Mishnah 6 in chapter 3 of Tractate Sanhedrin is divided into two parts: the first part deals with the manner in which the court receives testimony from the witnesses, and the second part deals with the method of reaching a decision based on the majority of the judges.
We will preface with a brief introduction: generally, two witnesses are required to verify what occurred. However, as previously mentioned, there is an exception to this rule enacted by the Sages regarding loans. The Sages established that cross-examination is not required for testimony on a loan, for if the witnesses were required to confirm the exact details of the time and place of the loan, it would be difficult for the lender to collect his debt, and eventually, people would hesitate to lend money. After all, a loan is an act of kindness - a person lends his money for free - and if he fears he will not get it back, he will refrain from doing so. Our Mishnah does deal with a loan situation, but as implied by it, cross-examination is required according to the letter of the law.
"Keitzad bodkin et ha'edim" - how do they examine the witnesses:
The Mishnah describes the order of receiving and verifying the testimony:
"Hayu machnisin otan" - they would bring the witnesses into the court. The people present are the judges, the litigants, and the witnesses, and sometimes even an audience of bystanders.
"Ume'ayemin aleyhen" - in front of all those present, they would strike fear into the witnesses and clarify for them the severity of the act: giving false testimony is one of the most severe transgressions, a false witness is disgraced in this world and in the World to Come, he is considered by people to be a lowly and unreliable person, and thus destroys his good name.
"Umotzi'in et kol ha'adam lachutz, umeshayarin et hagadol shebahen" - after the warning, they would send everyone outside, and leave the greatest among them. They would leave the most senior witness, whether in status or in years, whose testimony is collected first.
It is worth noting that there are differences in the versions of the Mishnah regarding exactly who leaves. The other witnesses certainly leave, and it certainly does not refer to the judges and the litigants: the judges must be present to conduct the examination, meaning the interrogation, and the litigants are present because it is much more likely that the witness will deliver honest testimony when he is required to look into their eyes, and thus he will be forced to tell the truth. The question is whether they also remove the audience watching from the sidelines. According to one version, there is an advantage in leaving them, since an audience carefully scrutinizing the witness's words forces him to be even more exact with the truth, but this is not the version before us.
Afterward, the judges turn to the most senior witness and say to him: "Emor, keitzad atah yodea shezeh chayav lazeh" - tell us, how do you know that Reuven owes money to Shimon, and what is your testimony.
The Mishnah lists two answers that are ineffective:
"Hu amar li sha'ani chayav lo" - the witness testifies that Reuven himself told him: 'I owe Shimon money'.
"Ish peloni amar li shehu chayav lo" - the witness testifies that he heard from a third person, Levi, who everyone knows to be an honest person who would never tell a lie, and Levi confirmed to him that he knows for certain that Reuven owes Shimon money.
In both cases, the Mishnah states: "Lo amar klum" - this is not effective testimony. The second case is clear: hearsay evidence is not accepted. The witness heard from a third party that there was a debt, and even though that third party is not suspected of lying, the court insists on receiving first-hand testimony and not hearsay. However, even in the first case, where the witness reports that the defendant admitted it to him, this is not confirmation that it is true, as the defendant might have said it for many reasons: perhaps he wanted to convince people that he has no money so they would not knock on his door, and he said, "I owe money to someone else first, and I cannot right now"; perhaps he did not pay attention and did not check his records; and perhaps he said it just to silence those approaching him. Either way, the admission itself is not sufficient to obligate him to pay.
Therefore, the Mishnah continues and states what the witness must say: "Ad she'yomar befaneynu hodah lo shehu chayav lo matayim" - the defendant said formally 'you are my witnesses', and the witness was one of them, and added: 'I hereby confirm before you that I owe him two hundred zuz'. Such a formal admission, in which the defendant appointed people to be his witnesses and called upon them to testify about it, teaches that he understood his words obligate him and that he meant them, and therefore he will be obligated based on it. It is understood that if the witness says, "I saw the loan taking place on such-and-such day and in such-and-such place", his testimony is obligating; and the novel point is that even when he does not know first-hand but only "second-hand", if it was told to him by the defendant formally - "I say to you as my witnesses that I admit before you that I owe this money, so that you will know it formally" - this is admissible testimony.
And afterward, "machnisin et hasheni ubodkin oto" - they remove the first witness, bring in the second, and ask him the same questions in the same way. "Im nimtse'u divreyhem mechuvanim" - if the two testimonies can be reconciled, meaning they both deliver more or less the same story, then "nos'in venotnin badavar": the judges discuss and weigh whether the testimony is sufficient, whether to obligate the defendant to pay, and so on. If they ruled yes - yes, and if they ruled no - no. Thus far is the first part of the Mishnah.
Majority Decision:
The second part of the Mishnah deals with the application of the rule to follow the majority. In a beis din of three, two opinions are required to constitute a majority, whether to hold liable or to acquit:
"Shenayim omrim zakai ve'echad omer chayav" - he is acquitted. This is two against one, and we follow the majority.
"Shenayim omrim chayav ve'echad omer zakai" - he is liable, and we rule according to the opinion that holds him liable.
This is a regular majority, unlike what we saw earlier regarding capital cases. In regular monetary cases, a simple majority is sufficient.
But what is the halachah when not all three judges express their opinion? Regarding this, the Mishnah says: "Echad omer zakai ve'echad omer chayav, va'afilu shenayim mezakin o shenayim mechayevin ve'echad omer eini yodea" - one says he is acquitted and one says he is liable, or even if two acquit or two hold him liable and one says "I do not know." Even though there are two out of three who acquit or hold him liable, the statement of the third judge that he does not know is worse in a certain sense than a decision one way or the other, since it means that the judge is not functioning as a judge. We are thus left with a beis din of only two, and that is not enough.
The solution is "yosifu hadayanim" - they add judges to the beis din. They specifically add two and not one, and now there are five judges sitting on the beis din. The hope is that the two additional judges will ask insightful questions and add perspectives to the discussion, so that a clear answer will be reached and even the one who was unsure will come to a decision. Afterward, another vote is taken among the five of them, and we follow the majority: whichever way three of them say, that is what will be established.
If two say "I do not know," and there are three remaining who hold him liable, he can be ruled liable, since there is a beis din of three ruling. But if two hold him liable, two acquit, and the fifth says "I do not know," we are still stuck: there are not three who say the same thing and there is no majority. In such a case, another two are added, making the beis din number seven, and they deliberate again to achieve a majority. And in the unlikely event of three against three and one saying "I do not know," there is again no decision, and another two must be added, and so on.
In summary: In this Mishnah we learned the procedure for examining witnesses - bringing them in, instilling fear in them, sending out the bystanders, and leaving the greatest of the witnesses; the rule that we do not accept hearsay testimony, nor even a casual admission by the defendant, but only a formal admission in front of witnesses; and the need for consistency between the words of the two witnesses as a condition for the judges' deliberation. We also learned the method of majority decision in monetary cases, and the law when one of the judges says "I do not know" - that two judges are then added, and they deliberate anew until a clear majority is reached.