Makkos Chapter 2, Mishnah 1. This chapter deals with the law of one who kills accidentally, who is liable to go into exile to a city of refuge. The concept of exile for killing by accident was already mentioned in the first mishnah of the first chapter, but here the entire chapter is devoted to this subject.
"Eilu hen ha-golin" - these are the ones who go into exile:
"Eilu hen ha-golin: ha-horeg nefesh bishgagah" - these are the ones who go into exile: one who kills a person accidentally. The mishnah comes to enumerate which forms of accidental killing are significant enough to obligate the killer in exile, and which of them are too severe for exile to suffice - where the guilt resting on the killer is too great for the punishment of exile to be enough for him.
The Torah, in describing how the accidental killing came about, uses the expression "vayipol alav" - that the person falls upon his fellow, and his fellow dies as a result. From here Chazal derived that the only situation that obligates exile is when the act occurred in the course of a downward motion, and not in an upward motion, as will be explained further on in the mishnah.
The cases that obligate exile:
"Hayah megalgel b'ma'agilah v'naflah alav v'haragto" - he was rolling a roller and it fell on him and killed him. The roller is a cylindrical stone that people would roll on the roof in order to smooth out the tar or the coating material. As he was pushing the roller away from himself, it fell on a person below and killed him.
"Hayah meshalshel b'chavis v'naflah alav v'haragto" - he was lowering a barrel and it fell on him and killed him: he was lowering a barrel from the roof, and it slipped out of his hands and killed a person.
"Hayah yored b'sulam v'nafal alav v'harago" - he was going down a ladder and he fell on him and killed him: he was climbing down a ladder, fell on the person below and killed him.
"Harei zeh goleh" - he goes into exile, since all of these took place in the course of a downward motion.
The cases that are exempt from exile:
"Hayah moshech b'ma'agilah v'naflah alav v'haragto" - he was pulling a roller and it fell on him and killed him: he pulled the roller toward himself, and it fell behind him and killed a person.
"Hayah doleh b'chavis v'nifsak ha-chevel v'naflah alav v'haragto" - he was drawing up a barrel and the rope snapped and it fell on him and killed him: he was raising a barrel toward himself, the rope snapped, and the barrel fell on a person and killed him.
"Hayah oleh b'sulam v'nafal alav v'harago" - he was going up a ladder and he fell on him and killed him: he was climbing up a ladder, fell and killed a person.
"Harei zeh eino goleh" - this one does not go into exile.
The reason for the distinction: someone who is on his way down bears a greater degree of caution, and there is an expectation that he will be careful. In contrast, one who is pulling something upward does not anticipate that it will slip and be wrenched out of his hands, and therefore this is a level of accident containing so little intent that it does not carry an obligation of exile.
The mishnah sums this up in a principle: "Zeh ha-klal: kol she'b'derech yeridah - goleh, v'shelo b'derech yeridah - eino goleh" - this is the rule: whatever occurs in the course of a downward motion, he goes into exile; and what is not in the course of a downward motion, he does not go into exile.
"V'nashal habarzel min ha'etz" - two interpretations:
The Mishnah now turns to another case discussed in the Torah, in which the Tannaim disagree about the meaning of the verse. The Torah says of a person chopping wood "v'nashal habarzel min ha'etz" - and there are two ways to understand the verse:
The iron - the metal head of the axe - slipped off the wood, meaning off the handle of the axe, struck a person and killed him. The killing was done by the metal part of the axe.
The iron sent flying a chip from the wood being chopped, and that piece of wood flew off and killed the person. It was not the metal that killed, but the wood being chopped.
The dispute in practice:
"Nishmat habarzel mikato v'harag" - the metal slipped off the handle, off the wooden grip of the axe, and killed a person:
Rabbi says: he does not go into exile - first, because in his view the verse is speaking about the wood being chopped, which did the killing. Furthermore, the metal slipping off the handle is something that can be anticipated to a significant degree, and a person must be extremely careful about it; therefore this is "karov l'meizid" (close to intentional) - an act that has an element of intent to it, in which the person is genuinely negligent, and the punishment of exile is not sufficient for him.
And the Sages say: he goes into exile - this is the case the Torah described, that the metal is what caused the death, and in such a scenario the killer goes into exile.
"Min ha'etz hamisbake'a" - the person was killed by the chip that flew off the wood being chopped:
Rabbi says: he goes into exile - this is the case the Torah described.
And the Sages say: he does not go into exile - this is not the case the Torah described. Furthermore, with a piece of wood that flies off, this is considered "koach kocho" (a secondary force): it is not a direct result of the person's force - the way the flying axe head comes directly from his force - rather, the axe strikes the wood, and the wood flies off and shoots away. This is an indirect action, and therefore, according to the Sages, even exile is not required.
In summary: In this Mishnah we learned the fundamental principle in the laws of exile - "kol shebederech yeridah goleh" - derived from the wording "vayipol alav": only an accidental killing that occurred in a downward motion obligates exile, and not one in an upward motion, in which there is less intent. We also examined the dispute between Rabbi and the Sages in explaining "v'nashal habarzel min ha'etz" - whether it refers to the slipping of the axe's metal head or to a chip flying off the wood being chopped - and the considerations underlying it: "karov l'meizid" on the one hand, and "koach kocho" on the other.