Kerisos Chapter 3, Mishnah 10 - the last Mishnah in the chapter. In this Mishnah, we will expand on the essence of the concept we have learned, the concept of 'divided entities', and clarify how far it can be taken. Once again, we will meet Rabbi Akiva asking his questions, and this time: how does this principle apply to the laws of Shabbos.
Three Types of Unintentional Sins on Shabbos:
He did not know at all that such a thing as Shabbos exists.
He knew that it is forbidden to perform labor on Shabbos, but did not know that today is Shabbos - he thought today was Friday, such as someone who was stranded on a deserted island and the like.
He knew that Shabbos exists and knew that today is Shabbos, but did not know that this specific action is forbidden on it.
Avos and Toldos:
In the laws of Shabbos, there is no explicit description in the Torah of what is forbidden on Shabbos, but rather a general prohibition of "labor" alone. The details of the labors are learned from Parashas Ki Sisa, where the instructions for building the Mishkan appear and the Torah forbids building it on Shabbos. From here, the Sages understood that the creative actions used in the work of the Mishkan are the ones forbidden on Shabbos, and they enumerated thirty-nine different types of creative actions.
Each of these is called an "av melachah" - a general category of labor. The av is the specific way the labor was performed in the Mishkan, but it represents a general and conceptual way of achieving a certain result. Alongside it exists a "toldah" - a similar action whose intention, purpose, or result is identical to that of the av, even though it was not actually performed in the Mishkan. For example, the labor of planting involves sowing seeds, but any action that encourages the growth of a plant is forbidden by the Torah, and therefore watering a tree is a toldah of planting.
The toldos are forbidden on Shabbos exactly like the avos, but there is one fundamental difference between them regarding liability: one who performs multiple labors on Shabbos that are all toldos of a single av, or the av itself and its toldos - such as one who planted grain and also watered trees - is only liable for one sin-offering, since they are all included in a single av melachah. However, if he performed labors from two different avos, he is liable for a sin-offering for each and every av.
Rabbi Akiva's Two Questions:
The Mishnah opens with the words of Rabbi Akiva: "Sha'alti es Rabbi Eliezer: ha'oseh melachos harbeh beshabbasos harbeh" - I asked Rabbi Eliezer: one who performs many labors on many Shabboses. These words include two questions:
A person who performed the same labor Shabbos after Shabbos - he knew that it is forbidden to perform labor and knew that today is Shabbos, but did not know that this action is forbidden, and he planted grain week after week - does he bring one sin-offering for everything, or one sin-offering for each and every Shabbos?
A person who performed two toldos of a single av melachah on one Shabbos - such as one who grafted a tree and watered a tree, which are both toldos of planting, or who sowed seeds and also performed the toldos - does he bring a separate sin-offering for each toldah, or one sin-offering for all the toldos together?
It turns out that the question is: when he performed the same labor over the course of several Shabboses during one lapse of awareness, or when he performed multiple toldos of the same av on one Shabbos - is he liable for one sin-offering for everything, or a sin-offering for each and every Shabbos and for each and every toldah? For everyone agrees that two different avos require two sin-offerings; the doubt is regarding two toldos of a single av, and regarding separate Shabboses where each one perhaps stands on its own, as we saw regarding nidos.
Rabbi Eliezer's Answer: "Amar li" - he said to me. In one breath, Rabbi Eliezer answered both questions at once: in both cases, he is liable for each and every one. One who performs the same labor on three consecutive Shabboses brings three sin-offerings, one for each Shabbos; and one who performs three different toldos of a single av on the same Shabbos also brings three sin-offerings, one for each toldah.
From here on, throughout the rest of this long Mishnah, we will no longer deal with the issue of toldos. The liability for multiple chatas offerings for multiple toldos is the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, based on his reasoning, and this is not the halachah. The focus of our discussion is the second topic: how to relate to performing the same melachah on multiple Shabboses during one lapse of awareness - does it obligate one chatas or more than one?
Rabbi Eliezer's Kal Vachomer:
Rabbi Eliezer bases his words on a kal vachomer: "Umah im hanidah" - And if regarding a niddah (and the Gemara notes that it means "niddos"). Let us recall what we learned: One who cohabits with five women who are niddos, even if they are all his wives, they are considered separate entities, and he is liable a chatas for each and every one. From here Rabbi Eliezer derives: If for five niddos he is liable five chatas offerings even for one transgression, all the more so that for five Shabboses he is liable five chatas offerings, one for each Shabbos, even for the exact same prohibition.
And this is the wording of the kal vachomer: A niddah - "she'ein bah totza'os harbeh vechata'os harbeh" - regarding a niddah it is harder to become liable, as there is only one way to become liable for it, which is the cohabitation itself, and there is no multiplicity of ways that obligate a chatas; and nevertheless, "chayav al kol achas ve'achas" - he is liable for each and every one - five women, five chatas offerings. Whereas Shabbos, "sheyesh bah totza'os harbeh vechata'os harbeh" - there are many ways to desecrate it, and each one of them obligates a chatas on its own, and it emerges that Shabbos is more prone to chatas liability - "eino din sheyehei chayav al kol achas ve'achas" - is it not logical that he should be liable for each and every one, that he should bring a chatas for each and every Shabbos that he desecrated, akin to the law of separate entities, as every Shabbos is like a separate entity in itself.
Rabbi Akiva's Rejection - Two Warnings:
Rabbi Akiva responded: "Amarti lo: Lav" - I said to him: No - I reject this kal vachomer. "Im amarta benidah, sheyesh bah shetei azharos" - If you said so regarding a niddah, which has two warnings - by sleeping with a niddah two transgressions are committed at the exact same time, "shehu muzhar al hanidah vehanidah muzheres alav" - as he is warned concerning the niddah and the niddah is warned concerning him, and both are liable a chatas. Therefore, the niddah is more stringent in this respect than Shabbos, and the kal vachomer is refuted, since a kal vachomer only stands when the 'kal' (lenient case) is always more lenient than the 'chomer' (stringent case). "Tomar beShabbos she'ein bah ela azharah achas" - Would you say so regarding Shabbos which has only one warning - the Shabbos desecrator violates only one negative prohibition.
"Haba Al Haktanos Yochiach":
Rabbi Eliezer replied: "Amar li: Lav, haba al haktanos yochiach" - He said to me: No, one who cohabits with minors will prove it - the existence of two warnings at the exact same time does not preclude the derivation. For one who cohabits with five niddos who are each a minor, eleven years old, the minors are not liable a chatas at all, since they are minors, and it emerges "she'ein bahem ela azharah achas" - that there is only one warning regarding them - the prohibition is cast only on him and not on them - and nevertheless, "vechayav al kol achas ve'achas" - and he is liable for each and every one: if he inadvertently cohabits with five minors, he is liable a chatas for each one of them.
Rabbi Akiva rejected this: "Amarti lo: Lav" - I said to him: No - I do not agree with this at all, "im amarta bah" - if you said regarding it. One who cohabits with minors, "af al pi she'ein bahen achshav" - although they do not have it now - true, right now they are not subject to the warning, because they are minors - "yesh bahen le'achar zeman" - they will have it after a time, for once they grow up the warning will apply to them, and it emerges that fundamentally the warning pertains to them, just that it does not apply now. "Tomar beShabbos she'ein bah lo achshav velo le'achar zeman" - Would you say so regarding Shabbos which has it neither now nor after a time - on Shabbos there is no second warning at all, neither now nor after a time. For this reason Rabbi Akiva rejects Rabbi Eliezer's proof.
There is an opening here for much expansion, including an exploration of the essence of a minor boy or girl who commits a transgression and what the Torah says about this, but we will not enter into this at all, as Rabbi Eliezer does not defend his opinion but immediately moves on to a new proof.
"Haba Al Habehemah Yochiach":
"Amar lo: Haba al habehemah yochiach" - He said to him: One who cohabits with an animal will prove it - Rabbi Eliezer puts the niddos and the women aside and brings a proof from one who cohabits with an animal: One who cohabits with five animals - the negative prohibition is cast only on the person, and there is no negative prohibition on the animal at all - and nevertheless he is liable five chatas offerings, one for each animal, since each animal is considered a separate entity in itself, separate entities. And if so, certainly on Shabbos, which has many more ways to become liable and is more prone to chatas liability, he should become liable five chatas offerings for performing one melachah on five Shabboses.
"Amarti lo" - Rabbi Akiva replied: Even regarding the animal itself I am in doubt whether the five animals are considered separate bodies like menstruating women, or if they are like one body, just as I am in doubt regarding Shabbos. If so, one cannot bring a proof from the animal, since its own law is not clear to me. This concludes the Mishnah.
In summary: Rabbi Akiva does not accept Rabbi Eliezer's claim. However, as a matter of halachah, according to the Rambam, we indeed treat separate Shabboses as separate bodies, and therefore one who desecrates separate Shabboses is liable to bring a separate chatas for each and every one of them, just as one who cohabits with five animals is liable for five chatas offerings.