The second Mishnah in the fourteenth chapter continues to discuss the prohibitions of slaughtering and offering outside - offering sacrifices outside their designated place in the Courtyard. The Mishnah lists cases where offering outside is prohibited, and nevertheless, the one who offers them is exempt from the punishment of kares. The reason for this is that all these are animals that would be completely invalidated if they were offered inside, and even if they were brought up onto the Altar, they would be taken down. Since they are not fit to be brought inside, one who offers them outside the Courtyard is exempt from kares.
The list of invalidated animals in the Mishnah:
We have already learned this list in the eighth chapter, in the first Mishnah there:
"Harove'a vehanirba" - an animal that participated in an act of bestiality. In the case of "harove'a", the animal is the male, and in the case of "hanirba", the human is the male.
"Hamuktzeh" - an animal that was set aside for the purpose of idol worship.
"Hane'evad" - an animal that was actually worshipped as an idol.
"Esnan" - an animal given as payment to a prostitute.
"Mechir" - an animal given as payment or exchange, such as one who exchanges a cow for a dog, the cow becomes prohibited.
"Kilayim" - the offspring of a goat and a sheep together, something that is uncommon but possible.
"Hatereifah" - an animal that suffered a fatal injury, and is invalid even after the fact.
"Yotzei dofen" - an animal born by Caesarean section, taken from its mother's side.
It should be noted that in the cases of "muktzeh" and "ne'evad", this only applies to sacrifices of lesser sanctity (kodashim kalim). For sacrifices of highest sanctity (kadshei kodashim), once they have been dedicated to Hashem, the owner no longer has the power to prohibit them: A person cannot prohibit something that is not his - not through idol worship nor through setting it aside for idol worship - because kadshei kodashim are the property of the Most High, the property of the Almighty, so to speak. Regarding kodashim kalim, there is a dispute, and our text takes the position that kodashim kalim are the property of the owner: The owners are the ones who possess them, and therefore, if one set aside his sacrifice for idol worship or worshipped it, he has prohibited it.
And in the words of the Mishnah: "Shehikrivan bachutz - patur, shene'emar: lifnei mishkan Hashem" - if he offered them outside, he is exempt, as it is stated: "before the Tabernacle of Hashem." The prohibition of slaughtering and offering outside, whose punishment is kares, is stated specifically regarding things that are fit to come before the Tabernacle of Hashem, before the dwelling place of the Almighty, His home, so to speak. And from here: "Kol she'eino ra'uy lavo lifnei mishkan Hashem - ein chayavin alav" - anything that is not fit to come before the Tabernacle of Hashem, one is not liable for it - for any sacrifice that is inherently invalid, the one who offers it is not liable for kares.
Why is the derivation in the previous Mishnah not enough?
In the previous Mishnah, we expounded the first part of that very same verse: "And to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting he did not bring it to offer a sacrifice to Hashem" - that the liability is stated for things that should have come to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting and were not brought. Now we are expounding from the end of the verse, "before the Tabernacle of Hashem," things that could have come before the Tabernacle of Hashem. Seemingly, even the invalidated animals in our Mishnah could not have come to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, and the first derivation should have been enough.
The answer is that the second part of the verse, which our Mishnah deals with, comes to include even an animal that was completely valid at the time it was dedicated as a sacrifice - neither "harove'a" nor "hanirba" and the like - and only afterward became invalid. Even with this, one who offers it outside is exempt from kares.
Examining the cases one by one:
The cases are not as simple as they initially seem:
"Harove'a," "hanirba," "hamuktzeh," "hane'evad," and "hatereifah" - these are easy to understand: At the time the animal was dedicated for a peace offering, its dedication was completely valid, and only afterward did it become "harove'a," "hanirba," "muktzeh," "ne'evad," or "tereifah."
"Esnan" and "mechir" - a separate derivation teaches that after the animal was dedicated, using it as an "esnan" or "mechir" does not invalidate it. If so, this is not an invalidation that was created after the dedication.
"Kilayim" and "yotzei dofen" - these two relate to the way the animal was born: The "kilayim" is born from crossbreeding, and the "yotzei dofen" is born by Caesarean section. How, then, could there be a stage where it was dedicated in a valid state and only afterward became invalid, since it is invalid from the very beginning?
Therefore, these four cases - an esnan (a harlot's fee), a mechir (the exchange for a dog), kilayim (a crossbreed), and yotzei dofen (an animal delivered via Caesarean section) - apply to an animal that was still a fetus in its mother's womb. At that stage, it could be offered through the sacrifice of the mother, and it was only prohibited once it was born:
Esnan and mechir - It was promised to the harlot or the dog owner: when this offspring is born, it will be given to you as your payment or in exchange for the dog. The prohibition only takes effect at the moment of birth.
Kilayim - It is not prohibited until it is born.
Yotzei dofen - It does not become included in the prohibition until it is born.
In all these cases, offering them outside the designated area is prohibited, but from the exposition of the phrase "before the Tabernacle of Hashem" we learned that anything that is not fit to be brought before the Tabernacle of Hashem does not incur kares. This concludes the first section of the Mishnah.
The second section of the Mishnah - blemished animals:
A blemished animal is invalid for sacrifice according to all opinions, and if it was brought up on the Altar, it is taken down. There are two types of blemishes:
A permanent blemish - A blemish that will never heal on its own.
A temporary blemish - A blemish that may heal on its own, at which point the animal will once again be valid for sacrifice.
In this section, the Mishnah presents a new dispute. According to the Sages, an animal that is currently invalid even post facto is taken down from the Altar, and consequently, one who offers it outside the Courtyard is exempt from kares. Rabbi Shimon derives a broader teaching from the verse: it is not just referring to a specific group of sacrifices that cannot be brought now but will be able to be brought later (such as an individual's obligatory sacrifices), but rather a complete generalization - any animal that is not fit to be brought now but will be fit to be brought later, one who offers it outside now is exempt from the kares mentioned in Vayikra 17, but transgresses the general negative commandment in Devarim 12.
The first case - a blemished animal:
A temporary blemish is subject to change, and any animal that is not fit to be brought now but will be fit later falls under this dispute. The wording of the Mishnah: "Baal mum, bein baal mum kavua bein baal mum oveir, shehikrivan bachutz - patur" - whether the blemish is permanent or temporary, one who offers it outside the Courtyard is exempt from kares, since the animal is defective and unfit to be brought, and if it was brought, it is taken down from the Altar.
"Rabbi Shimon omer: baal mum kavua - patur" - an animal that has a blemish that will not heal, such as one with three legs where a fourth leg will not grow, one who offers it outside is exempt from kares. However, "baal mum oveir - belo saaseh" - a temporary blemish may heal, and then the animal will once again be valid for sacrifice; therefore, one who offers it outside now is not liable to kares, but transgresses the separate, general negative commandment, "You shall not do according to all that" - the prohibition against doing something now that can be done permissibly at a later time.
The second case - turtledoves and young pigeons:
The birds brought for a sacrifice are of two types: torim (turtledoves) - adult birds, and bnei yonah (young pigeons) - fledglings that have not reached adulthood. The definition is given elsewhere: from the time the neck feathers begin to turn golden, the bird has reached adulthood. Bnei yonah are valid only while they are small, and once they reach this age they are no longer valid; whereas a tor is valid only after it has fully matured and its neck feathers have turned golden.
One who brings a bird when it is not its proper time - it is invalid even after the fact. However, there is a distinction: The turtledove which is disqualified now because it is not yet mature, if he waits - it will mature and become fit for a sacrifice, and therefore Rabbi Shimon holds that it carries at least a general negative prohibition; whereas the young pigeon whose time has passed will never return to its state of fitness.
The wording of the Mishnah: "Torin shelo higia zemanan, u'venei yonah she'avar zemanan, shehikrivan bachutz - patur" - Turtledoves that have not yet reached their maturity, and young pigeons that have already reached maturity and are no longer fit for a sacrifice, one who sacrifices them outside the boundaries is exempt from kares, for even if he had brought them inside - he would have had to take them down from the Altar.
"Rabbi Shimon omer: Benei yonah she'avar zemanan - patur, vetorin shelo higia zemanan - belo saaseh" - The young pigeons that have matured are forever invalid, and one who sacrifices them outside is exempt; but the turtledove which cannot be brought now, but if he had waited until it matured it could be brought, one who sacrifices it now transgresses the general prohibition in Deuteronomy 12, a negative commandment.
The third case - an animal and its offspring, and one whose time has not yet come:
This case includes two matters. The first is "oso v'es beno" - the prohibition against slaughtering a mother and its offspring, whether a cow, goat, or sheep, on the same day: If he slaughtered the animal today, he cannot slaughter its mother on the same day, and similarly, if he slaughtered an animal that has an offspring, he cannot slaughter its offspring on the same day. Even though the wording of the verse "oso v'es beno" sounds like masculine language, the Ramban explains that the verse is speaking of species - cows, goats, and sheep - and the word for a species is masculine, but in practice, it is referring exclusively to female mothers. The prohibition is to slaughter a mother and its offspring, male or female, on the same day: One has permission to slaughter the mother or the offspring, but once one is slaughtered - the second is invalid.
The second matter is mechusar zeman - an animal whose proper time has not yet arrived. The verse explicitly requires that an animal not be brought during the first seven days of its life: "When a bull, or a sheep, or a goat is born - it shall be seven days under its mother, and from the eighth day and onward it shall be accepted for an offering." From the eighth day onward it is fit for a sacrifice, and during the first seven days it is not. The derivation connects this verse to the preceding verse: Even though the preceding verse explicitly prohibits only the slaughtering of the mother and its offspring on the same day, the juxtaposition of the verses teaches that just as the animal brought during the first seven days of its life is unfit for a sacrifice even after the fact, so too the second of the mother and offspring slaughtered on the same day is unfit even after the fact.
It is worth noting that "mechusar zeman" refers to two separate things: an animal that has not reached its proper time, its eighth day, or a person who has not reached their proper time to bring their sacrifice - such as the zav who is waiting for the eighth day, or the postpartum woman who is waiting for the forty-first day after giving birth to a son. One who brings it before its time does not fulfill his obligation even after the fact, and we will expand on this matter in the next Mishnah.
In both of these matters, had he waited - until the next day to slaughter the mother or the offspring, or until the eighth day to bring the offspring - the sacrifice would have been valid, and therefore Rabbi Shimon argues regarding them that they carry a general negative prohibition. The wording of the Mishnah: "Oso v'es beno u'mechusar zeman, shehikrivan bachutz - patur" - Whether the animal is early, before its eighth day, or whether the person is early and has not reached his fit time, he is exempt from kares, for it would have been invalidated anyway had it gone up on the Altar inside. "Rabbi Shimon omer: harei zeh belo saaseh" - Since if he had waited it would be valid, one who sacrifices it now transgresses the general negative prohibition.
And in conclusion, the Mishnah formulates the rule: "Sherabbi Shimon omer: kol shehu ra'ui lavo le'achar zeman - harei zeh belo saaseh ve'ein bo kares" - Any animal that is fit to be brought at a later time, there is a general prohibition from Deuteronomy 12 for sacrificing it outside, but there is no kares of Leviticus 17 for it. "Vachachamim omrim: kol she'ein bo kares - ein bo lo saaseh" - Since there is no liability for kares here, the general prohibition does not apply either. And the halachah follows the Sages, and not Rabbi Shimon.