Siman 489, Se'if 6

Shulchan Aruch, siman 489, se'ifim 5 and 6.

Continuing the siman: We finished se'if 4, which contained two parts: someone who does not know the count and asks his friend, what he may say to him, and also the halacha regarding the time of eating.
Order of study: We will learn se'if 6 before se'if 5, because it lays out the fundamental principle of kavanah (intent) in berachos, and from it the halacha of se'if 5 becomes clear as well.

"If he began and said 'Baruch atah Hashem Elokeinu Melech ha'olam' with the intention of saying 'today is four,' and then remembered and concluded with 'five,' and in fact it is five; or the reverse, that in fact it is four and he began with the intention of saying 'four' but erred and concluded with 'five,' he does not repeat the berachah."
(Shulchan Aruch, siman 489, se'if 6)

(In this se'if the Shulchan Aruch uses Aramaic, "ada'ata d'leima," which is not his usual style, because he copied the wording from an earlier work that was written in Aramaic.)

The two cases in this se'if

The first case: The one making the berachah thinks that today is the fourth day of the omer, and he began the berachah intending to say "four." In the middle of the berachah he remembered that today is the fifth, and he concluded with "five," and that is indeed the truth, that today is the fifth. The Shulchan Aruch rules that he does not repeat the berachah.
The second case: The reverse. The truth is that today is the fourth, and he knew this and began the berachah intending to say "four," but he erred and concluded with "five." Here too the Shulchan Aruch says he does not repeat the berachah, and this is the difficult part of the se'if.

The first part: he intended "four" and concluded with "five," which was correct

"And concluded with five: meaning that he counted five days."
(Mishnah Berurah)

On the face of it there is no question here: His conclusion was correct, since he said the true number, and the Mishnah Berurah adds no further explanation.
Why it nevertheless requires a ruling: In the halachos of berachos this is not obvious, because a berachah is not merely a statement of the lips. The poskim say that the one reciting the berachah must know what he is blessing over and why he is blessing.
The reason for a berachah: In birchos hanehenin (berachos over enjoyment) he is thanking the Ribbono shel Olam for having something to eat and drink, since everything belongs to Him. In birchos hamitzvos he is thanking Hashem for the privilege of having been given Torah and mitzvos, since performing a mitzvah is a privilege.
Sefiras ha'omer: The counting itself is the mitzvah, and the berachah is an introduction to it; nevertheless, kavanah is required in the berachah as well. And in general the accepted ruling is that mitzvos require kavanah.

Examples from the halachos of berachos where kavanah is essential

Wine and beer: A person is holding a cup and thinks it is wine. He begins "Baruch atah Hashem Elokeinu Melech ha'olam" intending to say "borei pri hagafen," and then realizes it is beer and concludes "shehakol nih'yeh bidvaro." There are opinions in halacha that even though his conclusion was correct he has not fulfilled his obligation, because the beginning of the berachah was directed at something entirely different.
An apple that fell, with a date lying there: A person held an apple in his right hand and recited "borei pri ha'etz," and the apple fell and was lost. On the table lies a date, whose berachah is also "borei pri ha'etz." Even though it is the same berachah, the matter is not simple, and in addition the date is one of the seven species, although there is a halacha that sometimes one recites the berachah on the food he prefers before the seven species.
An apple that fell, with an orange lying there: His intention was specifically for the apple, and now he comes to eat an orange. There are poskim who hold he must recite "borei pri ha'etz" again, because the berachah he had in mind was directed at the apple and not at the orange, and there is a dispute among the poskim about this.
When he had everything in mind from the start: If, when he took the apple and recited the berachah, he had in mind everything lying on the table, there is no problem at all. The difficulty arises specifically when he intended only that particular apple, and only after it fell did he decide to take the orange as a fallback.

The question of the Yerushalmi: one who drinks from a river

The question: A person walks along the bank of a river and recites a berachah on the water in front of him, but the water flows on, and by the time he drinks, different water has arrived, not the water over which he made the berachah. If indeed one must recite a new berachah on the orange that came in place of the apple, seemingly he would have to recite a new berachah on the water as well.
What the question itself teaches: From here we see that kavanah in berachos is a very significant matter, and that it is not simple.
The answer of the Yerushalmi: Everyone knows that water in a river does not stand still but flows, and therefore when he recites the berachah his intention from the outset includes the water that is about to arrive, so he did in fact make a berachah on what he drinks.
One cannot resolve it based on chillul Hashem: We do not say that since he already invoked Hashem's Name, and we do not want that to be blemished, we will therefore validate the berachah after the fact. If the act was done contrary to halacha, invoking Hashem's Name does not make it valid, just as one cannot say about someone who recited a berachah in a place unfit for it that he acted properly because he mentioned the Name.

Why we are lenient in the first case

This is not an announcement but the establishing of a fact: In sefiras ha'omer the one counting is not conveying something of his own; he is stating a fact: today is the fifth day. And in the end he stated the fact correctly, even though at first he thought otherwise.
The berachah is not indispensable: The Mishnah Berurah adds a further reason: even without any berachah at all he would have fulfilled his obligation to count. Therefore what he initially thought about "four" is "nothing at all," and it does not detract from the count itself.

"For even if he had not recited a berachah at all he would have fulfilled his obligation."
(Mishnah Berurah)

The second part: he knew today was the fourth and mistakenly concluded with "five"

The difficulty: His conclusion was not correct. Even though his intention was for the right number, kavanah is part of the matter but not the whole of it, and he did not articulate the correct count with his lips.
The Mishnah Berurah's question: In the first case, where he concluded with "five" and it really is five, it is understandable that he fulfilled his obligation, since even without a berachah he would have been yotzei, and there is no defect in the fact that during the berachah he thought it was four. But in the latter case, what does it help him that at the time of the berachah he knew which day it was, when in the end he counted a day that it is not?
The ruling of the Acharonim: The Acharonim agreed that in this case he must count again, and there is nothing to be done, since he actually erred.

"His first berachah was in vain, since he concluded after it with a different day."
(Mishnah Berurah)

Understanding the wording of the Shulchan Aruch: Some Acharonim engaged in intricate discussions to explain the Shulchan Aruch's intent, but it appears straightforwardly that there is a textual corruption here, that the printer or typesetter erred, and the ruling needs to be split into two separate rulings.

Toch k'dei dibbur (within the span of normal speech)

The principle: Whenever a person catches his mistake within toch k'dei dibbur and corrects himself, he nullifies what he said, and this is valid according to all opinions.
What needs correcting in time: Even in the second case, if he remembers within toch k'dei dibbur that he erred at the conclusion, he should conclude properly and need not repeat.
The wording of the Mishnah Berurah: From the Shulchan Aruch's words it seems that he is speaking of someone who, at the time of the berachah, knew the day of the count and made the berachah intending to count properly, and only afterward erred and concluded incorrectly.
The novel ruling of the Acharonim: Several Acharonim agreed that even if at the time of the berachah his mind was on a different day and he indeed counted mistakenly, nevertheless, if within toch k'dei dibbur he remembers that he erred, he should conclude the berachah properly and he thereby fulfills his obligation.

"And if he erred and said 'today is the fourth day of the omer,' and within toch k'dei dibbur he remembered that today is the fifth, it is enough that he conclude 'the fifth day of the omer,' even though he did not say 'today is the fifth day.'"
(Mishnah Berurah)

Correcting the number suffices: He need not repeat the entire text, but rather correct the number itself precisely, and as long as he is within toch k'dei dibbur the correction is effective. This is similar to the practice of one who corrects himself in reading "zecher" and "zeicher."

The sources of this halacha: Sha'ar HaTziyun, os 41

The Acharonim cited: Ma'amar Mordechai, by Rabbi Mordechai Carmi; and Chok Yosef, by Rabbi Yosef Darmstadt, who authored a special work on Pesach and wrote about matters of the omer as well; and this is also implied by the Alter Rebbe, Rabbi Shneur Zalman of Liadi, author of the Tanya.
The view of the Turei Zahav: The Taz was stringent and wrote that if the entire berachah was said with the intention of counting incorrectly, and afterward he remembered, he must recite a new berachah and count again, and he has not fulfilled his obligation, even though he ultimately said the correct number.
The Taz's proof: From the case of the lupine (turmus) in the Yerushalmi. A person held a lupine in his hand and recited a berachah over it, and the lupine fell and was lost, and he wants to take something else whose berachah is "borei pri ha'adamah." The Yerushalmi says this does not work, since when he made the berachah his intention was on the lupine in his hand, and a berachah covers only that which he made it over.
The Acharonim's rejection: Ma'amar Mordechai and Chok Yosef rejected his words. The Yerushalmi follows its own approach, and furthermore the proof is not comparable: in birchos hanehenin he is holding a tangible object in his hand and blessing over it, whereas in sefiras ha'omer the berachah is not over a tangible object but over the day and over the mitzvah itself, "asher kideshanu b'mitzvosav v'tzivanu al sefiras ha'omer," and therefore since he concluded properly it is perfectly acceptable.
The conclusion: Halachically it is ruled that if he did not say the correct number he has not fulfilled his obligation, in accordance with the Acharonim who rejected the Taz.

Se'if 5: one who begins the berachah without knowing the count

"If he does not know the count... and he began with the intention of concluding as he will hear from his friend, and he concluded as his friend did, he has fulfilled his obligation."
(Shulchan Aruch, siman 489, se'if 5)

The case: The one making the berachah does not know how many days of the omer it is. He says "Baruch atah Hashem Elokeinu Melech ha'olam asher kideshanu b'mitzvosav v'tzivanu al sefiras ha'omer," and waits to hear the number from his friend or from the shliach tzibbur, and then continues after him.
The difficulty: According to what we have explained, the one making the berachah must know what he is blessing over and what he is about to do; he does not make a berachah into thin air. And here, at the very moment of the berachah, he does not know what day it is, as though he were holding a fruit in his hand without knowing what he is blessing over.
The comparison to birchos hamitzvos: Even though the lupine case is a birchas hanehenin while sefiras ha'omer is a birchas hamitzvah, and there is certainly a distinction between them, in birchos hamitzvos too the underlying principle is that a person must know what he is about to do. Like one who recited a berachah intending to shecht and then came to cover the blood, which is a different mitzvah.
The basis for leniency: Ma'amar Mordechai and Chok Yosef already rejected the proof from the lupine, since there the berachah was over a tangible object in his hand, whereas here the berachah is over the day and over the mitzvah itself, and does not depend on an object in his hand.
Practically, in our times: This is how many people conduct themselves, not knowing the count and waiting to hear it from the shliach tzibbur. And in any case, today the practice is to make the berachah after the shliach tzibbur has counted, so everything is proper and in order, and this discussion applies only to someone who has already made the berachah and does not know the number.

(Further study of this se'if is deferred to the next shiur.)

In passing · correcting a berachah begun in error, and practical halachos

1. "Lamdeni chukecha"

The source: A verse in Tehillim, "Baruch atah Hashem, lamdeni chukecha" (Blessed are You, Hashem, teach me Your statutes).
When it works: Someone who said "Baruch atah Hashem" and caught himself that the berachah is out of place, for example the apple he wanted to bless over disappeared, should conclude "lamdeni chukecha," and then he has recited a verse rather than a berachah in vain.
When it does not work: Someone who already said "Baruch atah Hashem Elokeinu Melech ha'olam" cannot use this remedy, and therefore it does not resolve the question in se'if 6.
In Shemoneh Esrei: Someone who forgot Ya'aleh V'yavo and began "V'sechezenah eineinu b'shuvcha l'Tziyon b'rachamim, baruch atah Hashem": some discussed whether he should say "lamdeni chukecha" and return to Ya'aleh V'yavo. In Shemoneh Esrei the matter is more complicated, because he is adding something that is not part of the text of the tefillah, and there is a discussion about this.

2. A lupine that fell, and flowing water in our times

A lupine that fell, in our times: Even though the Yerushalmi says the berachah does not cover what remains on the table, most poskim say that today, when a guest is served peanuts and seeds and all sorts of things, his intention from the outset is on everything set before him, and if his lupine fell he may take peanuts without a new berachah. And all the more so is there room to be lenient regarding another lupine lying before him.
Water from a faucet and from a water machine: In our times, one who presses the button on a water machine and recites a berachah while the water continues to flow is drinking different water from what was before him at the time of the berachah. And since he sees that the water is flowing, his intention includes the water that is coming, as the Yerushalmi says regarding one who drinks from a river.
Safek berachos l'hakel: In practice we are lenient in these berachos on the basis of safek berachos l'hakel (when in doubt about a berachah, do not recite it), and this is also the principle that applies in the halachos of sefiras ha'omer. Nevertheless, it is important to know that there are poskim who were stringent, and some are stringent like the Taz because the Yerushalmi was stringent.