Before us is Maseches Eduyos, chapter 6, mishnayos 5-6. Here we return to the central theme of the tractate - Tannaim testifying to traditions they received. Having left behind the testimonies of Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel, we now meet Akavya ben Mahalalel, one of the outstanding early Tannaim. What we know about him is essentially limited to the mishnah before us and the positions he holds in it, to his famous mishnah at the opening of the third chapter of Maseches Avos, and to one more mishnah in Maseches Negaim.
The exchange between Akavya and the Sages:
The mishnah opens: "Akavya ben Mahalalel he'id arba'ah devarim" - Akavya ben Mahalalel testified to four things. Before we examine the four things themselves, the mishnah describes the dialogue that took place between him and the Sages of the generation at the vineyard in Yavneh: "Amru lo: Akavya, chazor bach be'arba'ah devarim shehayisa omer, vena'ascha av beis din leYisrael" - they said to him: Akavya, retract the four things you have been saying, and we will make you av beis din of Israel. In other words, if you will withdraw from the four opinions you hold and not rule in accordance with them, we will appoint you av beis din of Israel.
Av beis din is the second highest office in the hierarchy of authority in Israel, second in the Sanhedrin only to the Nasi. But the Nasi was often a political and diplomatic leader, and not necessarily the greatest scholar of the generation, so that the av beis din was in practice something like the leading scholar of the generation. The Sages were therefore prepared to appoint him to this lofty office, provided that he retract. This implies that his opinions were unusual, that the Sanhedrin did not agree with them, and that they felt it was not fitting to appoint as av beis din someone who held them.
And if one asks how this fits with the law of the rebellious elder (zaken mamre), one must remember that Akavya's opinions were stated regarding cases that had already occurred, not regarding a case now standing before the court. When a Sanhedrin is called upon to decide an actual case, they hear the case, take a vote, and the majority opinion determines the law - "acharei rabim lehatos" - and from that moment on he is forbidden to rule like the minority opinion against the Sanhedrin. But here the Sanhedrin was not deliberating an actual case, only cases that had already happened, so the discussion is theoretical and there is room for differing opinions. Even so, the Sages held that as long as he did not retract his opinions they could not appoint him.
Akavya answered them: "Muvtach li leikarei shoteh kol yamai, velo lei'asos sha'ah achas rasha lifnei haMakom" - better that I be called a fool all my days than that I be wicked for even one hour before the Omnipresent. Meaning: better that everyone call me a fool for my whole life than that I be wicked for even a single hour before the Holy One, blessed be He. There are two reasons behind his words:
Loyalty to tradition: He had a tradition from his teachers in these four matters, and he could not withdraw from it. If he were to withdraw, the Holy One, blessed be He, would know that he was in effect abandoning his tradition - and his entire life revolved around preserving it. He would not do this even if everyone mocked him, because what matters to him is what the Holy One, blessed be He, knows, and integrity is all that he has.
How it would look, and chillul Hashem: Even if for some reason he had become convinced that the Sages were right and he was mistaken, from the moment the office was offered to him he could no longer retract. For even if he were to retract for proper reasons, and the Holy One, blessed be He, would not hold it against him, people would think he retracted only because he wanted to gain a position of power, and there is no greater chillul Hashem than that - that people should say of him that for the sake of honor and power he compromises his principles. Absolutely not.
The four testimonies:
The first two testimonies are stated together in one phrase: "Hu hayah metamei se'ar hapekudah vedam hayarok, vachachamim metaharin" - he would declare impure the hair of the deposit and green blood, and the Sages declare them pure. The two matters are unrelated to one another, and we will take up each one separately.
The first opinion - the hair of the deposit:
This concerns the laws of negaim. For a nega - the white skin blemish - to be considered a source of tumah, confirming signs are required: either the hairs within the nega have turned white, or the nega has spread (pisyon). And it is a condition that the white hairs were not there beforehand, but rather that the nega is what caused them to turn white.
So what is the law when a first nega appeared, the hairs within its area turned white, and afterward the nega healed on its own and disappeared, while the white hairs remained in place? These hairs were, as it were, deposited by the earlier nega, and hence their name - se'ar hapekudah, the hair of the deposit. And now a second baheres, a new nega, appears in that same spot. It turns out that the white hairs were already there before the second nega appeared, only that they had turned white because of the first one. Is this to be considered a sign of tumah?
Akavya ben Mahalalel said that this is a sign of tumah, and the Sages said that it is not a sign. The Sages expound the wording of the verse, "and it turned the hair white" - the affliction is what turned the hair white, and from here we learn that it must specifically be the affliction now under discussion, and in our case that is the second affliction, whereas the present affliction is not what turned the hairs white, and therefore it is pure.
The second opinion - green blood:
This concerns the color of blood with regard to the laws of niddah. The Mishnah in tractate Niddah lists five colors of blood that are impure: four of them are shades of red, and the fifth is black. The basis of this is that blood darkens over time, and even the black color is ordinary uterine blood that emerged in the usual way and darkened afterward. The question is what the law is regarding green blood, that is, orange blood.
And why did we render it as 'orange'? The Rosh and others bring two descriptions of this color. The first - like the color of an egg yolk. Now, the yolks common today are pale yellow, but the color of the yolk depends on what the hen eats: hens fed on soy and corn have pale yellow yolks, whereas hens that roam and feed on grass and on whatever they find along the way have far more orange yolks. The second description the Rosh brings is the shade of gold that tends toward reddish: gold in its pure form is yellow, but it is the way of the world to alloy it with copper in order to harden it, and this alloy is called 'red gold,' and its color is coppery and orangish.
It is worth noting that in antiquity there was almost no country or culture that had a name for the color orange. Even in the European languages the color is named after the fruit and not the reverse, and only once the orange arrived was the color given its name. In the Middle East in the time of the Mishnah, and likewise in Europe until the Middle Ages, there were no oranges, and therefore the color had no name.
In Akavya's view, green blood is red blood that turned orange, exactly as it could have turned black, and therefore it is impure. And the Sages say: if it has no reddish shade in it, it is not impure. In both of these opinions the halachah was decided according to the Sages.
The third opinion - the hair of a blemished firstborn animal:
The firstborn - the first male born to a cow, a goat or a ewe, the one that opens the womb - is given to a kohen, is offered as a firstborn sacrifice and is eaten by the kohen. If it develops a blemish that disqualifies it from being offered, the animal remains in the kohen's ownership and he may slaughter it and eat it, but a trace of sanctity remains in it: he may not work with it and he may not shear it either. After slaughter, the hides and all the wool on them are permitted to the kohen. The question is what the law is regarding wool that fell off the animal while it was still alive.
The Sages forbid the wool that fell off, and its prohibition stands even after the fact: even after the animal has been slaughtered and the wool attached to its hide has become permitted, the wool that fell off beforehand remains prohibited. The reason for this is the concern that if the wool were permitted, the owners would not hurry to slaughter the animal but would leave it alive so that its hair would grow and fall off, and they might even come to actual shearing, which is forbidden. Once the wool that fell off on its own is forbidden, there is no longer any incentive to keep the sheep, goats or cows alive, and they will hurry to slaughter them - and that is the desired result.
Akavya disagrees: true, during the animal's lifetime the wool may not be used, but once it has been slaughtered - just as the wool attached to its hide is permitted, so too the wool that fell off beforehand is permitted. Therefore the kohen may place the wool that fell off on its own in a niche in the window, and after the animal is slaughtered make use of it.
And this is the language of the Mishnah: "Hu hayah matir se'ar bechor ba'al mum shenashar, vehinicho bachalon, ve'achar kach shechato - vachachamim osrin" - he would permit the hair of a blemished firstborn that had fallen off, and which he placed in the window, and afterward he slaughtered it - and the Sages forbid.
The fourth opinion - giving the bitter waters to a convert and a freed maidservant:
The fourth testimony deals with giving the sotah the bitter waters to drink, a process meant to determine whether she actually committed adultery. In brief: if a husband suspected his wife of improper behavior and warned her not to be alone with a particular man again (kinuy), and after that warning she was found secluded with him once more (setirah), the working assumption from that point on is that she was unfaithful. And if she insists that she is innocent, how can the husband ever trust her again?
The Holy One, blessed be He, in order to restore peace and renew the bond between husband and wife, performs a miracle through this process: if she is guilty, she will die from drinking the bitter waters. Their composition: water to which dust from the floor of the Beis HaMikdash was added, along with a scroll on which Hashem's Name was written and then erased into the water. Some say they are called 'bitter waters' because a bitter substance was added that gave them a bitter taste, and others say the bitterness lies in their effect. And if she survives the drinking, she is innocent, and from then on the couple can live happily, and the Holy One, blessed be He, will bless them with children. The purpose of the sotah waters, then, is the rehabilitation of a broken relationship, for the husband no longer trusts his wife, and this is precisely the concern of the Holy One, blessed be He, who makes peace between a man and his wife.
The question under discussion: does this process apply even to women who did not begin their lives as Jews but converted? Two forms of entry into the Jewish people are considered here:
The convert: a non-Jewish woman who underwent a standard conversion.
The freed maidservant: a kind of entry through the back door. A non-Jewish woman who was acquired as a maidservant by a Jew immerses in a mikvah and becomes a sort of Jewess in her status as a maidservant, obligated in mitzvos like a Jewish woman, and yet she is not a full Jewess. Once she is freed, she becomes a Jewess in every respect, and this is a kind of conversion.
The root of the discussion lies in the wording of the verse: "May Hashem make you into a curse and an oath among your people" - the Holy One, blessed be He, makes the woman who undergoes this process into a byword, someone whom people mention in their curses. And what is meant by 'among your people'? The people she came from, or the people she now belongs to? A woman who began as a non-Jew and converted: does 'your people' in the verse refer to the original nation she left, or has she, upon converting, become a full Jewess so that the verse speaks of her present people?
Akavya ben Mahalalel understood 'among your people' to refer to the original nation, and since she is not Jewish, a convert is not given the waters to drink. The Sages, however, and this is the halachah, hold that once she converted she belongs to the Jewish people in every respect, 'among your people' applies to her, and she is included among those who drink. And this is the language of the Mishnah: "Hu hayah omer: ein mashkin lo es hagiyores v'lo es hashifchah hameshuchreres, v'Chachamim omrim: mashkin" - he used to say: we do not give the bitter waters to a convert or to a freed maidservant, and the Sages say: we do give them to drink.
The Case of Karkemis:
The Mishnah continues to discuss this last point. "Amru lo: ma'aseh b'Karkemis shifchah meshuchreres shehaysah biYerushalayim, v'hishkuha Shemayah v'Avtalyon" - they said to him: there was a case of Karkemis, a freed maidservant in Jerusalem, and Shemayah and Avtalyon gave her the waters to drink. The Sages brought a precedent to refute his position: a woman named Karkemis, a freed maidservant in Jerusalem, was given the waters by the court of Shemayah and Avtalyon, the Nasi and the head of the court who preceded the generation of Hillel and Shammai, and who were themselves converts. Here you have a precedent that a freed maidservant is eligible to drink the bitter waters.
"Amar lahem: dugma hishkuha" - a cryptic phrase that is difficult to understand. 'Dugma' means something resembling something else, and 'hishkuha' means that they gave her to drink. The first explanation in the Bartenura is that because she was like them, a convert as they were, they gave her to drink. And Akavya certainly did not intend any disparagement of the convert, for we are speaking of the greatest men of the generation; his point was that strictly by law there was no basis for giving her the waters, but they, who carried the banner of converts, did not want to treat her differently, and because of their connection to her they were, as it were, blinded in the matter and gave her to drink, since they identified with converts and wanted them to be treated as full members of the Jewish people.
This accusation against the great men of the generation is exceedingly severe, and therefore "v'niduhu" - the Sages placed him under nidui. Nidui is the mildest form of ban, and one under nidui conducts himself somewhat like a mourner sitting shivah: he does not cut his hair, generally for thirty days, he does not launder his clothes, he is not counted toward a minyan, and no one may sit within his four amos. This is the characteristic punishment for one who insults the Sages and speaks of them dismissively.
Had Shemayah and Avtalyon been alive, it would have been in their hands to stand on their honor and place him under nidui, or to refrain from doing so. But since they were no longer among the living, the court before us saw it as an obligation from the outset to stand up for the honor of the Sage, and therefore it placed Akavya ben Mahalalel under nidui for leveling at Shemayah and Avtalyon an accusation that was unacceptable and injurious to their honor.
"Umeis b'niduyo, v'saklu beis din es arono" - Akavya died while still under his nidui, and the court stoned his coffin. This does not mean that they threw stones at the coffin, but that they placed a stone upon it symbolically, to mark that he died in a state of nidui and to underscore just how unacceptable his statement had been.
The Approach of Rabbi Yehudah:
At this point Rabbi Yehudah says: "Chas v'shalom she'Akavya nisnadeh, she'ein ha'azarah nin'eles bifnei kol adam mi'Yisrael b'chochmah uv'yiras cheit k'Akavya ben Mahalalel" - Heaven forbid that Akavya was ever placed under a ban, for the courtyard was never locked before any man in Israel whose wisdom and fear of sin equalled that of Akavya ben Mahalalel. In other words, an error crept into the story. The plain meaning of his words: the gates of the courtyard were never locked before a Jew as great in wisdom and fear of sin as Akavya. He is referring to the days of the Temple, when the Pesach offering was brought in three groups: the first group would enter the courtyard, the doors would be locked behind them, and they would bring their offerings, and after them the second group and the third. It emerges that the doors were locked upon the very finest of Israel, who came to take part in the Pesach offering, and among all of them there was none who could compare to Akavya ben Mahalalel in wisdom and in fear of sin.
The Bartenura's version of the text reads "in humility and fear of sin." Either way, the point is the same: Akavya was truly one of the giants of his generation, and it is inconceivable that he was placed under a ban.
How, then, will Akavya's statement be understood according to this approach? The Bartenura brings a second explanation of the phrase "dugma hishkuha," and this is how Tosafos understood Rabbi Yehudah's position: "dugma" means a copy, counterfeit water resembling the bitter waters. Shemayah and Avtalyon did not give her the actual bitter waters, since she was not fit for them, but rather gave her a drink that looked like them and deceived her, in the hope that she would confess before drinking. According to this, there was no disrespect toward Shemayah and Avtalyon in Akavya's words at all, and it is likewise resolved why the incident with Karkemis is no precedent - for in fact Shemayah and Avtalyon never gave the bitter waters to a convert or a freed maidservant.
If so, according to Rabbi Yehudah, who was it that was banned and died while under the ban? The Mishnah says: "Umi nidu? Elazar ben Chanoch, shepikpek b'taharas yadayim" - and whom did they place under the ban? Elazar ben Chanoch, who cast doubt upon the purity of the hands. It was a different man, Elazar ben Chanoch, who mocked the whole matter of the purity of the hands - the very idea that the hands contract tumah and are purified on their own, independently of the body. By Torah law, a person's body and his hands are a single unit: either all of him is tamei or all of him is tahor. The Sages, however, instituted that the hands contract tumah on their own even when the body is tahor, and an entire tractate, Yadayim, was devoted to this subject. Elazar ben Chanoch rejected this entirely, and because he mocked it he was placed under a ban.
"Uk'shemes, shalchu beis din v'hinichu even al arono" - when Elazar ben Chanoch died, the court sent and placed a stone upon his coffin, to indicate that he died in this state of contempt for the Sages. "Melamed shekol hamnudeh umes b'niduyo - sokelin es arono" - this teaches that whoever is placed under a ban and dies while still under it has a stone placed upon his coffin at the time of burial, symbolically, to make known to all that he died under the ban.
In summary: In this lesson we examined the four testimonies of Akavya ben Mahalalel - the hair of the blemish, the greenish blood, the hair of a blemished firstborn animal that fell out, and the giving of the bitter waters to a convert and a freed maidservant - and his refusal to retract them even at the price of the position of head of the court, out of loyalty to the tradition of his teachers and fear of desecrating God's name. We also learned the incident with Karkemis and the two explanations of the phrase "dugma hishkuha," the laws of the ban, Rabbi Yehudah's position that it was not Akavya who was banned but Elazar ben Chanoch, who cast doubt upon the purity of the hands, and the halachah that emerges from here, that whoever is placed under a ban and dies while under it has his coffin stoned.