We continue in the first chapter of tractate Sanhedrin and reach the Mishnah dealing with a court of twenty-three. Only one Mishnah was dedicated to it, because this court is intended for one specific matter: capital cases, situations in which a person is liable to be put to death. The Mishnah establishes this fact in its first four words, and the entire rest of the Mishnah is dedicated to a second point - that this very same law applies when an animal is going to be put to death. The Mishnah will detail the causes for which an animal is liable to receive the death penalty by a court, and it establishes that it, too, is judged in the exact same manner: by a court of twenty-three, with witnesses and so on, exactly as is done for a person. We will learn this from the verses, as we will see in the text.
"Dinei nefashos be'esrim usheloshah":
Court proceedings that involve the possibility of the death penalty require a court of twenty-three. We will learn the source of the number twenty-three in the next Mishnah later in the chapter, God willing.
"Harovea vehanirva":
These expressions refer to animals and not humans, and the intention is an act of bestiality. "Harovea" - a male animal, "vehanirva" - a female animal. When a man or a woman mates with an animal, an inconceivable act, the death penalty applies not only to the person but also to the animal. The execution of the animal, just like the execution of the person, requires a court of twenty-three.
The source for this is in the verses:
"Vehargata es ha'ishah ve'es habehemah" - the verse links together the execution of the woman and the execution of the animal, and from here we see that the law of the Rovea requires a court of twenty-three.
"Ve'es habehemah taharogu" - this is only a partial quote of the full verse, which deals with the execution of a man: "And a man who lies with an animal shall be put to death" - this is the person, "and you shall kill the animal" - and this is the animal. Here, too, a court of twenty-three is required, both for him and for the animal.
"Shor haniskal be'esrim usheloshah":
An ox that gored and killed a person is sentenced to death, provided it was verified in a court of twenty-three that this indeed occurred. As it is stated: "Hashor yisakel vegam be'alav yumas". If the verse were read simply, it would mean that just as the ox is stoned, so too its owner is put to death. However, the Gemara elsewhere rejects this, and learns from another verse: "He shall surely be put to death, the striker is a murderer" - only a person who strikes his fellow and kills him incurs the death penalty, but when the person himself did not cause the death but rather his property did, its owner is not executed. If so, linking the person and the animal together comes to teach about the manner of the trial: just as a person is judged in a court of twenty-three, so too an ox that is to be stoned - the animal whose stoning comes about because it killed a person - is judged in a court of twenty-three.
It is worth noting that these matters do not apply only to oxen. The law of an ox that is stoned applies equally to any animal that killed a person. The Gemara brings an incident of a rooster that pecked at the fontanelle of a baby - the soft part of his skull - and the baby died, and they executed the rooster. The Torah used an ox merely as an example.
Privately Owned Wild Animals:
Furthermore: aside from domesticated animals that have owners, even a person who owns a wild animal - the same law applies. The wild animals listed here are the six that are always considered inherently forewarned, the animals that are perpetually dangerous:
"Haze'ev" - the wolf.
"Veha'ari" - and the lion.
"Vehadov" - and the bear.
"Vehanamer" - and the leopard.
"Vehabardelas" - the Rosh and the Rambam dispute its identification. Many explain that it is the hyena, although etymologically it is more likely referring to the cheetah. Either way, it is a dangerous animal.
"Vehanachash" - and the snake.
And regarding all of them, the Mishnah rules: "Mitasan be'esrim usheloshah" - their death is judged by twenty-three.
The foundation of this is that these animals are considered tamed creatures, meaning they can be domesticated. A person who keeps a lion as a pet, and that lion goes out and kills a person, cannot exempt himself by claiming, "I thought it was tamed." The lion is liable to death for killing a person, and since it is the person's property, this property must undergo the legal process like any ox that is stoned. The novelty is that although these are dangerous animals, and one might have thought that a person has no interest at all in domesticating them and that the rule would not apply to them - they too are included. For according to all opinions, a standard wild animal - a bear or a lion - that comes out of the bushes and kills a person, involves no doubt and requires no Torah adjudication, and the first person to kill it does a great favor to the public, as it belongs to no one and is ownerless. But these six animals, when owned by a person, are his property, and therefore their law is to be judged in a court of twenty-three.
The dispute among the Tana'im:
Rabbi Eliezer: "Kol hakodem lehorgan zachah" - whoever is first to kill them acquires merit. There is no need for a court of twenty-three. If a neighbor had a lion, a bear, or a leopard, and the animal went out and killed a person, whoever hastens to kill it acquires merit and has the privilege and virtue in doing so, for he is saving the public. His reasoning: since it became clear that these animals are killers, it is revealed retroactively that they are not tame creatures and are not domesticated but rather wild animals. Consequently, a person has no ownership rights over them, they are not his property, and since they are not privately owned, anyone who kills them does the right thing and acquires merit.
Rabbi Akiva: "Mitasan be'esrim usheloshah" - their death is judged by twenty-three. They must be sentenced to death in a court of twenty-three. Ostensibly, this is the opinion of the Tanna Kamma, as they both stated twenty-three for a privately owned animal, but Rabbi Akiva differentiates between the first five dangerous mammals (wolf, lion, bear, leopard, and bardelas) and the snake. The snake, in his opinion, is not capable of domestication at all, it is a reptile and cannot be tamed, and it is always dangerous - and therefore he agrees regarding it that whoever is first to kill it acquires merit.
One must be careful of a common mistake: many times when it is said "whoever is first acquires," the meaning is that the first person gets to acquire the item, keep it for himself, and benefit from it. That is not the simple meaning here. An ox that is stoned and all these animals that are to be killed are forbidden from benefit, and no good may be derived from them. The intention is not that the winner may make a rug from the lion's skin. The lion must be killed and its carcass may not be utilized - but it is a merit for the one who acts first.
Halachah:
Just as a court of twenty-three is required to execute a death penalty on a person - and later in the tractate we will deal more and more with death penalties and the immense difficulty of actually executing a person - so too is the case in principle with animals. The Rambam, interestingly, seems to rule like Rabbi Akiva: privately owned animals, even a lion and the like, require a court of twenty-three, whereas a snake does not require it. This ruling is puzzling, and the Raavad disagrees with it. Therefore, the manner of judging a snake is debated even in the Shulchan Aruch. In any event, fundamentally the halachah is that an animal that killed is liable to death, but the matter requires a court of twenty-three.