We are studying Mishnah 5 in the seventh chapter of Maseches Terumos. It is a wonderful Mishnah, but it demands full concentration and cannot be learned absent-mindedly. Its subject is doubts that arise regarding Terumah. Let us preface that our entire discussion here revolves around Terumah that is rabbinic in origin, and it must be so, since we are about to rely on the principle 'safek d'rabbanan l'kula' - that in a case of doubt and uncertainty in a rabbinic matter we rule leniently.
Indeed, according to many opinions, as was brought in the introduction to Maseches Terumos, it is quite possible that even in the time of the Mishnah the mitzvah of separating Terumah was only rabbinic, since the majority of the Jewish people were not in Eretz Yisrael, the Yovel had not been reinstituted, and the like. Either way, our Mishnah is to be understood exclusively in the context of rabbinic Terumah.
The first case: a se'ah that fell into one of two baskets:
The Mishnah opens: "Shtei kupos, achas shel Terumah v'achas shel chullin, shenaflah se'ah shel Terumah l'toch achas mehen v'ein yadua l'eizo mehen naflah" - before us are two containers: one holds Terumah and the second holds chullin. A se'ah of Terumah fell into one of them, and it is not known into which of them it fell.
To this the Mishnah answers: "Harei ani omer: l'toch shel Terumah naflah" - we are permitted to assume that the Terumah fell into the basket of Terumah. In other words, before the falling there was one container forbidden to be eaten and one container permitted; by law we may assume that the Terumah that fell went into the existing container of Terumah, and consequently nothing has changed: the forbidden one remains forbidden and the permitted one remains permitted.
The principle of 'teliyah':
The guiding principle here is 'safek d'rabbanan l'kula': when a doubt arises in a rabbinic matter - and here we are dealing with rabbinic Terumah - we may rule leniently. This leniency is called 'teliyah', and it means attributing and assigning: we attribute the Terumah that fell to the existing basket of Terumah.
This is not a blanket license to attribute the falling to whichever container is more convenient and more lenient. For example: if we had two containers before us, one holding ten units of chullin and the second holding fifty units of chullin, and Terumah fell into one of them - we are not permitted to say: "Better that we attribute it to the small one, for then I will be left with fifty units to eat, whereas if it fell into the fifty I will be left with only ten." Arbitrary attribution of this sort is forbidden.
The objection to this is termed "mah chazis", whose literal meaning is: what did you see? On the strength of what mechanism did you see fit to choose one over the other arbitrarily? Teliyah was permitted only where one container is forbidden and one container is permitted, in a manner that after the attribution nothing has changed: the permitted remains permitted and the forbidden remains forbidden. But to attribute arbitrarily where both containers are equally forbidden or equally permitted - that is not allowed.
The cases in which one may attribute:
Terumah alongside chullin, ma'aser sheni or ma'aser rishon: One may say that the Terumah fell into the basket of Terumah and not into the basket of chullin or ma'aser, since right now one is permitted and one is forbidden.
Terumah gedolah, terumas ma'aser or meduma (a mixture of Terumah and chullin) alongside pure chullin: Here too one may attribute the Terumah that fell to that same basket of terumas ma'aser, meduma or terumah gedolah, since one remains permitted as it was and one remains forbidden as it was.
Two baskets of Terumah belonging to a kohen, one pure and one tamei: If Terumah that is tamei fell into one of them and it is not known into which, the kohen may attribute it to the basket of tamei Terumah - for previously he could not eat it and now too he cannot, while the basket of pure Terumah which he was able to eat from remains permitted.
This is a rule in every rabbinic doubt: we rule leniently and attribute it to one of the two containers, provided that one was permitted all along and one was forbidden, and things remain exactly as they were.
Is nullification by a majority also required?
Another interesting point emerges in the Gemara: does the permitted vessel, the vessel of chullin, need to contain a majority of chullin even after the Terumah has fallen in? For example: the chullin basket contains only half a se'ah of grain, the second basket contains Terumah, and the Terumah that fell was a full se'ah. According to the possibility that the Terumah - which is a rabbinic prohibition - fell into the chullin basket, there is no majority of chullin there: one part Terumah against half a part chullin, so the majority is Terumah.
The question, then, is whether we may still safely assume that the Terumah fell into the Terumah vessel and the chullin remains permitted, or whether in such a case we must know that even in the "worst case scenario" there was nullification here, meaning a majority of chullin that nullifies the Terumah.
(And if you ask: surely if there was half a se'ah here and a se'ah and a half fell in, it would be evident in the mixture that more had fallen in. The answer is that after the fall, unknown quantities were lost - some spilled and some were eaten - and there is no way to know how much fell in to begin with.)
There is a dispute about this: Reish Lakish holds that nullification is also required, while Rabbi Yochanan holds that it is not necessary. And the halachah follows Rabbi Yochanan, that no nullification is needed. The principle of 'a doubt in a rabbinic matter is decided leniently' suffices, and even if in fact the forbidden Terumah fell into the chullin vessel so that a majority of Terumah is found there - it makes no difference. We attribute it to the second vessel and eat the entire chullin vessel without restriction.
The second case: two baskets that became mixed up:
The Mishnah now moves to an entirely new case: two vessels are before us, one of chullin and one of Terumah, and they got shuffled and mixed up with one another until it is no longer known which of them is the basket of Terumah and which is the basket of chullin.
The law in this case, and one must listen carefully so as not to get confused: both vessels are now treated stringently. We must be concerned that each one of them may be the Terumah, and both of them carry the rabbinic restrictions of Terumah. We will return to the question of why this law differs from the previous case.
The Mishnah continues: if a person ate from one of the vessels - for example a Yisrael who is not a kohen, who by strict law was forbidden to eat from something that might be Terumah - what is his obligation? "Patur" - he is completely exempt.
The reason: with regard to robbing the kohen of his money - perhaps he robbed him and perhaps he did not, perhaps he ate the kohen's Terumah and perhaps he did not, and we will never know. And it is a general rule in monetary obligations that "the one who wishes to extract from his fellow bears the burden of proof": the burden of proof rests on the kohen to prove that this person ate Terumah. And since the kohen cannot prove it, once everything has become mixed up, the one who ate owes him nothing.
However, the Mishnah states simply "patur," which implies that not only is the non-kohen who ate exempt from monetary compensation to the kohen, but he also does not need to pay the principal and the fifth for atonement. This requires explanation, and it appears that for some reason the rules of the principal and the fifth - the rules of atonement - follow the rules of monetary compensation in a case of doubt.
But this is not at all clear. One could raise a strong objection and say that these are two separate matters: even if there is no monetary compensation to the kohen here, personal atonement is still required, and the formula for that is paying the principal and the fifth. According to this, he should have been obligated in the principal and the fifth.
To illustrate the distinction between money and atonement:
A person whose father is not a kohen is likewise not a kohen. Suppose his mother grew up as the daughter of a kohen, since her father was a kohen, but she married his father, who was not a kohen. Consequently he is not a kohen and may not eat Terumah, and if he did eat it, then under ordinary circumstances he must repay the kohen for what he ate: the principal, and not merely compensation for what he ate but an added fifth as well. The payment is made from properly tithed chullin that is fit to be eaten, and it becomes Terumah.
Now what is the law if he inherited Terumah from his mother's father? The Terumah belongs to him by full legal right; it was never taken from any kohen, and he has no obligation whatsoever to return it to a kohen. True, there is not much he can do with it - he may sell it to another kohen, but he may not eat it or derive benefit from it, since he is not a kohen. And if he did eat it: from the standpoint of monetary compensation there is no one to compensate, since he himself absorbed the loss of the value of the Terumah, and a person does not compensate himself. Even so, the law remains that he must pay principal and a fifth - when he ate it unintentionally and without intent - in order to receive his atonement.
If that is so, it is hard to understand why in our Mishnah, in the case of a person who ate from one of two vessels that are of doubtful Terumah status, there is no obligation at all and he is entirely exempt. From the monetary standpoint it is understandable - "the one who wishes to extract from his fellow bears the burden of proof", and the kohen cannot prove that the man ate what belonged to him. But from the standpoint of the atonement component, the principal and the fifth, he should seemingly still have to pay, whereas the Mishnah says he does not.
It is possible that indeed he need do nothing, since the doubt and the rules governing a doubtful case of eating Terumah are judged according to the principle of "the one who wishes to extract from his fellow bears the burden of proof". And it is possible that this is not so, and the Mishnah in fact holds that he must pay principal and a fifth, except that this principal and fifth - which the Mishnah did not mention - he may sell to a kohen, since he owes money to no kohen, yet the obligation still rests upon him to take chullin and turn it into Terumah. The matter is not settled, and it is a dispute among the Rishonim.
The law of the second basket:
The Mishnah continues: "V'hasheniyah" - the second basket, which is of doubtful Terumah and doubtful chullin status and was not eaten - "noheig bah biTerumah", one must treat it as Terumah with all of its stringencies. And it must be emphasized, as stated above: this is not because the first basket was eaten. Even before either of the vessels was eaten, both of them were of doubtful Terumah status, and both carried the stringencies on account of the possibility that they were Terumah. Nothing has changed, and that is the point of the Mishnah.
The Mishnah adds here: "v'chayeves b'challah". Beyond the stringency stemming from the possibility that this is Terumah, one must also be stringent because of the possibility that it is chullin. And what is the stringency in chullin? If we are dealing with grain that was ground into flour and it is chullin, then when one makes dough from it in the required measure, one must take a separate portion from it - the separation of challah - and give it to a kohen. The obligation of challah applies to chullin alone, and there is no separation of challah from Terumah.
It emerges that if he made flour from this basket of wheat, which is of doubtful Terumah and doubtful chullin status, one must be stringent because of the possibility of Terumah - that no non-kohen Israelite may eat from it; and one must also be stringent because of the possibility of chullin - that a kohen who makes dough from this flour must separate challah, even though he may eat it himself. And just as a kohen who buys flour in a store must separate challah when he bakes, even though the challah is eaten by him, so too here: the obligation to separate remains in force.
This is the view of Rabbi Meir: we are stringent regarding Terumah - to give it to a kohen, and we are stringent regarding chullin - to separate challah. Rabbi Yosei, however, exempts it. In his opinion, although it is correct to be stringent out of doubt in both directions, he has an entirely separate approach: medumah, a mixture of chullin and Terumah, is exempt from the separation of challah. And in the scenario before us, two baskets that became intermingled, one Terumah and one chullin - each of them takes on the status of medumah, and is therefore exempt from challah.
And if you will ask: there is no mixture here at all, since each of them is entirely chullin or entirely Terumah; why should this be called medumah? That is a good question. It would appear that according to Rabbi Yosei's approach, combining the two together creates a mixture: if you were to place both baskets inside one large box, then inside that box there is a mixture - part of it chullin and part of it Terumah, and it is not known which is which.
And in truth this is the case with every medumah mixture. If grapes became intermingled, half of them chullin and half of them Terumah, then any single grape taken from the mixture is entirely chullin or entirely Terumah - after all, it is a single grape, and it came either from the Terumah or from the chullin at the time they became intermingled. Even so, that single grape is treated as medumah, because it is liable to be either one. The same applies here: each basket is entirely Terumah or entirely chullin, and nonetheless it takes on the status of medumah, and a medumah mixture, in Rabbi Yosei's opinion, is exempt from challah. It is worth noting that there are Tannaim who hold that a medumah mixture is nevertheless obligated in the separation of challah.
Someone else ate the second, and one person ate both:
The Mishnah continues: if, after the first basket was eaten, another person came and ate the second basket, which is likewise of doubtful status, possibly chullin and possibly Terumah - he too is exempt. The reason is the same: there is no proof that what he ate was Terumah, and therefore he bears no monetary obligation, and apparently he also has no obligation of restitution for the sake of atonement. And according to those who hold that he does bear such an obligation - he adds the principal and a fifth from chullin and sells them to a kohen.
"Aval achal echad es sh'teihen" - if one person ate both baskets, he certainly ate Terumah, since one of them contained Terumah and the other chullin, and the only uncertainty is which was which. And the law is: "meshalem k'ketanah shebish'teihen" - he pays principal and a fifth according to the measure of the smaller of the two baskets. For "the one who seeks to extract from his fellow bears the burden of proof," and the burden of proof rests on the kohen; and the most he can prove is the amount of the smaller basket. If the smaller one held ten units and the larger one twenty, perhaps the larger was the Terumah - but he certainly ate at least ten units of Terumah. Therefore he pays principal and a fifth according to the measure of the smaller basket, since he certainly ate that amount of Terumah.