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Menachos Chapter 1, Mishnah 4: When Mincha Is Pasul But Not Pigul

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Our Mishnah picks up exactly where the previous Mishnah left off, and explains the other side of the coin: what it means that the permitting element was not offered as prescribed. That is, even though the kohen had an intent of outside its time during one of the four essential services, the minchah does not become piggul - and one who eats it is not liable to kareis - because an additional disqualification became mixed into the offering.

And these are the cases in which the permitting element was not offered as prescribed:

What are the examples? In what way is the offering performed improperly beyond the intent of outside its time, so that the offering is merely disqualified and is not piggul?

  1. "Kamatz chutz limkomo, venasan bichli vehilech vehiktir chutz lizmano" - the kohen performs the kemitzah with the intent that the eating will take place in a place that is not fit, whether the altar will consume the kometz or the frankincense, or the kohen will eat the remainder, outside the Courtyard. This is an intent of outside its place, which disqualifies, and it is not an intent of outside its time. Afterward he performs the three remaining services - placing the kometz in a service vessel, carrying it to the altar and burning it - in one of them or in all of them, with an intent of outside its time, that the offering be eaten at a time that is not fit, on the following day. Since there was not an intent of outside its time alone here, this is not piggul.

  2. "O shekamatz chutz lizmano, venasan bichli vehilech vehiktir chutz limkomo" - his intent during the first of the four stages is that the offering be eaten at the disqualified time, while during the next three stages - placing in the vessel, carrying to the altar and burning - his intent concerns the disqualified place. Once again an additional disqualification became mixed in, and therefore it is disqualified and not piggul.

  3. "O shekamatz venasan bichli vehilech vehiktir chutz limkomo" - he performed all the stages, or some of them, with an intent of outside its place in addition to the intent of outside its time. Here too it is merely disqualified and not piggul.

In the minchah of a sinner and in the minchah of jealousy:

As was explained in the first Mishnah of the chapter, these two menachos are disqualified by an intent of not for their own sake - if the kohen performed one of the four essential services with the intent that he is performing it for the wrong type of minchah, or for a different owner. From here follow three additional cases:

  1. "Kematzan shelo lishman, venasan bichli vehilech vehiktir chutz lizmanan" - he performed the kemitzah with intent for the wrong type of offering or for the wrong owner, and the three remaining stages - placing in the vessel, bringing to the altar and burning - with an intent of outside its time. Since not for their own sake and outside its time were combined, this is not as prescribed, and it is therefore disqualified and not piggul.

  2. "O shekematzan chutz lizmanan, venasan bichli vehilech vehiktir shelo lishman" - his intent at the time of the kemitzah was outside its time, a potential piggul intent, but the placing in the vessel, the carrying to the altar and the burning he performed not for their own sake, with intent for the wrong offering. Once a second disqualification is added, this is again not piggul.

  3. "O shekematzan venasan bichli vehilech vehiktir shelo lishman" - in addition to the intent of outside its time, during each of the four stages he also intended that he is performing it for the wrong type of offering or for a different owner. And all of this, as stated, applies to the minchah of a sinner and the minchah of jealousy.

"Zehu shelo karav hamatir kemitzvaso" - these are the cases in which the permitting element, namely the kometz, was not offered in the manner in which it must be offered, that is, without additional disqualifications beyond the intent of outside its time. Therefore the offering is merely disqualified and is not piggul, and one who eats it is not liable to kareis.

Combining an intent regarding place with an intent regarding time:

What is the law when the kohen had two separate intents, one concerning a place that is not fit and the other concerning a time that is not fit? In all of these cases the result is the same:

  • "Kezayis bachutz vechezayis lemachar" - one intent to eat a kezayis in a place that is not fit, and a second intent to eat another kezayis at a time that is not fit.

  • "Kezayis lemachar vechezayis bachutz" - even though the order is reversed: his first intent is outside its time, and his second intent, regarding another kezayis, is outside its place.

  • "Kachatzi zayis bachutz vechachatzi zayis lemachar" - he intends to eat half a kezayis in a place that is not fit and half a kezayis at a time that is not fit.

  • "Kachatzi zayis lemachar vechachatzi zayis bachutz" - the first half at a time that is not fit, and the second half in a place that is not fit.

In all of these cases - "pasul ve'ein bo kareis" - it is disqualified. Disqualified, because there is here at least a kezayis that is eaten improperly; but since this is not a pure intent of outside its time, it is not piggul, and one who eats it is not liable to kareis.

Rabbi Yehudah's approach:

On this point Rabbi Yehudah disagrees, as is his way already in Maseches Zevachim, and he applies the principle of "tefos lashon rishon" - the first expression is the one that takes hold and establishes the reality. Accordingly, it is the first thought that defines the matter: if his first thought was outside its proper time, it is piggul; and if his first thought was outside its proper place, it is invalid. The second thought no longer changes anything.

In the words of the Mishnah: "Amar Rabbi Yehudah, zeh hakelal: im machsheves hazeman kadmah lemachsheves hamakom - piggul vechayavin alav kareis" - if the first thing he had in mind was the improper time, and his second thought was about the improper place, the second thought does not change anything, and one who eats it bears the punishment of kareis. "Ve'im machsheves hamakom kadmah lemachsheves hazeman - pasul ve'ein bo kareis" - for it is the first thought that determines the law, and not the second.

It should be clarified that in principle Rabbi Yehudah agrees with the foundation of "karev hamatir kemitzvaso"; he holds separately that the first thought is the determining one. Hence the example brought in the Gemara: if he had a single thought that included, at one and the same time, both outside its proper time and outside its proper place - for example, the kohen thinks at the time of the kemitzah that he will eat a kezayis of the Minchah in an improper place and at an improper time together - there is no thought here that preceded the other, but rather a mixture of the two, and even Rabbi Yehudah would agree that in such a case it is invalid and not piggul.

"Vachachamim omrim: zeh vezeh pasul ve'ein bo kareis" - the Sages hold like the first Tanna, and they do not accept the principle of tefos lashon rishon: it makes no difference which thought came first, and once there were two thoughts, it is invalid and there is no kareis. Even though the Sages' words add nothing new beyond the words of the first Tanna, the Mishnah thereby teaches that the halachah follows them, since they are the majority.

Eating and burning do not combine:

The last part of the Mishnah deals with a different matter, and it parallels a Mishnah already taught in Maseches Zevachim. If he had in mind during one of the four services of the Minchah "le'echol kachatzi zayis ulehaktir kachatzi zayis" - that is, that he would eat half a kezayis of the leftovers at an improper time, and that he would burn half a kezayis on the Altar at an improper time - even though there were here two thoughts of an improper time, and even though the two halves combine to a full kezayis, it is nevertheless "kasher". And why? "She'ein achilah vehaktarah mitztarfin" - the improper thought regarding the kohen's eating and the improper thought regarding the Altar's eating, which is the burning, do not combine to form the kezayis required as the minimum measure.

It emerges that a full kezayis is required - whether eaten by the kohen in an improper place or at an improper time, or a full kezayis burned on the Altar in an improper place or at an improper time - in order for the offering to become invalid; but two half-kezayis measures, one for eating and one for burning, do not combine with one another.