We have reached the fourth and final section of the first chapter of Maseches Eduyos. Until now the chapter has divided into three movements:
Mishnayos 1-3: disputes between Shammai and Hillel in which the Sages ruled like neither one of them.
Mishnayos 4-6: the "meta" mishnayos, dealing with the question of why an individual opinion is recorded and what purpose dissenting and minority opinions serve.
Mishnayos 7-11: cases in which Shammai himself disagreed with Beis Shammai.
The last three mishnayos - 12, 13 and 14 - deal with scenarios in which Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel disagreed, and Beis Hillel retracted and ruled in accordance with Beis Shammai. Altogether four separate cases are discussed, and our mishnah contains two of them. Its subject: a woman who has been widowed and the consequences that follow.
Background: one witness is believed regarding prohibitions:
This mishnah is also taught in the fifteenth chapter of Maseches Yevamos, among the chapters that deal with the principle that a single witness is believed regarding prohibitions, and most relevant for us - the reliability of a single witness to testify that a man has died, thereby permitting his wife to marry someone else.
Normally, establishing a marriage or a divorce requires two valid witnesses. This is not merely a matter of confirming a fact; it is a substantive requirement in its own right: there is no matter of intimate status with fewer than two - two witnesses are needed to bring about the act itself.
A man who dies leaves his wife a widow whether or not there were witnesses to his death; the moment he passes away the marriage terminates on its own. But in order to establish his death as a halachic fact - since in the last situation known to us they were married - two witnesses are normally required. For this reason the Sages made an enactment and believed even a single witness who testifies that a man has died, in order to permit his widow to remarry. The alternative is many women left as agunos, locked into a marriage to a husband who is gone and never able to marry again. The Sages therefore were lenient and relied on the testimony of one witness.
More than that: that single witness need not even be a third party. The woman herself is believed to testify that her husband died - and this is the main concern of our mishnah: what is the scope of this leniency?
The first case: a woman who comes from overseas:
The mishnah opens: "Eilu devarim shechazru Beis Hillel lehoros kedivrei Beis Shammai" - the four cases presented in the next three mishnayos are those in which Beis Hillel changed their position and ruled in accordance with Beis Shammai.
There is a moral point here: Beis Hillel were world-class geniuses, and they certainly could have marshaled many arguments in defense of their position - a position that in itself is entirely defensible. Even so, they stood by the truth, fulfilled the teaching of Chazal that a person admits the truth, and changed their view once they saw that this was the proper and correct position.
"Ha'ishah shaba'ah mimedinas hayam ve'amrah meis ba'ali - tinasei" - a woman who arrives from a distant land and reports to the local beis din, which knew that she was a married woman, that her husband died while they were abroad. We believe her testimony and permit her to marry, even though there is only a single witness here, and even though she is not objective and seemingly has a personal interest in the matter.
The Mishnah in Yevamos limits this to two conditions:
Peace between husband and wife: that there is no known friction between them; otherwise we would suspect that she wants to rid herself of her husband and marry another man while he is still alive.
Peace in the world: that there is no situation that might cause the woman to jump to the conclusion that her husband died while he is in fact alive. A war zone, or a natural disaster such as a volcanic eruption, into which the husband set out and never returned: the woman does not actually know that he died, but she assumes that he did, and she says to herself that if she does not report his death she will remain trapped forever. In such scenarios she is not believed.
And the same applies to the other side of the coin: "Mes ba'ali - tisyabem" - if the husband left no surviving children, the woman falls to yibum, and on the strength of her own testimony alone she is permitted to undergo yibum. Ordinarily a man may not marry his brother's wife even after his brother's death, and nevertheless in this scenario she is believed and the yibum is permitted.
"Beis Hillel omrim: lo shamanu ela b'ba'ah min hakatzir bilvad" - Beis Hillel are not convinced. They are aware of the precedent in which the Sages believed a woman who reported her husband's death, but in their view that was a highly specific case: an incident that occurred during the wheat harvest.
The incident went as follows: a man went out to harvest wheat, a snake bit him and he died. There were no valid witnesses there to testify to what had happened, but his wife knew, and she came back and told the story, and the court sent messengers who found the body and even identified it as her late husband. The point is that in such a scenario the place is not far away, the court can investigate and the truth will come to light. But when the report arrives from the ends of the earth - who is going to investigate? And from where do we know to be lenient in such a case?
Beis Shammai answered them: "Echad haba min hakatzir v'echad haba min hazeisim v'echad haba mimedinas hayam" - true, the incident happened during the wheat harvest, but clearly the harvest itself is not the relevant factor. Had the woman come and reported that her husband was bitten by a snake during the olive picking, we would not have said that since this is not the wheat harvest she is not to be believed; olives or wheat, what difference does it make? Similarly, what difference is there between near and far? In the end the report is destined to become public knowledge. "V'lo dibru b'katzir ela b'hoveh" - the Sages spoke of the harvest simply because that was the case that actually happened, but the rule is a general one: a woman who comes and reports that her husband died is believed.
"V'chazru Beis Hillel l'horos k'Beis Shammai" - Beis Hillel accepted this reasoning: even though we are dealing with a distant land, people come and go, the matter will eventually become known, and therefore we believe her.
The second case: collecting the kesubah:
The second half of the Mishnah builds on the first and deals with that very same case. "Beis Shammai omrim: tinasei v'titol kesubasah" - not only does she marry on the strength of her own testimony that her husband died, she even collects her kesubah. This refers to the principal of the kesubah, the two hundred zuz that were guaranteed to her at the time of her marriage.
"U'Beis Hillel omrim: tinasei v'lo sitol kesubasah" - she may marry, but she does not collect the two hundred zuz from the estate. Their reasoning: the credibility that the Sages granted to a single witness is exceptional, since establishing a halachic fact in court requires two valid witnesses, and here there is only one witness, a woman, and she herself is the interested party. The leniency was instituted solely because of the concern for agunos, that they not remain trapped and unable to remarry. But when it comes to the two hundred zuz there is no issue of iggun at all; that is a monetary matter, and in a monetary claim the rule is that the burden of proof rests on the one who wishes to extract money. Since she lacks two witnesses, she cannot extract money from another party.
"Amru lahem Beis Shammai: hitartem es ha'ervah hachamurah v'lo tatiru es hamamon hakal?" - if you permitted a woman whose status is that of a married woman to marry another man, which is the most severe of prohibitions, a sin punishable by death, will you not permit her to collect her kesubah when she marries? It is only two hundred zuz. It makes no sense to be lenient in the weighty matter and strict in the light one.
"Amru lahem Beis Hillel: lo matzinu she'ein ha'achim nichnasin l'nachalah al piha" - many monetary consequences flow from a man's death, and just as she is not believed to allow the heirs to take possession of the inheritance, so too she is not allowed to collect from the estate. The law is one and the same.
Beis Shammai answered that her claim for her kesubah is different from any other monetary claim: "U'misefer kesubasah nilmad" - we learn it from a careful reading of the text of the kesubah as it was written in the days of the Mishnah, in which the husband writes to his wife: "She'im tinasi le'acher titli mah shekasuv liche" - "that if you marry another, you shall take what is written for you." Bear in mind: a woman who is left a widow does not collect her kesubah; rather, she continues to live in the home and on the estate of her late husband. Only if she chooses to remarry does she collect her kesubah, two hundred zuz.
Since the kesubah itself explicitly links her remarriage to the collection of her kesubah, we learn that although other monetary claims arising from the husband's death require two witnesses, the collection of the kesubah is bound up entirely with her ability to remarry. And since we have permitted her to remarry, we will also permit her to take her kesubah.
"V'chazru Beis Hillel l'horos k'Veis Shammai" - Beis Hillel accepted this argument, that the wording of the kesubah makes clear that the claim for the kesubah, at least the principal amount, is different from the other monetary obligations that arise from a person's death. Therefore, not only does she remarry, but she also takes her kesubah.
In the next two mishnayos, 13 and 14, we will take up the two remaining cases in which Beis Hillel reversed their position and ruled in accordance with Beis Shammai.