We are now studying Mishnah 7 in the sixth chapter of tractate Zevachim - an especially long mishnah, two hundred and fifteen words, the seventh longest in the entire Talmud. In the first chapters of the tractate, we discussed thoughts that invalidate animal offerings, and now we are summarizing all those laws in one mishnah, as they apply to bird offerings.
Why all the laws can be summarized in one mishnah:
Number of offerings: For animal offerings there are eight types, whereas for bird offerings there are only two types - the olah and the chatas.
The blood services: With a bird there are only two blood services - the melikah, which parallels slaughtering, and the mitzuy of the blood on the wall of the Altar, which parallels the sprinkling of the blood.
What does not exist with a bird: There is no receiving of the blood in a service vessel, because there is not enough blood; and there is no carrying, because the melikah is done right on the Altar.
Eating and burning: With animal offerings there are many details and possibilities regarding eating and burning, whereas with a bird - the olah is burned completely and the chatas is eaten completely, and there are no other options.
Since there are so few components, everything can be summarized in a single mishnah, and the principle is simple: The laws of a bird chatas are based on the exact same principle as an animal chatas (a cow, goat, or sheep), and the laws of a bird olah on the same principle as an animal olah. Anyone who clearly remembers the first chapters is already in a good position.
The four invalidating thoughts:
The first category - shelo lishmah and shelo leshem be'alim: It is forbidden to have these thoughts, but if one did, in most offerings they do not invalidate the offering, rather the one bringing it must bring another offering in its place. "Shelo lishmah" - that he thought about the wrong type of offering; "shelo leshem ba'al" - that he thought about a different person who is not bringing the offering.
The second category - chutz lizmano and chutz limkomo: If, during one of the main blood services (for a bird: melikah or mitzuy), he thought that he would eat what is fit to be eaten or burn what is fit to be burned at the wrong time or in the wrong place - the offering is invalid, even if this was a passing thought that was not carried out in practice.
An example of a shelo lishmah thought: One who slaughters an olah with the thought that it is a chatas - the offering is valid, but the bringer must bring a new olah. The same is true for a bird: One who performs melikah on a bird olah with the thought that it is a bird chatas - the offering is valid, but the bringer, the woman after childbirth or the metzora, must bring another bird. However, remember that the exception to this rule is the chatas, as well as the pesach offering, where if one thought about the wrong type of offering - they are completely invalid. The same is true for a bird chatas: If he performed melikah with the thought that it is a bird olah - it is invalid. And since there are only two types of bird offerings, these are the only possibilities. These exact same laws apply even when he thought about the wrong person: For an olah it does not invalidate, and for a chatas it does invalidate.
And regarding thoughts of time and place: When one had a thought of chutz lizmano - that he would eat the meat at the wrong time or burn it on the Altar at the wrong time - the offering also becomes piggul. Meaning, not only is it not valid but rather invalid, but even one who eats from this meat, and even now during the proper time, incurs the penalty of kares. And we said that the law of piggul - the penalty of kares for eating the meat - applies only if the only thing that went wrong was the thought of chutz lizmano. But if other things went wrong, such as a thought of chutz limkomo also being mixed in, then the permitting factor was not offered according to its commandment - the blood was not brought to the Altar in the way it should have been brought - and then the law reverts to a general invalidation and not piggul. Piggul is therefore a pure invalidation of chutz lizmano, without other invalidations mixed in.
Let us approach the text of the mishnah:
"Chatas ha'of shemelakah shelo lishmah" - he performed melikah on the bird chatas with the thought that it was a bird olah. Since a chatas is invalidated by a thought of shelo lishmah, it is invalid.
"Vechen mitzuy damah shelo lishmah" - also in the second blood service, the mitzuy which parallels the sprinkling, if he did it with the thought that he was dealing with the blood of an olah - the law is the same. It is worth noting that this is somewhat puzzling, because the blood of the olah is sprinkled above the line and the blood of the chatas below the line; nevertheless, if he had this strange thought during the service, the law applies.
"O lishmah veshelo lishmah, o shelo lishmah velishmah - pesulah" - if he had two thoughts, for the correct offering and for the wrong offering, in whatever order it may be, the offering is invalid, because a thought of shelo lishmah invalidates a chatas.
"Olas ha'of kesherah, uvilvad shelo alah labe'alim" - With a bird olah, the intention of shelo lishmah (not for its own sake) does not invalidate it. Therefore, if he intended it to be a chatas, it is valid. However, it does not count for the owners to fulfill their obligation, and the one who brought it must bring another bird olah in its place.
From intentions of shelo lishmah to intentions of outside its proper time and outside its proper place:
"Echad chatas ha'of ve'echad olas ha'of shemelakan ushemitzah daman, le'echol davar shedarko le'echol ulehaktir davar shedarko lehaktir" - The law is the same for both of these. If during the melikah or the squeezing out of the blood he intended to eat something that is normally eaten, namely the meat of the bird chatas, or to burn something that is normally burned, namely the meat of the bird olah - and this does not refer to the crop and the feathers, but to all the rest.
"Chutz limkomo - pasul ve'ein bo kareis" - If he intended for the bird chatas to be eaten outside the Courtyard, this thought alone invalidates it immediately, even if it is a passing thought during the melikah or the squeezing out of the blood. But since there was only an intention regarding place here, one who eats from the bird now does not incur kareis.
"Chutz lizmano - pigul vechayavin alav kareis, uvilvad sheyikrav hamatir kemitzvaso" - If during the avodah of the chatas he intended to eat it tomorrow and not today, or during the avodah of the olah he intended to burn it tomorrow and not today, the korban becomes not just invalid but pigul, and one who eats from its meat is liable to kareis - provided that the blood was offered properly, aside from that intention of outside its proper time.
"Keitzad karav hamatir kemitzvaso?"
He performed melikah properly without any intention, and during the squeezing out of the blood he intended to eat the meat tomorrow and not today.
He performed melikah with the intention to eat the chatas tomorrow and not today, and afterward he squeezed out the blood without any invalidating intention.
He performed melikah and squeezed out the blood while intending during both stages to eat the meat of the chatas at the wrong time, tomorrow, or to burn the meat of the olah at the wrong time, tomorrow.
In all of these cases there is only one invalidating intention - the intention of time - and nothing else went wrong. This is the meaning of the Mishnah that the matir (the permitting agent), the blood, was offered according to its mitzvah, and this korban becomes pigul.
"Keitzad lo karav hamatir kemitzvaso?"
He performed melikah with the intention to burn it outside its proper place - in another place besides the Altar - or to eat it outside the Courtyard if it is a chatas, and afterward, during the squeezing out of the blood, he intended to eat it or burn it tomorrow.
He performed melikah with an intention regarding the wrong time, and during the squeezing out of the blood he introduced a second invalidation of an intention regarding place.
He had both intentions both during the melikah and during the squeezing out of the blood. This last case is not a novel ruling at all, but rather parallels the Mishnah in the second chapter of the tractate.
The same applies to a bird chatas, where the possible invalidation of shelo lishmah is also added:
"Shemalkah shelo lishmah umitzah damah chutz lizmanah" - He performed melikah on the chatas with the intention that it is an olah, thereby invalidating it, and afterward, during the squeezing out of the blood, he intended to eat it tomorrow. He has thus introduced another invalidation, and it is not pigul.
He performed melikah with the intention of outside its proper time - an intention of pigul - and afterward he squeezed out its blood shelo lishmah, as if sprinkling the blood of an olah. Here too he introduced a second invalidation, and it is not pigul.
He performed melikah and squeezed out its blood shelo lishmah, and did not have a pure intention of outside its proper time at all.
These are the examples where that which permits was not offered according to its mitzvah - as the blood was not sprinkled properly to begin with - and therefore it is impossible for it to carry liability for kares under the law of piggul.
The Mishnah continues, again echoing the words of the second chapter of the tractate: "Le'echol kezayis bachutz uchezayis lemochor, kezayis lemochor uchezayis bachutz, kechatzi zayis bachutz uchechatzi zayis lemochor, kechatzi zayis lemochor uchechatzi zayis bachutz - pasul ve'ein bo kares" - To eat an olive's volume outside and an olive's volume tomorrow, an olive's volume tomorrow and an olive's volume outside, half an olive's volume outside and half an olive's volume tomorrow, half an olive's volume tomorrow and half an olive's volume outside - it is invalid and does not carry kares. If one thought at the time of melikah or draining that he would eat an olive's volume in the wrong place and an olive's volume at the wrong time, the two olive's volumes combine; and likewise when he thought of place and time with half-olive's volumes, in whichever order it may be. In all those cases the thoughts combine and the offering is invalid, but since there are no pure thoughts of outside its time here, it does not carry kares, and one who eats from the meat now is not liable.
The opinion of Rabbi Yehudah:
Rabbi Yehudah disagrees, just as he disagreed in the second chapter, and says: "Zeh hakelal - im machsheves hazman kadmah lemachsheves hamakom, piggul vechayavin alav kares; ve'im machsheves hamakom kadmah lemachsheves hazman - pasul ve'ein bo kares" - This is the rule - if the thought of time preceded the thought of place, it is piggul and one is liable for it with kares; and if the thought of place preceded the thought of time, it is invalid and does not carry kares. In his opinion, the rule is not that any addition of an invalidation besides outside its time removes it from the category of piggul; rather, the first thought is the determining one. If the first thought was a thought of outside its time, it has already become piggul and it is impossible to remove it from the category of piggul, and one is liable for it with kares. And if the thought of place came first, it is too late, and there is nothing here but an invalidation without kares.
However, "Chachamim omrim: zeh vazeh pasul ve'ein bo kares" - the Sages say: This and that are invalid and do not carry kares. The Sages repeat the opinion of the Tanna Kamma, that any introduction of another invalidation removes it from the category of pure outside its time, and therefore there is no law of piggul here.
Finally, the Mishnah states something that everyone agrees upon: "Le'echol kechatzi zayis ulehaktir kechatzi zayis - kasher, she'ein achilah vehaktarah mitztarfin" - To eat half an olive's volume and to burn half an olive's volume, it is valid, as eating and burning do not combine. One who thinks that he will eat half an olive's volume and burn half an olive's volume, the offering is valid and there is no invalidation here at all, because as was stated even regarding animal offerings, half an olive's volume of eating and half an olive's volume of burning do not combine into a full olive's volume.
Regarding bird offerings, this halachah is somewhat puzzling, since the liability applies only to one who thinks to eat what is fit for eating or to burn what is fit for burning, and the chatas is entirely eaten while the olah is entirely burned. Therefore, there is no room at all for a thought that he would eat half and burn half, as half is not burned in a chatas and half is not eaten in an olah. Rather, the Mishnah remains in a structure exactly parallel to the structure in the previous chapters, and the reason is that memorizing the mishnayos does not tolerate slight changes, as these lead to confusion and improper memorization. Therefore, the structure of the Mishnah here regarding bird offerings is identical to the structure regarding animal offerings earlier in the tractate.
In summary: In this mishnah, all the invalidating thoughts were gathered as they apply to bird offerings, and we are able to gather them in a single mishnah due to the small number of types and the small number of services. We learned that a thought of not for its own sake invalidates a bird chatas and does not invalidate a bird olah except that it does not count for the owner; that a thought of outside its place invalidates and does not carry kares; and that a thought of outside its time makes it piggul and one is liable for it with kares, provided that that which permits is offered according to its mitzvah - that another invalidation did not become mixed into it. And we discussed the dispute between Rabbi Yehudah and the Sages regarding the precedence of the thoughts, and the rule that eating and burning do not combine.