Yisrael, Hashem Elokeinu, Hashem Echad”: that the entire world, with all its details, adds nothing whatsoever to the Creator, and that everything is in complete bittul to Him. We spoke at length about the two well known modes of His oneness, yichuda ila'ah and yichuda tata'ah, hinted at in “Shema Yisrael” and in “Baruch Shem.” But the subject that occupied us throughout all those chapters was the world and its relationship to the Creator: the world does not add to Him but is part of Him; it looks like a separate existence only to our eyes, while in truth all of it is He, and all of it is one with Him.

The new level in chapter 8:

From here on the Alter Rebbe begins to explain something further. It is not only that the existence of the world is batel and adds nothing, that much we have already understood and illustrated from every angle, but what about the Divine middos and the supernal sefiros? Here we are no longer speaking about the world, but about Divine powers and about the very terms by which we describe the Creator. Do they introduce plurality into Him, as though there were the Creator and then, in addition, His attributes? Until now the discussion was about the creation that His power brought into being, that is, the world; from here on we will discuss the Divine powers themselves, all the sefiros from chochmah onward, and we will learn that even the descriptions applied to the Creator add nothing to Him, and that everything is He. This is a separate and loftier explanation, and it too is utterly fundamental.

Introduction: the general background

Before we approach the chapter itself, let us lay out some general background, so that we understand what this whole discussion revolves around. We will go back several generations: great figures in earlier generations already debated this very question. We will first study the various approaches as they appear among the great Torah authorities, see how the matter was understood in the past and what chassidus adds to it, and then, with Hashem's help, we will come to chapter 8.

On the question of how one may define the Holy One, blessed be He, there is a dispute between the Rambam and the Maharal of Prague. It is not a dispute in which the two met and debated face to face, since several centuries separate them (close to four hundred years), yet it is customary to call it a dispute nonetheless. We will begin with the Rambam's approach, continue with the words of the Maharal who rejects it and holds otherwise, and finally see how chassidus makes peace between them.

The approach of the Rambam:

The Rambam sets out his definition in his Mishneh Torah, in Sefer HaMada, Hilchos Yesodei HaTorah, and we have before us two citations: one from chapter 1 and one from chapter 2. The Rambam addresses the attributes ascribed to the Holy One, blessed be He, and draws a distinction between types of attributes: there are attributes that are no more than metaphor and figure of speech, which cannot truly be said of Him at all, and there is an attribute that can indeed be said of Him. The distinction is between attributes of intellect and attributes of emotion.

Regarding the attributes of middos that are used to describe the Creator, that He is angry, that He rejoices, that He loves, and the like, the Rambam writes [Hilchos Yesodei HaTorah 1:12]: «כל הדברים הללו וכיוצא בהן שנאמרו בתורה ובדברי נביאים הכל משל ומליצה הם, כמו שנאמר 'יושב בשמים ישחק', 'כעסוני בהבליהם', 'כאשר שש ה'' וכיוצא בהן. על הכל אמרו חכמים דברה תורה כלשון בני אדם», “All these expressions and others like them that are stated in the Torah and in the words of the prophets are all metaphor and figure of speech, as it says, 'He who sits in heaven laughs,' 'They angered Me with their vanities,' 'As Hashem rejoiced,' and the like. Of all of these the Sages said: the Torah speaks in the language of human beings.” So according to the Rambam, not one of these descriptions can be said of the Creator in its literal sense.

What, then, can be said of Him? The Rambam writes [Hilchos Yesodei HaTorah 2:10]: «הקב"ה מכיר אמיתו ויודע אותה כמות שהיא, ואינו יודע בדעה שהיא חוץ ממנו כמו שאנו יודעים», “The Holy One, blessed be He, recognizes His truth and knows it as it is, and He does not know with a knowledge that is outside of Himself, the way we know.” Already here the Rambam applies to the Creator an attribute of knowing. The very same Rambam who stated explicitly before that it is all metaphor and figure of speech says here that He knows. Only that His knowing is not like our knowing, exactly as we learned at length in the earlier chapters of Tanya: we know by means of information that comes from outside and is added to the mind, so the information we absorb changes us, whereas by the Creator it is not a knowledge like ours at all.

In his words: «שאין אנו ודעתנו אחד אבל הבורא יתברך הוא ודעתו וחייו אחד מכל צד ומכל פנה ובכל דרך ייחוד. שאלמלי היה חי בחיים ויודע בדעה חוץ ממנו, היו שם אלוהות הרבה הוא וחייו ודעתו, ואין הדבר כן אלא אחד מכל צד ומכל פנה ובכל דרך ייחוד. נמצאת אתה אומר: הוא היודע והוא הידוע והוא הדעה עצמה, הכל אחד. ודבר זה אין כוח בפה לאומרו ולא באוזן לשומעו ולא בלב האדם להכירו על בוריו», “For we and our knowledge are not one, but the Creator, blessed be He, He and His knowledge and His life are one from every side, from every corner and in every manner of unity. For if He were alive with a life and knowing with a knowledge outside of Himself, there would be many gods, He and His life and His knowledge; but it is not so, rather He is one from every side, from every corner and in every manner of unity. You thus find yourself saying: He is the Knower, He is the Known, and He is the Knowledge itself, all is one. And this is something that the mouth has not the power to express, nor the ear to hear, nor the heart of man to grasp clearly.”

What is it that one has not the power to grasp? On the simple level: the understanding of how He is the Knower, He is the Known, and He is the Knowledge itself, and all is one. (Later we will see that the Alter Rebbe himself finds in these words a far deeper meaning.)

The Rambam's position, in our own words: the Holy One, blessed be He, may be called “knowing,” except that His knowing is not like our knowing, and He and His knowledge are one. But to call Him angry, joyful, loving or hating, that is nothing more than metaphor and figure of speech.

What is the difference between the attribute “knowing” and the attribute “rejoicing”?

The difference is basic and straightforward: the very nature of middos is that they relate to another, whereas intellect is a thing unto itself, even with no relation to another. A person's perfection as a being of intellect does not depend on his surroundings at all; it is an essence that stands on its own. Joy, anger and love, by contrast, are relevant only when there is another; without another there is no way to activate them at all. It emerges that middos have no absolute perfection in and of themselves, while intellect does have perfection in and of itself. On this basis the Rambam rules: to say of the Creator that He knows is appropriate, because that is a perfection; but to say of Him that He is angry or that He rejoices is merely a description relative to the creations.

The approach of the Maharal of Prague:

Several centuries later came the Maharal of Prague. Among his other works he wrote the sefer Gevuros Hashem, and in his introductions to that sefer he addresses this subject. The gist of his words: to apply any attribute at all to the Creator, even to say of Him that He “knows,” is simply impossible. The Rambam ruled out the attributes of emotion and held that the attribute “knowing” is fitting; the Maharal argues that even this attribute places a limitation upon the Creator, and that nothing at all may be said of Him.

And he brings a fascinating proof. If knowledge and intellect were a worthy attribute, it would have been fitting to call the Creator “HaSeichel Baruch Hu,” the Intellect, blessed be He. Yet the Sages of Israel do not call Him that; they call Him “HaKadosh Baruch Hu.” And the meaning of the word kadosh is separate, set apart: set apart from everything, from every attribute and every description.

In the Maharal's words: «ואנחנו תלמידי משה עליו השלום אין אומרים כך, וחס ושלום לומר כך עליו, אבל הוא יתברך שקראו רבותינו ז"ל בשם הקדוש ברוך הוא ולא נקרא השכל ברוך הוא, כי אמיתת עצמו לא נודע, רק שהוא נבדל מכל גשם וגוף ומכל הנמצאים», “And we, the disciples of Moshe, peace be upon him, do not say so, and Heaven forbid to say such a thing of Him; rather, He, blessed be He, whom our Sages of blessed memory called by the name HaKadosh Baruch Hu and not HaSeichel Baruch Hu, for the truth of His essence is not known, only that He is separate from all matter and body and from all existing things.”

And he continues: «ועל זה נאמר קדוש ברוך הוא, שעניין קדוש נאמר על מי שהוא נבדל, כי הוא יתברך פשוט בתכלית הפשיטות מופשט מכל גדר, ומזה עצמו שהוא בתכלית הפשיטות אין דבר נבדל ממנו», “And about this it is said HaKadosh Baruch Hu, for the term kadosh is said of one who is set apart, since He, blessed be He, is simple with the ultimate simplicity, abstracted from every definition; and precisely because He is of ultimate simplicity, nothing is separate from Him.” In other words: precisely because He is free of every definition, He can also be everything. Anything that is defined is, by virtue of that very definition, set apart from whatever does not fall within that definition. But the Creator, who is simple with ultimate simplicity and has no definition at all, has nothing that is separate from Him.

In his words: «כי הדבר שיש לו גדר ומיוחד בדבר מה, ובשביל אותו גדר נבדל ממנו דבר שאינו בגדרו, אבל מפני כי הוא יתברך פשוט ואין לו גדר כלל, אין דבר נבדל ממנו, ואם כן הוא יודע הכל והוא יכול הכל, וכל זה מפני שאין לו גדר שיוגדר בדבר מיוחד, ובשביל זה הכל נמצא מאתו גם כן», “For a thing that has a definition and is distinguished by something particular, by virtue of that definition whatever is not within its definition is separate from it. But since He, blessed be He, is simple and has no definition at all, nothing is separate from Him, and therefore He knows all and He is able to do all; and all of this is because He has no definition that would define Him as something particular, and for this reason everything comes into being from Him as well.” The Maharal's claim is that He cannot be defined not because of any lack, but on the contrary: precisely because He is above everything, everything is found in Him, provided only that we do not place Him within any framework of any attribute whatsoever.

And he continues: «ורבותינו ז"ל בחכמתם הרבה, הם שהודיעו לנו אמיתת דברים אלו במה שקראו אותו הקדוש ברוך הוא, רצונם לומר שהוא פשוט נבדל מכל הנמצאים, ולא קראו אותו רק בלשון שלילה», “And our Sages of blessed memory, in their great wisdom, made known to us the truth of these matters by calling Him HaKadosh Baruch Hu, meaning that He is simple and separate from all existing things; and they called Him only in a language of negation.” The title “HaKadosh Baruch Hu” is not a positive description that defines Him as being “such and such,” but a negative one: separate from everything. The title “He is the Knower,” by contrast, is a positive description that places Him within a particular definition. The Maharal, then, completely rejects the Rambam's formulation that He is “the Knower, the Known, and the Knowledge.”

[And the fact that we find great Jewish figures called “kadosh,” such as the holy Arizal and the holy Ohr HaChaim, poses no difficulty, since tzaddikim are called by many of the names of the Holy One, blessed be He, and all of this is by way of metaphor.]

The answer of the Tosfos Yom Tov:

The Maharal of Prague had a student who was among his greatest, universally known as the author of the Tosfos Yom Tov, the famous commentary on the Mishnah. His name included the name “Yom Tov” (Rabbi Gershon Shaul Yom Tov), and that is why his commentary is called Tosfos Yom Tov. As the Maharal's student, he too comes to defend his teacher's position.

The Tosfos Yom Tov was asked: the Maharal's words, in which he states categorically that there is no possibility of describing the Creator with any description at all, and that the only fitting term is “kadosh,” which is a negative term, are difficult to understand. For there are a great many terms by which we describe the Holy One, blessed be He: wise, gracious, merciful, kind, mighty, and so on. And more than that, the Holy One, blessed be He, Himself uses such terms about Himself in the Torah, such as “I am Hashem, I have made.” How, then, are the Maharal's words to be reconciled?

The Tosfos Yom Tov replied: the question never gets off the ground. The Holy One, blessed be He, created and brought forth in atzilus certain middos and powers, but that does not mean that He can be described by them. Would it ever occur to anyone to say of the Holy One, blessed be He, that He is a table, or that He is inanimate matter, even though He created the table and the inanimate? Just as He created physical creations, so too did He emanate and create lofty powers, the concepts of chochmah, binah, chesed and gevurah; but the fact that He created and formed these middos does not allow us to call Him by them. Just as we do not describe Him with the lowly terms, so we do not describe Him with the lofty ones: the Creator formed a creation and formed a middah, but that is not He Himself, and no description whatsoever applies to Him.

And even if we ascribe to the Creator qualitative traits rather than quantitative ones, this is still a definition. Take for example “the Mighty and the Awesome.” These are qualitative middos, and still, “mighty” is not “awesome” and “awesome” is not “mighty.” The point is not that the middos contradict one another, but that the very statement “both this and that” already defines Him. And if He is not simple, then He is composite, made up of an infinity of things.

And here we reach the great chiddush, which is the very subject we are about to study in this chapter: if all things are part of Him, then seemingly He is composite. Take a human being as an example: he is “one,” but a composite one, made up of many details. The Holy One, blessed be He, by contrast, is a one that is not composite: all the details are there, and He is present in every one of the details, and this does not make Him composite in the slightest, and He cannot be divided. That is the problem.

The approach of the Maharal:

It was this problem that the Maharal wrestled with, and because of it he determined that the Creator Himself is utterly abstract and in no way composite: He created all sorts of things, but He Himself is not them. And if you will say that Chazal taught that the Torah is the wisdom of the Holy One, blessed be He, so that one who studies it and delves into it is, as it were, studying the very chochmah of the Holy One, blessed be He, to this the Maharal answers that the Holy One, blessed be He, created the concept of chochmah as well. True, chochmah comes from Him, but it is not He, just as the table too comes from Him and we do not say of Him that He is a table. When we define Him and say, in the Rambam's words, that “He is the Knower,” this is no different from saying “He is a table,” and the same applies to chochmah.

According to the Maharal, as far as the Creator is concerned, chochmah too is just another thing. For us chochmah is something exalted, but relative to Him it is nothing at all. The Torah is indeed holy, that is, set apart, and it comes from a supernal source, from the source of chochmah, and it descended below; and when it descended into the definition of intellect, that is a genuine descent.

To summarize: in chapter 8 we rise to a further level in explaining the oneness of the Creator: not only does the world add nothing to Him, but neither do the sefiros and the Divine attributes. As an introduction we set out the two approaches. The Rambam distinguishes between the attributes of middos, which are no more than metaphor and figure of speech, and the attribute of intellect and knowledge, which can be said of Him, since “He is the Knower, He is the Known, and He is the Knowledge itself,” and He and His knowledge are one. The Maharal of Prague rejects even this attribute: the Creator is simple with the ultimate simplicity and abstracted from every definition, and therefore Chazal called Him “HaKadosh Baruch Hu,” in a language of negation, set apart from everything. And his student, the author of the Tosfos Yom Tov, explained that even the lofty terms are nothing more than powers that the Creator created and emanated, and they cannot serve to describe Him. We also saw that any attribute, even a qualitative one, defines and composes, and it was because of this difficulty that the Maharal determined that the Creator created the concept of chochmah as well: chochmah is from Him, but it is not He.

In the next section we will examine the strength and the weakness of each of these approaches, and we will see how chassidus makes peace between the approach of the Rambam and that of the Maharal, and how it all comes together in the words of the Alter Rebbe in chapter 8.