Negaim, Chapter 3, Mishnah 2. Our chapter turns from the appearance of the nega itself to the people involved in it: who is capable of contracting tzara'as at all, who is qualified to inspect the mark, and how the examination is conducted when more than one nega is present. The Mishnah begins with the broadest possible statement and immediately carves out its exceptions.
"Hakol mitam'in binega'im, chutz min ovdei kochavim v'ger toshav." Everyone is susceptible to the tumah of nega'im, with two exceptions. One is a full idolater, a non-Jew in every sense. The second is a ger toshav, a resident alien who has not accepted the mitzvos of the Torah but has undertaken to observe the seven mitzvos of bnei Noach. According to one of the Rambam's positions, this undertaking requires a formal acceptance before beis din, yet even so it does not make him a Jew. Neither of these two is ever rendered tamei by tzara'as.
The Rav points out where the novelty of the ruling lies. One might have assumed that a katan, a minor, is likewise excluded, since one verse speaks of an "ish tzaru'a," a man afflicted, which sounds like an adult. The Mishnah teaches otherwise, for another verse says "adam ki yihyeh b'or besaro," and the word "adam" is all inclusive. Every member of Klal Yisroel is included in these laws, a child no less than an adult.
Who is qualified to look
"Hakol ksheirim", all are qualified, "liros es hanega'im", to inspect nega'im; "ela shehatumah v'hataharah bidei kohen", except that pronouncing a person tamei or tahor belongs to a kohen alone. There is real practicality in this halacha. The Rambam sets a high bar for a kohen's expertise: before he may issue rulings he has to have thoroughly mastered the whole range of shades and hues a nega can take on. Suppose, then, that the only kohen at hand never acquired such training. The Mishnah opens a door: any Jew who is a talmid chacham and is fluent in these halachos may carry out the inspection, and the kohen supplies the verdict aloud. The Rambam's stringent requirement was aimed at a kohen who means to decide the case entirely by himself, with no scholar beside him. Where the available kohen is unlearned, the talmid chacham does the looking at his side.
The braisa in Toras Kohanim refers to such a kohen as a shoteh. Many mefarshim explain that this is not to be taken literally. He is neither a fool nor incompetent, and he certainly must understand enough to follow what is being told to him. He is called a shoteh only in comparison to the talmid chacham who is doing the actual determination.
"V'omrim lo, 'Emor tamei,' v'hu omer, 'Tamei.' 'Emor tahor,' v'hu omer, 'Tahor.'" The talmid chacham instructs him: say the word tamei, and he says tamei; say the word tahor, and he says tahor. The declaration itself must come out of the kohen's mouth, even though the halachic analysis was not his. Some of the mefarshim add that the kohen must also look at the nega himself. Even though he does not know how to interpret what he is seeing, he gives it a look, and then the talmid chacham tells him which word to pronounce.
One nega at a time
"Ein ro'in shnei nega'im k'echad." Two nega'im are never examined simultaneously. The kohen brings his ruling on the first mark to a close, and only then does he take up the other one.
The Tiferes Yisroel raises an interesting question here. Why is this not simply an application of the well known principle that we do not perform mitzvos in bundles, ein osin mitzvos chavilos chavilos? He answers that that rule applies where there is tircha, real exertion involved. Lumping such mitzvos together suggests that they are a burden the person wants to be rid of in one stroke. Examining a nega involves no great exertion, so that principle does not apply. Here there is an independent halacha: the kohen must devote his full concentration to the single nega before him.
"Bein b'ish echad uvein bishnei anashim." This holds whether both marks are found on a single individual, or one on each of two individuals. "Ela ro'eh es ha'echad umasgiro umachlito ufotro, v'chozer lasheini." He inspects one nega and arrives at one of three decisions. He may impose hesger, when the color is questionable and the man must be shut away for observation until day seven. He may pronounce him a muchlat, when the indications are already decisive: white hairs sprouting inside the white patch, where hairs that had been dark turned white, or a michyah, a spot of sound flesh within the nega. Such a person is sent beyond the camp to dwell in isolation, and about him the Torah writes "tamei tamei yikra", that he announces his own tumah. Or the kohen may dismiss the matter altogether, deciding there is nothing here to worry about. Having concluded the first case, he goes back and gives that same undivided attention to the other mark, or to the other man.
Nothing new is decided while the week is still running
"Ein masgirin es hamusgar v'lo machlitin es hamuchlat." Picture a man already sitting in hesger, waiting to see what the seventh day will reveal, and while those days are still running a second nega surfaces elsewhere on his skin. We do not impose a fresh hesger upon him before the current week has run its course. The same holds for one who is already a muchlat and is counting his days beyond the camp: should a new nega appear on him bearing decisive signs, we refrain from declaring him muchlat for it while that week is still under way.
"V'lo machlitin es hamusgar v'lo masgirin es hamuchlat." The crossed cases follow the same rule. A muchlat on whom a nega appears during the week that would ordinarily call for hesger is not placed in hesger for it; and a man sitting in hesger on whom a nega appears whose signs are conclusive on the spot is not pronounced muchlat while those days are still running. "Aval bitchilah uv'sof shavu'a." Rulings of this sort are handed down only at the outset, or once the week has reached its end, when the newly appeared nega can be judged together with the seventh day examination of the earlier one.
What stands behind this is the welfare of the metzora himself. Hold off until the seventh day of the hesger or hechlet already in progress, and there is a fair chance that the mark which cropped up along the way will have faded by then, sparing him any additional stretch of waiting. Rule on it immediately, by contrast, and even after the first nega leaves him tahor, even with nothing visible remaining on his skin, he is still bound to complete a full seven days for the second. We have no wish to saddle him with that added hardship, and so the new mark is set aside to be examined when the first term reaches its conclusion.
"Hamasgir masgir, v'hamachlit machlit, masgir ufoter, machlit ufoter." On that permitted occasion, however, the kohen may rule on both together. He may place under hesger one who is already under hesger, giving him another seven days for the new nega. He may declare muchlat one who is already muchlat, for a second nega. He may place him under hesger for one nega and release him as tahor regarding another. And he may declare him muchlat for one nega, so that he sits outside the camp, while releasing him regarding another nega on that very same day.
The Mishnah has thus given us three foundations: that every Jew, adult or child, falls under these laws while a non-Jew and a ger toshav do not; that the examination may be performed by any competent talmid chacham while only a kohen may pronounce the verdict; and that each nega receives the kohen's full and separate attention, with new rulings deferred to the beginning or the close of the seven day period out of consideration for the afflicted person himself.