We continue with Tractate Eduyos chapter 5, and arrive at mishnah 7, the last of the chapter, which brings to a close the account of Akavya ben Mahalalel, who disagreed with the Sages in four matters. This mishnah is especially remarkable, since it reflects the way the halachic process works and the character of the Torah scholar.
Akavya's charge to his son:
"Bish'as misaso amar livno: b'ni, chazor becha b'arba'ah devarim she'hayisi omer" - As his death approached, Akavya turned to his son and instructed him not to follow his father's opinion in those four matters in which he had disagreed with the Sages.
"Amar lo: v'lamah lo chazarta becha?" - The son answers his father: if you truly hold that the halachah follows the Sages, why do you not retract your own view? And if that is not your opinion, why are you instructing me to retract?
"Amar lo: ani shamati mipi ha'merubin v'hem sham'u mipi ha'merubin" - Here it emerges that the dispute is not one of reasoning but of the tradition itself, and both sides rely on a majority:
Akavya: In my day, when I learned, the consensus and the majority of the Sages held as I do, and it is upon them that I rely.
The Sages: Not so, the accepted and prevailing view was as we say.
It turns out that the argument is over who constituted the majority, and for that reason they reached an impasse that they had no way to resolve. It is worth emphasizing: had the Sanhedrin taken a count and ruled by formal vote in favor of one view, Akavya would not have been permitted to disagree with them, for that is the law of a zaken mamre, a rebellious elder. But here no halachah had ever been ruled to begin with, and the discussion is purely about what the tradition was.
From here on, Akavya gives his son good advice. He himself is bound to stand his ground, out of integrity and out of a desire to preserve the tradition he received; but his son has broader room to maneuver, and the difference lies in the source of the tradition each of them received:
In Akavya's case: "Ani amadeti bishmu'asi v'hem amdu bishmu'asan" - each side relies on a tradition received from the majority, and there is no way to decide between them.
In the son's case: "Aval atah shamata mipi ha'yachid u'mipi ha'merubin" - the position that the consensus was like Akavya's you received from one man alone, from your father, whereas the opposing position you hear from the many.
This does not disqualify the tradition he received from his father, for the tradition of a single individual is legitimate as well; but the son, in his own time and place, sees that the minority holds like his father and the majority holds like the Sages. He is therefore entitled not to follow the minority tradition he received, but to lean after the majority. "Mutav l'haniach divrei ha'yachid v'le'echoz b'divrei ha'merubin" - if you are convinced that the truth is with me, you may follow me; but if you are not certain, it is better for you to follow the other tradition and to follow the many. This was the advice Akavya gave his son, and the mishnah does not reveal to us whether he accepted it or not.
The second request - "Pekod alai la'chavereicha":
Before his passing, one final exchange took place between them. "Amar lo: pekod alai la'chavereicha" - the son asked his father to speak well of him before the Sages, and to inform them that the dispute between his father and them does not extend to the son, and that they should accept him as one of their own, for he too wished to be counted among the Sages.
"Amar lo: eini mafkid" - Akavya replied that he had no intention of speaking to them on his behalf.
"Amar lo: shema avlah matzata bi?" - The son asked: is there some flaw in me? Perhaps you do not wish to put in a good word for me because you do not see me as worthy of it?
"Amar lo: lav" - Akavya answered that he saw no flaw in him at all. Rather, he did not wish to lean on family ties and make his son's acceptance depend on his father's standing. The beis midrash is meant to be a place where each person rises or falls solely on the basis of his own qualities and abilities.
"Ma'asecha yekarvucha uma'asecha yerachakucha" - Your own deeds are what will decide: if you conduct yourself properly, they will bring you close and earn you respect, and you will be part of the inner circle of the Sages; and if you conduct yourself improperly, in a manner unbefitting a talmid chacham, it is right that they distance you, and I do not want you to be treated with special consideration merely because I recommended you. I do not wish to tilt the process in your favor with a good word, for if you are worthy, you will ultimately gain recognition and acceptance on your own.
In summary: In this Mishnah we learned the final instructions of Akavya ben Mahalalel to his son. Regarding the four matters, he explained that the dispute between himself and the Sages is a dispute over received tradition, in which each side relies on a majority, and therefore he himself is bound to stand by what he heard; whereas his son, who hears an individual opinion against the opinion of the many, ought to hold by the words of the many. And regarding the request to put in a good word for him before the Sages, we learned the principle "Ma'asecha yekarvucha uma'asecha yerachakucha" - a person's standing in the beis midrash is determined by his own deeds and qualities, and not by family ties and recommendations.