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Zevachim Chapter 13, Mishnah 6: Partial Offerings Outside the Azarah

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Mishnah 13:6 returns to a point we discussed two Mishnayos earlier, in Mishnah 13:4: what is the law for someone who burns only a portion of an item - such as an olive's volume of the handful and the like - rather than the entire required amount. There, the Tanna Kamma, who is the anonymous Sage, and Rabbi Eliezer disagreed, and we will begin by reviewing their statements.

The Dispute Between the Tanna Kamma and Rabbi Eliezer in Mishnah 13:4:

The Mishnah there lists various meal offerings and handfuls:

  • "Hakometz" - the handful.

  • "Halevona" - the frankincense.

  • "Haketores" - the incense.

  • "Minchas kohanim" - the meal offering of a kohen, which is burned in its entirety.

  • "Minchas kohen mashiach" - the daily offering that the High Priest pays for, half of which is burned in the morning and half in the evening.

  • "Minchas nesachim" - the accompanying meal offerings that come with animal sacrifices, primarily with every peace offering and every burnt offering.

Regarding all of these, the Tanna Kamma says: If he burned "kezayis" - an olive's volume, outside, even though he did not burn the entire item, he is liable, since this amount is significant and effective. Rabbi Eliezer, however, exempts him: an olive's volume is not enough to make him liable, and there is no liability unless he burns the entire amount.

It should be added that even Rabbi Eliezer concedes: if he burned everything in its proper place inside the Temple, and only the final olive's volume remained, which he did not burn inside but outside, he is liable. The reason is: that olive's volume burned outside joins with the rest, and since if it had been burned inside it would have been effective to complete the burning, it makes him liable when burned outside.

Two Permitters in a Meal Offering: The Handful and the Frankincense:

Our Mishnah returns to this concept regarding a meal offering, which generally consists of two parts: the fine flour - flour and oil - and on top of it, the frankincense. Frankincense is a type of incense, a dried tree resin. Its shape and color are like golden raisins, and its texture resembles rock candy; imagine small crystals like these resting on top of the fine flour.

In most meal offerings, the frankincense crystals are pushed aside, and a handful - a fistful - is taken from the meal offering, and it goes up on the altar together with all of the frankincense. They are two separate things, and both must be offered on the altar in order to permit the meal offering: a double requirement of permitters.

Hence the question of the Mishnah: what is the law for someone who offers outside only one of the two, the handful or the frankincense? The Tanna Kamma says "chayav" - he is liable, as is his approach regarding an olive's volume - this is a significant portion, and the rest can be completed afterward, and therefore he is already liable for it. Rabbi Eliezer, consistent with his opinion, "potur ad sheyakriv es hasheni" - exempts him until he offers the second one: there is no liability for a sin offering for offering outside unless he offered both parts, both the handful and the frankincense. The halachah follows the Tanna Kamma, which is the majority opinion, and not Rabbi Eliezer - one who offers one of them outside is liable.

"Shenei bezichei levonah" - two dishes of frankincense:

The Mishnah continues with this same line of thought and moves on to the two dishes of frankincense that are placed on the Showbread. In the Sanctuary, in the Heichal, stands the Table, and upon it are twelve loaves of Showbread in that special frame. The bread remains there from Shabbos to Shabbos, and at the end of the week the old loaves are removed, new ones are placed in their stead, and the kohanim eat the twelve loaves.

Placed atop the loaves throughout that week are two bazikin - two spoons - of frankincense, and what permits the Lechem Hapanim to be eaten by the kohanim is the burning of the two bazikin on the Altar. What is the law, then, for one who burns only one of the two outside?

The Mishnah states: "Shnei bazichei levonah shehikriv et echad mehen bachutz - chayav" - regarding two spoons of frankincense, if one offered one of them outside, he is liable. This is the opinion of the majority of the Sages, that a significant quantity generates liability even if he did not offer the entire item. "Verabbi Elazar poter ad sheyakriv et hasheni" - and Rabbi Elazar exempts him until he offers the second one, meaning until the second spoon is also burned outside; as long as he has not burned everything, he is exempt from bringing a chatat.

Yet even here, Rabbi Elazar concedes that if he burned one spoon in its proper place inside, and the second one outside, in a place where it is forbidden to place it - he is liable for a chatat. After all, had that spoon which was taken outside been burned in its proper place, it would have been effective; and since he burned it outside, he becomes liable.

"Hazorek miktzat damim bachutz":

From here, the Mishnah moves from meal offerings to animal sacrifices: "Hazorek miktzat damim bachutz" - one who sprinkles some of the blood outside, meaning one who places blood on an altar outside the Temple courtyard. Before discussing the law, an introduction: In the first passage of Leviticus 17, in the first nine verses, two separate prohibitions are explicitly mentioned - the prohibition of slaughtering outside and the prohibition of offering up outside. Sprinkling the blood is not explicitly mentioned there, and it is derived through exegesis. The Tannaim debate the basis of that exegesis, but everyone agrees that there is a separate prohibition against sprinkling blood outside its designated place - practically, outside the Temple courtyard - whose punishment is karet.

In light of this, the question arises: What is the law if one performed only one sprinkling of blood outside? In most offerings - the olah, chatat, asham, shelamim, and todah - there are at least two sprinklings (for a chatat there are four, and for the rest there are two that constitute four, meaning two sprinklings that reach four walls), and the mitzvah is to place both of them. The law is: Even for just one sprinkling on a wall outside the permitted boundary - he is liable.

There is no great novelty in this, because after the fact, a person fulfills his obligation even with one sprinkling. For example, for an olah offering, two placements of blood are given that constitute four: a sprinkling on the northeastern corner and a sprinkling on the southwestern corner. If, after the first sprinkling, the kohen fumbles and all the blood splashes onto the floor, and no blood remains for the second sprinkling - after the fact, he has fulfilled his obligation, since as long as one placement was given on the Altar, it is sufficient. Since one placement in the correct location is valid, it stands to reason that one who gives one placement in the incorrect location would be liable for a chatat.

The Novelty: Blood Placements on the Inner Altar:

The novelty is regarding the inner Altar. For five offerings - the three bulls and two goats, which are the burned bulls and goats, that are not eaten but burned - their blood is not placed on the outer Altar but on the inner Altar, the golden Altar in the Sanctuary. Regarding them, the halachah is that the blood placements are indispensable: if on Yom Kippur the kohen placed blood on one of the Altar's corners, and then the blood spilled onto the floor - after the fact, he has not fulfilled his obligation. A single placement of blood is not sufficient in itself to validate the offering. Nevertheless, the novel teaching here is that even there, a single placement is considered a significant quantity, and it is sufficient to generate liability - similar to a kezayit in the previous Mishnahs.

Why Rabbi Elazar Does Not Disagree Here:

According to his approach, Rabbi Elazar should have disagreed and required that he perform the entire procedure, and it is puzzling that he does not disagree. The reason is due to another view of his, which is unrelated to this dispute: In his opinion, each of the sprinklings performed on the inner Altar is a separate, independent mitzvah (and therefore, for example, if the blood spilled and he started anew, it is discussed whether he must repeat what he has already done). Since each sprinkling is a mitzvah in its own right, a single sprinkling - even for one of the inner offerings, like the inner chatat offerings - if placed on an altar outside the boundary, generates liability for karet.

"Af hamenasech mayim bechag bachutz":

There are two more loose ends along the same line of thought. The first is the water libation of the festival of Sukkos. What is the law regarding one who pours a water libation on an altar outside the Temple grounds - is he liable for kares or not? Here, Rabbi Elazar, who was lenient earlier and held that there is no liability until he offers the entire service, is actually stringent, and says: "Af hamenasech mayim bechag bachutz chayav" - "Even one who pours the water libation on the festival outside is liable."

His reasoning is that he holds like Rabbi Akiva that the water libation has a source in a verse. The verse uses the plural term "unesacheha" (and its libations), and as Rabbi Akiva understands it, this refers to two libations: the regular libation of the daily offering and the water libation on Sukkos. This is the derivation from the verse in Bamidbar 29:31, and this forms the basis of his opinion.

A Law Given to Moshe at Sinai:

The Sages disagree and hold that the water libation does not have a source in the verses, but rather it is an unwritten law given to Moshe at Sinai (Halachah leMoshe miSinai). Generally speaking, when Moshe Rabbeinu came down from Mount Sinai, there was no Chumash yet; he received all the laws at Sinai. Later, the Sages were able to demonstrate where each law that Moshe received is embedded and hinted at within the verses themselves, and how it can be extracted from there through exposition. However, there were laws that have no reference in the verses, not even an indirect reference for exposition, and these are known as laws given to Moshe at Sinai.

The halachah follows the Sages, that the water libation is a law given to Moshe at Sinai and is not derived from a verse. And since one of the technical requirements to be liable for a chatas or for kares is that the matter must have a source in a verse, and here there is none - one who pours a water libation outside is exempt.

The Remaining Blood:

One last point: the remaining blood, whose law is to be poured out onto the base of the altar. On the southwestern corner, there were two small areas: most of the offerings were poured out onto the southern base, which had a sort of hole at the southwestern corner; and the blood of the inner offerings, which were performed at the inner altar, was poured there into the western hole.

According to almost all opinions, pouring out the remaining blood is a separate mitzvah and does not invalidate the offering: if one did not pour the remaining blood onto the base, it does not hinder the efficacy of the offering. However, Rabbi Nechemiah in the Mishnah holds that this is a separate and indispensable obligation as part of the service, that the remaining blood from the offerings brought on the golden altar, the inner altar, must be poured onto the outer altar, onto that base; and if this is not done, there is a flaw in the offering itself.

Therefore, according to Rabbi Nechemiah, one who takes the remaining blood of one of the five inner chatas offerings - the burned he-goats and bulls - and pours it on an altar outside the Temple grounds, is liable for kares. But the halachah does not follow his opinion, rather it follows the other opinions that this does not invalidate the offering: failing to pour the remaining blood onto the base, after the required elements were done properly, does not invalidate the offering and the atonement. And therefore, even one who pours it completely outside - he has committed a great prohibition, but it is not the prohibition from the verse that incurs kares.