We return to the prohibitions of slaughtering and offering outside, outside the Azarah and the Beis Hamikdash. The Mishnah teaches that there is an aspect in which slaughtering is more stringent than offering, and there is an aspect in which offering is more stringent than slaughtering.
The stringency of slaughtering:
A person who consecrated an animal and said, "Behold, this is an olah," and instead of offering it in the Beis Hamikdash he slaughtered it outside the Azarah - he is liable even if he slaughtered it for a commoner. In explaining "for a commoner," two interpretations are offered: the first is that he intends to feed the meat to a regular person; and the second is that he intends to worship that person in the manner of idolatry. Either way, the slaughtering is not for Hashem - and nevertheless he is liable, as it is stated, "dam yeichashev la'ish hahu" - blood shall be imputed to that man, and from the language "to that man" we learn that even one who slaughters for the sake of a man, to serve a man, is included in the prohibition.
And this is not the law regarding offering: One who offers a sacrifice outside the Beis Hamikdash for the sake of another person, in the manner of that person's worship - he is exempt from the kares prohibition of offering outside. And it is understood that if he did this in the manner of idolatry, there is a separate negative prohibition of idolatry and even kares for that, but the prohibition of offering outside only applies when he offers it to Hashem outside the Azarah.
The stringency of offering:
Two people who held a knife and slaughtered the animal together - they are both exempt, even though a consecrated animal was slaughtered outside the Azarah, because the act was not done by a single person. And again from the verse, "dam yeichashev la'ish hahu" - "to that man" specifically, a single person.
In contrast, two people who held a limb of the animal and offered it together - meaning they placed it on the altar and burned it, and thereby performed both components: the elevating and the burning - are both equally liable. And according to the Rash, this is derived from the opening words of the passage (Vayikra 17), "ish ish" - the repetition of the word teaches that even if two people perform the act together, they are liable.
And the novelty of this matter becomes clear from the regular rule regarding two who performed an act: if each one needed his friend - they are both liable; and if each one could have done it by himself and they did it together - they are exempt, as in the laws of Shabbos. And here, even though each one of them could have offered the entire animal by himself, and the only difference is in the time, and according to the rule they should have been exempt - the verse teaches that there is a special stringency in offering sacrifices outside the Azarah, and both are liable.
He offered limb by limb - a dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yosi:
He offered one piece and after it a second and a third from the same animal - one leg, a second leg, and a third leg. Rabbi Shimon holds that every act of offering a limb is a separate transgression, just as we said regarding other prohibitions: one who writes on Shabbos - every new word is a new prohibition; one who cooks - every new item is a new prohibition; and one who eats a kezayis of chelev - every eating is a separate act. Here too, the first, second, and third limbs - these are three separate acts.
And this is speaking of a case where each one comes with a separate lapse of awareness: he brought in the first leg, they informed him that it is forbidden to do so and that he is liable for a chatas, and again he forgot and did it a second time, and again he forgot and did it a third time. In these three lapses of awareness there are three separate prohibitions, and therefore three obligations to bring three chatas offerings for the three acts.
And Rabbi Yosi says, "eino chayav ela achas" - he is only liable for one. The prohibition takes effect on the entire animal, and even if he offered different limbs and even in three lapses of awareness, there is only one kares prohibition for each animal.
The basis of the dispute lies in the verse "La'asos oso laHashem" - to what does the word "oso" (it) refer? According to Rabbi Shimon, to every single limb; and according to Rabbi Yosi, to the entire animal. And the halachah does not follow Rabbi Shimon, but rather the entire animal constitutes a single, complete prohibition.
"Ve'ein chayav ad sheya'aleh lerosh hamizbe'ach" - and he is not liable until he brings it up to the top of the altar:
This is at least the opinion of Rabbi Yosi: He is not liable until he actually offers the limb on top of the altar. One who burns it on the ground is exempt, since he must offer it on top of something, and not just on anything, but specifically on an altar, like the altar of Hashem, as is derived from the verses.
But Rabbi Shimon says "Afilu he'elah al hasela ve'al ha'even chayav" - even if he offered it up on a rock or on a stone, he is liable. There is no need for it to be an actual altar. "Sela" is bedrock, an elevated rock attached to the ground, and "even" is a regular stone or rock that is not part of the bedrock. In both cases he is liable, as long as it is elevated from the ground. And everyone agrees that if it is not elevated from the ground, he is exempt.
According to Rabbi Yosi, the precedent belongs to Noach, as it is stated, "And Noach built an altar" - specifically an altar. However, according to Rabbi Shimon, there are other sources, such as Manoach for example, showing that an altar is not specifically required. On the contrary, the need for an altar - "on the altar of Hashem" - is stated regarding the Ohel Moed: In the Ohel Moed an altar is required, but outside, there is no need for it. Therefore, as long as the object is elevated from the ground, one who offers upon it and causes its burning is liable.
And why were two separate things necessary, a rock and a stone? This explains that you should not say a rock is unique because it is attached to the ground and bears some resemblance to an altar; rather, everything is valid for this matter, and anything elevated is included.
In summary: We learned the aspects in which slaughtering is more severe than offering - one who slaughters for a layman is liable, which is not the case for one who offers - and the aspects in which offering is more severe than slaughtering - two who slaughter are exempt, and two who offer are liable. We discussed the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yosi regarding offering several limbs, whether each limb is a separate transgression or the entire animal is a single prohibition, and their dispute regarding the question of whether an altar is specifically required or if anything elevated from the ground is sufficient.