Shevuos, Chapter 8, Mishnah 6 - the final mishnah of Maseches Shevuos. This mishnah continues the line of the previous mishnayos, which dealt with cases where a person swore falsely: sometimes the oath obligates him in a korban and sometimes it does not, and everything depends on whether or not he exempted himself from monetary responsibility through his oath.
The borrower's claim: "eini yodea mah atah sach":
The owner of the animal comes to the one guarding it and asks him: "Where is my ox?" (continuing the example used in the previous mishnayos, of one who lent his friend an axe and demands of him: "Where is my axe?"). The other replies: "eini yodea mah atah sach" - "I have no idea what you are talking about," meaning, I never received anything from you at all. And the reality was that the ox died, or was injured, or was taken captive, or was stolen, or was lost - cases in which a borrower is liable in all of them. The owner of the animal said to him "mashbia ani alecha" - "I impose an oath upon you" - and he answered "amen" - he is obligated to bring a korban shevuah, since with the claim of "I have no idea what you are talking about" he exempted himself from every form of responsibility.
A paid guardian and a renter - switching one exemption for another and one liability for another:
The mishnah goes on to discuss one who said this "l'nosei sachar u'l'socher" - to a paid guardian and to a renter. These are exempt in cases of unavoidable accident - if the animal died, was injured, or was taken captive - and are liable for theft and loss. And these are the cases:
He claimed "meis" - it died - and in reality it was injured or taken captive.
He claimed "nishbar" - it was injured - and in reality it died or was taken captive.
He claimed "nishbah" - it was taken captive - and in reality it died or was injured.
He claimed "nignav" - it was stolen - and in reality it was lost.
He claimed "avad" - it was lost - and in reality it was stolen.
In all of these, if the owner said to him "I impose an oath upon you" and he answered "amen" - he is exempt. In the first three he was exempt both according to his claim and according to the reality, and in the last two he was liable either way. It emerges that the oath did not serve to remove any monetary responsibility from him, and therefore he is exempt from a korban shevuah.
He claimed an unavoidable accident and the reality was theft or loss - liable:
He claimed "meis o nishbar o nishbah" - it died or was injured or was taken captive - for which a paid guardian and a renter are exempt, "v'hu shenignav o avad" - but in reality it was stolen or lost, for which they are liable - the owner said "I impose an oath upon you," and he answered "amen" - he is liable. For in reality he was obligated, and with the claim of an unavoidable accident he sought to exempt himself through his oath.
He claimed theft or loss and the reality was an unavoidable accident - exempt:
He claimed "avad o nignav" - it was lost or stolen - for which a paid guardian and a renter are liable, "v'hu shemeis o nishbar o nishbah" - but in reality an unavoidable accident occurred and he is exempt - the owner said "I impose an oath upon you," and he answered "amen" - he is exempt, since through his oath he obligated himself at a time when in truth he was exempt.
"Zeh ha'klal":
From liability to liability - he is liable according to his claim and liable according to the actual facts - exempt.
From exemption to exemption - he is exempt according to his claim and exempt according to the actual facts - exempt.
From exemption to liability - in fact he was exempt, and his claim makes him liable - exempt, since by his oath he did not exempt himself at all.
From liability to exemption - in fact he was liable, and he made a claim that exempts him - liable.
The Mishnah formulates this very same principle in another way: "Zeh haklal: kol hanishba lehakel al atzmo - chayav; lehachmir al atzmo - patur" - this is the rule: whoever swears in a way that lightens his own obligation is liable, and whoever swears in a way that makes it heavier for himself is exempt. Any oath through which a person lightens the obligation resting upon him obligates him in the offering for a false oath, whereas an oath through which he makes matters heavier for himself, or even leaves things exactly as they were, carries no obligation to bring the offering.
In summary: in the Mishnah that closes the tractate we learned the rule that determines the obligation to bring the offering in the case of the oath of the watchmen: a borrower who denied everything exempted himself from all responsibility and is therefore liable; a paid watchman or a renter who substituted one unavoidable accident for another, or theft for loss, is exempt, since he did not change his financial status; if he claimed an unavoidable accident in place of theft or loss, he is liable; and if he claimed theft or loss in place of an unavoidable accident, he is exempt. And this is the rule: whoever swears in a way that lightens his own obligation is liable, and whoever swears in a way that makes it heavier for himself is exempt.
Thank you for joining us for Maseches Shevuos. On December 25th we will change direction and join the international Mishnah Yomit cycle, which is beginning a new cycle with Maseches Berachos, and we look forward to your joining us for the study of all of Shas, im yirtzeh Hashem. Until December 25th we will share with you some of our favorite mishnayos in Shas along with a few thoughts about them.