Menachos, Chapter 13, Mishnah 10 - the second to last mishnah of the tractate. Here we encounter one of the strangest developments in Jewish history: the founding of the Temple of Chonyo and the halachos that apply to it. The Temple of Chonyo was a temple dedicated to Hashem, the God of Israel, but it operated in Egypt. Josephus reports, astonishingly, that the Temple of Chonyo functioned until the year 73 CE - three years after the destruction of the Beis HaMikdash in Jerusalem - and only then did the emperor Vespasian see to its destruction, out of concern that the Jews would rebuild themselves there and operate out of that temple.
How the Temple of Chonyo was founded:
The origin of the Temple of Chonyo is described in a beraisa in Menachos: Shimon HaTzaddik had two sons - Shimi, the older, and Chonyo, the younger. Nevertheless, Shimon HaTzaddik determined that his successor would be Chonyo, as he was the greater of the two. Chonyo refused, since Shimi was two years older than he, and he said that Shimi was the one fit to become Kohen Gadol. But it seems he changed his mind: when Shimi was ready to serve and be trained, Chonyo misled him and instructed him to wear a certain garment and sash, which were in fact women's clothing - a gown, a sash and an apron. He then told the kohanim that Shimi was doing this in order to fulfill a vow he had made to his wife, that he would wear her clothes on the first day of his service as Kohen Gadol. The kohanim sought to kill Shimi; once he explained to them what had happened, they turned against Chonyo, and Chonyo fled for his life to Egypt, to Alexandria.
The largest Jewish community outside Eretz Yisrael was located in Alexandria and its surroundings, and this was the case throughout the entire Second Temple period. There Chonyo established his own rival temple to Hashem, in a place known today as Leontopolis (by its Greek name). The Temple of Chonyo operated for hundreds of years: according to Josephus 343 years, and according to other sources several hundred years. The timeline raises a certain difficulty, since Shimon HaTzaddik lived at the beginning of the Second Temple era; in any event, the Temple of Chonyo functioned for a long time as a kind of parallel temple for the Jews of Egypt.
As for its beginnings, the Baalei HaTosafos suggest that Chonyo's intentions may have been good, and that his original plan was that offerings would be brought in the temple he established on behalf of non-Jews - which is permitted. Either way, the question before us is how halachah in the Second Temple period related to this parallel temple operating in Egypt, and what its status was.
One who vows to bring an olah:
"Harei alai olah" - a person who obligates himself to bring an olah, "yakrivenah baMikdash, v'im hikrivah b'Veis Chonyo - lo yatza". He must bring it in the Beis HaMikdash, and if he offered it in the Temple of Chonyo he has not fulfilled his obligation, and there is nothing surprising in that.
"She'akrivenah b'Veis Chonyo" - his vow was, "I hereby obligate myself to bring an olah, but I intend to bring it in the Temple of Chonyo." The law is "yakrivenah baMikdash, v'im hikrivah b'Veis Chonyo - yatza": the olah is not offered in the Temple of Chonyo but in the Beis HaMikdash, and even so, if he offered it there - he has fulfilled something.
And what exactly has he fulfilled? The Gemara does not understand the mishnah at face value at all. Everyone knows that one may not offer sacrifices outside the Beis HaMikdash, and that doing so even carries the penalty of kareis. You are forced to say that the nature of his vow was this: "I hereby bring an olah, but I do not accept responsibility for it, and if something should happen to the animal - even if it is killed by being slaughtered in the Temple of Chonyo - I will not be obligated to replace it." "Yatza" therefore means that he has discharged his obligation and is no longer required to bring a new offering to the Beis HaMikdash, since his commitment was conditional from the outset upon his bearing no responsibility in the event that the animal was killed or even offered in the Temple of Chonyo.
Rabbi Shimon says: "Ein zu olah" - the vow does not take effect at all. He follows his own approach that we saw in Chapter 12: when a person makes a vow, we do not look only at the beginning of his words but at his words in their entirety through to the end, and if he attached a condition that does not accord with the manner in which offerings are brought - the vow does not take effect, since "he did not pledge in the manner of those who pledge," in the language of the mishnah there. In other words, one who says "I hereby bring an olah in the Temple of Chonyo" has said nothing, and his words carry no obligation whatsoever - just as one who says "I hereby undertake to bring a zebra as an olah" has obligated himself in nothing.
Since bringing an olah in the Temple of Chonyo is not a valid commitment, the matter is meaningless from the start. If he goes and slaughters the animal in the Temple of Chonyo, this is nothing more than the slaughter of an ordinary, non-sacred animal: the animal is not consecrated and there is no consequence to the act, just like one who slaughters an animal in any other place under the sun. The Temple of Chonyo is no more relevant a location than anywhere else, and there is no prohibition in slaughtering an animal there - for it is not an offering, it is not a Beis HaMikdash, and outside the Beis HaMikdash this is not a consecrated animal.
One who vows to be a nazir:
The mishnah continues with a related matter: one who says "Hareini nazir" takes upon himself nezirus. Nezirus is a type of vow, but it is an entire package that includes three basic categories of prohibitions:
Shaving: a prohibition against cutting his hair.
Tumah: a prohibition against becoming impure through contact with a corpse.
Grape products: a prohibition against consuming grapes and anything made from them.
When the days of his nezirus are complete, he must go up to the Beis HaMikdash and bring three types of offerings, and shave his hair - and the hair he shaves from his head is placed under the pot in which the shelamim he brought are cooked. This whole involved procedure is what the Mishnah calls "shaving", and the intention is not merely the cutting of the hair but the entire process bound up with bringing those offerings.
"Hareini nazir" - "I am hereby a nazir". The ruling is "yegalach ba'Mikdash, v'im gilach b'Veis Chonyo - lo yatza" - he shaves in the Beis HaMikdash, and if he shaved in Beis Chonyo he has not fulfilled his obligation. He must complete his nezirus, which is normally thirty days, in the Beis HaMikdash in Jerusalem: to bring his offerings there, to shave his hair there and to burn it under the pot. And if he went to Beis Chonyo in Egypt and sought to discharge his obligation there, it does not count for him, since that is not the Beis HaMikdash; he must go back and start over and bring his offerings in Jerusalem as required, with all the additional consequences that follow from having shaved his hair prematurely.
"She'agalach b'Veis Chonyo" - "that I will shave in Beis Chonyo". His original commitment was: "I am hereby a nazir, and my intention is to complete my nezirus with the shaving and the offerings in Beis Chonyo." The ruling is "yegalach ba'Mikdash, v'im gilach b'Veis Chonyo - yatza" - he shaves in the Beis HaMikdash, but if he shaved in Beis Chonyo he has fulfilled his obligation. That is not the place where this is done and he ought to return to the Beis HaMikdash, and nevertheless, if he went to Beis Chonyo and brought his offerings there and shaved, he has discharged his obligation.
Here too, says the Gemara, the Mishnah cannot be understood at face value. Since everyone knows that offerings are not brought outside the Beis HaMikdash, it is clear that he did not intend nezirus in its technical sense. His intention was this: Beis Chonyo is close to me and the Beis HaMikdash is far from me, and I do not have it in me to drag myself all the way to Jerusalem; therefore I do not wish to be an actual nazir, but rather to take certain forms of self-denial upon myself. Instead of swearing off meat on Fridays, he undertook to abstain from grape products like a nazir, from haircuts and from corpse tumah for thirty days, and to conclude the process by going to Beis Chonyo. It is indeed a strange thing to do, but if he did as he said, he has fulfilled his obligation, since all he vowed was a general act of self-denial, and that came to an end thirty days later, when he went to Beis Chonyo and cut his hair.
Rabbi Shimon says as he did earlier: since he committed himself to be a nazir and to complete his nezirus in Beis Chonyo - which is nothing at all - his vow never takes effect to begin with. He is not a nazir, and he may do as he pleases and even shave his hair, since he is not bound by anything. This is the same principle of Rabbi Shimon that we saw in chapter twelve. The halachah, however, does not follow Rabbi Shimon but the first Tanna, both there and here.
The kohanim who served in Beis Chonyo:
The Mishnah goes on to discuss the status of the kohanim - Jews who served in Beis Chonyo. The Sages penalized them: any kohen who performed a service in Beis Chonyo, meaning sprinkling blood on the altar and the like, is permanently disqualified from serving in the Beis HaMikdash. Beyond all the ramifications of offering sacrifices outside the Beis HaMikdash, even if he repented, and even if he acted inadvertently and did not know and thought it was permitted, it makes no difference. And this does not refer to slaughtering, which is permitted, but to the services beyond that.
The Mishnah adds: "v'ein tzarich lomar l'davar acher" - and it goes without saying regarding "another matter". The phrase "davar acher" is used in the Mishnah as a euphemism for idolatry, and sometimes for a pig; here, of course, idolatry is meant. That is to say, it goes without saying that a kohen who served as a sort of priest and performed any service in a temple of idolatry is permanently barred from serving in the Beis HaMikdash. And there is an explicit source for this, as it says in Melachim II: "But the priests of the high places did not ascend to the altar of Hashem in Jerusalem" - those Jews who served at altars of idolatry outside Jerusalem may not go up to the Beis HaMikdash in Jerusalem and serve there; "but they ate matzos among their brethren" - yet the verse permits them to eat matzos among their brethren.
The reference here is to menachos, since all menachos are unleavened dough and are therefore called "matzos" here. It emerges that even one who served in a temple of idolatry - and even inadvertently, and even if he repented - is permanently forbidden to serve in the Beis HaMikdash, but he is not forbidden to eat the remnants of the minchah, nor even the meat of the offerings; that eating is permitted to him as a kohen.
The Mishnah therefore says: "harei hem k'ba'alei mumin" - they are treated like a kohen who has developed a blemish, as we will learn shortly in Maseches Bechoros:
"Cholkin" - they take a share together with their fellow kohanim in the remnants of the menachos, in the meat of the shelamim and even in the meat of the ashamos and the like in the Beis HaMikdash.
"V'ochlin" - they may eat this meat and these menachos.
"V'lo makrivin" - but they may never bring offerings in the Beis HaMikdash, as a rabbinic penalty.