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Eduyos Chapter 5, Mishnah 2: Rabbi Yosi's Six Cases Where Beit Shammai Are Lenient

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Eduyos, chapter five, mishnah two. This mishnah continues the pattern of the previous one: Rabbi Yosei adds six disputes between Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel in which Beis Shammai are lenient and Beis Hillel are stringent, beyond the twenty four disputes listed in chapter four, and in doing so he disagrees with Rabbi Yehudah of the previous mishnah regarding the addition. Rabbi Yosei's view is an individual opinion, as is the way of all the mishnayos in this chapter, and therefore the halachah does not follow him: the disputes did indeed exist, but in practice Beis Hillel are the lenient opinion, and the halachah follows Beis Hillel as it always does. Fitting all six cases into one short lesson is a challenge, but we will try nonetheless.

The first case - poultry and cheese on one table:

The Torah says three times "lo sevashel gedi bachalev imo" - that one may not cook a kid, a young goat, in its mother's milk. From this threefold repetition the Sages derived three separate Torah prohibitions:

  1. A prohibition against cooking the meat of a kosher animal (cattle, goats, sheep and the like) together with dairy products.

  2. A prohibition against eating meat and milk that were cooked together.

  3. A prohibition against deriving any benefit from meat and milk that were cooked together - and therefore one may not even feed the mixture to a dog, since by doing so a person saves himself the cost of the dog's food.

To these the Sages added three rabbinic decrees:

  1. A prohibition against eating meat and milk together even when they were not cooked together - hence the separation into distinct meals and the waiting period between meat and dairy.

  2. An extension of the prohibition from the meat of animals to poultry as well, which may not be eaten with dairy by rabbinic law.

  3. A prohibition against bringing meat and dairy up onto the table at one and the same time - lest a person set the boiling pot of meat down on the table, it come into direct contact with the cheese, and he end up cooking meat and milk together and violating a Torah prohibition, since the boiling pot has the status of a first vessel.

With poultry, however, the Sages decreed only regarding eating and not regarding cooking, since they did not view cooking the two together as a common occurrence. Hence the question that this mishnah comes to answer: is it forbidden to bring poultry up onto the table together with dairy products?

Beis Shammai are lenient: there is no problem with it. After all, even the eating itself is only a rabbinic prohibition, and we do not issue a decree to protect another decree - to forbid bringing it onto the table out of concern that one might come to eat it, when the eating itself is only rabbinic.

Beis Hillel are stringent, according to Rabbi Yosei: the concern is not that he will eat the poultry with the cheese, but that the next time he will bring a hot meat dish onto a table on which there is cheese, and will cook meat and milk together in violation of Torah law. It turns out, then, that this is not a decree to protect a decree, but a single decree guarding against a Torah prohibition.

And in the words of the mishnah: "ha'of oleh im hagevinah al hashulchan v'eino ne'echal, k'divrei Beis Shammai" - poultry may be brought up onto the table together with dairy products, but eating them together is forbidden by rabbinic law. "U'Veis Hillel omrim: eino oleh v'eino ne'echal" - even bringing them up onto one table is forbidden, as a safeguard against a Torah prohibition, and all the more so may they not be eaten together.

The second case - Terumah from produce whose processing was not completed:

Everyone agrees that one may not separate Terumah from one species on behalf of another: someone who has olives and grapes cannot take extra from the olives and thereby exempt the grapes, but rather takes from the olives for the olives and from the grapes for the grapes. Grapes and wine, however, are considered a single species, and so too olives and olive oil. The question is whether a separate problem exists.

Beis Hillel, who according to Rabbi Yosei are the stricter ones here, hold that a person may separate Terumah only from produce whose processing has been completed, where the work is finished and nothing further remains to be done to it. This is derived from the verse concerning Terumas Ma'aser: "V'nechshav lachem terumaschem kadagan min hagoren" - like grain that has already been threshed and winnowed on the threshing floor. From here we learn that one may not separate Terumah before the processing of the food is complete. Therefore, someone producing wine may not separate grapes as Terumah for the wine, even though they are one and the same species, because the grapes - which here are destined to become wine - have not yet had their processing completed. Beis Shammai do not expound the verse this way, and in their view one may do so even at the outset. The accepted halachah is that after the fact, if a person separated from produce whose processing was not complete, the Terumah is valid.

And in the words of the Mishnah: "Torimin zeisim al shemen v'anavim al yayin, k'divrei Beis Shammai" - one may separate olives to exempt the oil, and grapes to exempt the wine. "U'Beis Hillel omrim: ein torimin" - because of the separate prohibition against separating from something whose processing is not complete, derived from that same verse.

The third case - kilei hakerem:

The prohibition of kilei hakerem is a Torah prohibition against sowing grain or vegetables together with vines, and the required distance depends on whether we are dealing with a single vine or with a group of vines that has the status of a vineyard. Everyone agrees that at least five vines are needed to be considered a vineyard, but they disagree about their arrangement:

  • Beis Shammai: Five vines in a single row are enough.

  • Beis Hillel: Four of the vines must form the four corners of a rectangle, set at right angles, with the fifth extending like a tail off one of the lines - three and two, with two and two parallel to each other.

If it is not a vineyard, the required distance is one amah, six tefachim. If he does have a vineyard, he must distance the grain or vegetables from the entire working area of the vineyard - the area worked around it, a perimeter of four amos. If he transgresses and sows within the working area, the vineyard becomes forbidden, as it says "Pen tikdash hamlei'ah hazera asher tizra u'sevu'as hakarem" - the full measure of seeds sown within that perimeter as well as the fruit of the vineyard, and all of it must be destroyed. And since "u'sevu'as hakarem" is stated in the singular, one who sows not inside the vineyard but in its perimeter forfeits only one vineyard.

According to Beis Shammai, a single row of five vines constitutes a vineyard. Therefore, in an arrangement of five by five vines, if a person sows grain or vegetables within four amos of the eastern row, the seeds become forbidden and so does that eastern row alone, since it is the single nearest vineyard, assuming the next row is more than four amos away. But according to Beis Hillel, for whom a vineyard is two by two with one extending out, it turns out that one vineyard is worth two rows, and therefore he forfeits two rows and not one. This is the stringency that the Mishnah is focusing on.

It is worth noting that this view also creates a leniency: with five vines in a single row, Beis Hillel would be lenient and permit sowing at a distance of more than one amah, since this is not a vineyard, whereas Beis Shammai, who consider it a vineyard, would require a distance of four amos. In any case, the halachah is that a vineyard is two by two with one extending out like a tail.

And in the words of the Mishnah: "Hazorei'a arba amos shebakerem - Beis Shammai omrim: kideish shurah achas" - one row of vines becomes forbidden. "U'Beis Hillel omrim: kideish shtei shuros" - since a vineyard is two rows, he forfeits two rows, and therefore this is the stricter view.

The fourth case - challah from me'isah:

The mitzvah of challah is a separation from the dough as a gift to the kohen, as it says "V'hayah ba'achalchem milechem ha'aretz tarimu terumah laHashem". The question is what qualifies as bread: certainly it is made from one of the five species of grain mixed with water into a batter, but must it specifically be baked, or is cooked food included as well?

The case before us is me'isah. According to the Bavli, one pours flour into boiling water and stirs, and it becomes a sort of batter; according to the Yerushalmi, one pours the boiling water onto the flour. Is this considered bread that is obligated in the separation of challah?

Beis Shammai are lenient: this is not called bread, and it is not obligated in challah. Beis Hillel are stringent: this too is called bread, since he is cooking flour of the five grains in water, and he must separate challah before eating it. And the language of the Mishnah: "HaMe'isah, Beis Shammai potrin u'Veis Hillel mechayvin" - and without knowing the context there is no way to understand what is being discussed.

The fifth case - immersing in a charedalis:

The verse says "Ach ma'ayan u'vor mikveh mayim yihyeh tahor" - "but a spring or a cistern, a gathering of water, shall be pure" - and from here we learn two paths to purity: a spring, which is a flowing source issuing from a wall or from the ground; and a mikvah of water, a collection of rainwater gathered into one place. Rainwater that has not yet gathered into one place but is still flowing is called zochalin, and it is not valid for immersion. "Cistern" means the hollow in which the mikvah collects, and wherever water gathers as a mikvah there must be at least forty se'ah, roughly seven hundred and fifty liters.

The question before us deals with a flow running down a mountainside: rain falls, the water accumulates and forms a kind of small, temporary river on the slope. The Mishnah calls this flow a charedalis, and the Rambam gives it an etymology - har and dalis, a mountain that pours out water as if from buckets (in English: sheet flow). May one immerse in this flow? There is no question about immersing one's body, since it is not deep enough to cover a person, but what about immersing vessels?

Since this is flowing rainwater, the answer would seem to be no, for there is no mikvah of water here and no gathering of water. However, there is a precedent in the Tosefta: in a bay of the ocean, which is a vast collection of water, even the wave that moves and crashes onto the shore is valid for immersion. The question is whether the charedalis can be compared to a wave in the ocean.

Beis Shammai are lenient and do draw the comparison. As the Rivan explains, we are speaking of a specific case: at the bottom of the slope down which the water runs there is a pool of water, and although the pool itself does not contain forty se'ah, the total volume of connected water - the pool at the bottom together with the flow on the slope - exceeds forty se'ah. This water is moving, but it is connected to the pool below, and it is like a wave in the ocean, and therefore one may immerse in it.

Beis Hillel are stringent and distinguish between the two: the wave in the bay comes from the mikvah itself and moves about within it, so it is already part of the body of water; whereas the charedalis running down the mountain is not yet part of the mikvah - it has not entered it and has not gathered into it, and its source is not the collected water; rather, it is filling that water. Therefore, even though there are forty se'ah in total, one may not immerse even vessels in the flowing portion, since it is still zochalin, flowing toward the gathering of water and not from it.

And the language of the Mishnah: "Matbilin becharedalis, k'divrei Beis Shammai" - one may immerse vessels in the running flow in order to purify them. It should be noted that in the time of the Mishnah this does not refer only to immersing new vessels as we do today, but also to removing tumah. "U'Veis Hillel omrim: ein matbilin" - for the reasons that have been explained.

The sixth case - a convert who converted on Erev Pesach:

The final case deals with the tumah of a corpse as it applies to converts. The underlying principle is that non-Jews are not subject to tumah on a Torah level: they do not become tamei through contact with a corpse, and even regarding niddah and the like we relate to them as tamei only by rabbinic decree. Their bodies, however, like the bodies of Jews, transmit tumah (and there is a dispute whether they transmit tumah in a tent). As long as a non-Jew lives as a non-Jew, he cannot become tamei.

The case: a person buried a corpse, and the next day, on the fourteenth of Nisan, Erev Pesach, he converted. Now he merits to take part in the korban Pesach like any Jew, except that he was exposed to a corpse earlier. Ordinarily, a Jew who is exposed to a corpse requires a seven day purification process with the sprinkling of the mei chatas, and one who contracted corpse tumah within seven days before Pesach cannot take part in the korban. The question is whether the Sages decreed a seven day purification process on a non-Jew who became a Jew, when we know that he was exposed to corpse tumah while he was still a non-Jew, before he may enter the Mikdash or eat kodashim.

The reason for the decree: people see the convert digging graves in the morning and reclining that very night at the Pesach seder, and they will come to err and say that a person who contracted corpse tumah may immerse and eat kodashim on the same day.

Beis Shammai are lenient: a gentile is not subject to the laws of tumah and taharah at all, so once he converts he is ready and fit. Conversion for a male takes place in two stages: bris milah, and immersion in a mikvah together with acceptance of the mitzvos. The immersion after the milah is essential in order to become a convert, and it is possible that a separate, additional immersion is required to permit him to eat kodashim, since there is a discussion - not fully spelled out - regarding the need for intent at the time of immersion, and in particular intent for eating kodashim. In any case, after a second immersion at most, the convert is entirely pure, he is a Jew, and no trace of his earlier tumah remains, and he therefore eats the korban Pesach that same night.

Beis Hillel are stringent: if we permit this, Jews will come to eat kodashim in a state of tumah. Therefore the convert must be required to wait seven days and to undergo the rabbinic purification process, with the sprinkling of the waters of the chatas on the third day and on the seventh day.

And the language of the Mishnah: "Ger shenisgayer erev Pesachim - Beis Shammai omrim: tovel v'ochel es pischo la'erev" - a convert who converted on the eve of Pesach: Beis Shammai say he immerses and eats his Pesach offering that evening. He goes to the mikvah, and this may well be the second immersion needed for eating kodashim, and he is permitted to eat the korban Pesach that same night; even though he was exposed to a corpse before his conversion, the tumah does not attach to him, since he was not subject to the laws of tumah. "U'Beis Hillel omrim: haporesh min ha'orlah k'poresh min hakever" - one who separates from his foreskin is like one who separates from the grave. Just as one who separates from a grave is impure for at least seven days, so too a convert who converted, and he must undergo the purification process like any Jew over the course of seven days, and only afterward may he eat kodashim and enter the Beis HaMikdash. And again, this is only a rabbinic law, instituted to protect the Jewish people from error.

One comment to close this topic: although the Mishnah uses the expression of separating from the foreskin, this is not to be understood literally. A full-fledged Jew who for whatever reason had not been circumcised until now, and who was circumcised on the eve of Pesach, certainly eats from the korban Pesach that same night. There is no question of tumah and taharah here at all; it is simply that an uncircumcised man cannot eat from the korban Pesach, and once he is circumcised he is immediately fit. It emerges that the Mishnah is speaking of a gentile who converts, for whom a process of at least seven days is required from the day of his milah until he becomes pure, and its words do not apply to a Jew who was circumcised on the eve of Pesach.

In summary: in this Mishnah Rabbi Yose lists six additional disputes in which Beis Shammai are lenient and Beis Hillel are stringent: placing fowl and cheese on one table; taking Terumah from olives for oil and from grapes for wine; the extent of the vineyard rendered forbidden when one sows within four amos of a vineyard; the obligation of challah on me'isah (dough made by pouring flour into boiling water); immersing vessels in a chardalis (a cascading stream of rainwater); and the purity of a convert who converted on the eve of Pesach. And as for the halachah, as stated, this is an individual opinion and the halachah does not follow him.