Bechoros, Chapter 4, Mishnah 6. In the previous Mishnah we dealt with taking payment for ruling on matters of a bechor, and now the Mishnah turns to a general matter, which goes beyond the laws of bechoros: performing mitzvos in exchange for payment. The fundamental principle is that this is forbidden.
The source of the prohibition:
Moshe Rabbeinu says to the nation: "See, I have taught you statutes and laws as Hashem my God commanded me." In other words, I taught you in the exact same manner that the Almighty taught me - for free. And just as I teach you Torah for free, so too you must teach Torah for free. This is a foundational rule.
A direct extension of this rule is serving as a judge: instructing and ruling in a beis din are essentially a continuation of teaching Torah, and therefore even sitting in judgment and rendering halachic rulings are included in the Torah's mitzvah to teach for free. Moreover, the Gemara expands this to the performance of any mitzvah whatsoever: a person must perform mitzvos, for himself and for others, without payment. This is the starting point of our Mishnah.
The text of the Mishnah:
"Hanotel secharo ladun - dinav betelin" - One who takes payment for his role as a judge, his rulings are invalidated. It is worth paying attention to the plural term "dinav": all his rulings are void, and even retroactively. The reason for this is that this person degrades the values of the Torah, which instruct one to teach Torah, render halachic rulings, and serve as a judge for free, while he takes payment for this; this implies that the Torah is not sufficiently important in his eyes. Therefore, the Sages penalized him and disqualified him from judging, and his rulings are void retroactively.
We are not speaking here of a judge who accepts a bribe or one who takes payment from only one side. Even in a case where both litigants approach the judge together and say to him: "We understand that you are a busy person, and we want you to sit in judgment over us. See, each of us is giving you a hundred dollars, and we ask you together, without any favoritism, to bring forth the true judgment" - even in this scenario, it is forbidden for the judge to take the money at all, and if he took it, his ruling is void. The reason: bringing truth, justice, and righteousness to the world is the basic role of a Jew, and taking money for it is flawed and unacceptable.
"Leha'id - edosav betelin" - One who takes payment for providing testimony, his testimonies are also invalidated. This is the exact same concept: whoever has testimony, it is an obligation upon him to state it, and he is not permitted to collect payment for this. One who takes payment for his testimony undermines the basic spirit of the Torah, and therefore his testimony is not acceptable in a beis din.
"Lehazos ulkadesh" - Here we are dealing with a specific mitzvah. "To sprinkle" is the sprinkling of the mei chatas, spring water mixed with the ashes of the parah adumah, to purify those who contracted tumah from a corpse. One who takes payment for the sprinkling - this is forbidden, since it is a mitzvah. And similarly "to sanctify", meaning the preparation of the water itself, taking the spring water and mixing it with the ashes: one who collects money for this service, his action is void.
And regarding this, the Mishnah employs an expression found in other places in the Talmud as well: "Meimav mei me'arah ve'efro efer makleh" - His water is cave water and his ash is ordinary ash. Even though he fulfilled all the technical instructions in preparing the mei chatas with the ashes of the parah adumah, we treat the water he prepared as if it were mere cave water - although it came from a spring and ashes are mixed into it, it has no utility. And similarly "his ash is ordinary ash": even though it actually came from a burned parah adumah, it is treated as simple, ordinary ash, from the ash that one takes out from the bottom of a stove, which has no connection to the matter.
Three paths to receiving indirect payment:
After all that has been said, the Mishnah presents three important points - we will call them exceptions to the rule, and in fact these are ways in which a person is permitted to receive payment indirectly for performing a mitzvah. This concept has daily practical application regarding those who hold holy offices in our society today.
"im hayah kohen vetimuhu miterumato" - A kohen who became tameh while fulfilling a mitzvah: During the preparation of the waters of the red heifer, the sprinkling might make him tameh, or he may be required as a judge to pass through a place that makes him tameh, or he might need to handle a dead mouse to issue his ruling (this does not refer to the Torah prohibition of passing through a cemetery, which a kohen is not permitted to do). Once he becomes tameh, he can no longer eat Terumah, which is his regular food, and Terumah is much cheaper than non-sacred food. Therefore, "ma'achilo umashkehu vesacho" - it is permitted to provide him with food, drink, and anointing oil that are not Terumah, so that he can use them in place of the Terumah that is forbidden to him.
The Jerusalem Talmud notes that we do not give him anything for free, since he would have had to pay for his food regardless; rather, Terumah - whether food or oil - is cheaper, and therefore it is permitted to make up the difference for him alone, so that he does not suffer a loss. This is the entire principle: We provide him with food only so that he is not financially harmed, and not to pamper him and feed him like a king.
"ve'im hayah zaken - markivo al hachamor" - A judge issuing a ruling here, as well as anyone fulfilling any other mitzvah, who is elderly and cannot walk on his own feet: It is permitted to provide him with a donkey to ride on. In our terms: Funding his taxi ride so that he can get to the mitzvah. This is not payment for the mitzvah, but rather preventing a loss for someone who is unable to walk and is forced to pay out of pocket.
"venoten lo secharo kepo'el" - It is permitted to pay him like a worker's wage. To illustrate: A person works as an electrician and takes one hundred shekels an hour for his services, and his work is difficult and even dangerous. They ask him: How much will you request in exchange for a day of absence from your work, where you will not go to the electrical shop but instead sit as a judge or a witness, or prepare the waters of the red heifer - a much less demanding occupation? And he replies: I have a family to support, and I cannot do this for free, but since this is an easier task, I will settle for eighty shekels an hour and not one hundred.
In this case, it is permitted to pay him eighty shekels an hour, but not the one hundred shekels he usually takes, because the task before him is easier - preparing the waters of the red heifer, checking mezuzahs, or any other mitzvah that requires less effort than the electrician's work. In other words, we do not pay him his full wage, but solely the amount he is willing to settle for in exchange for the easier work.
In summary: In this Mishnah, we learned the rule derived from the words of Moshe Rabbeinu, "just as Hashem, my God, commanded me" - just as he taught for free, so too we must teach for free - and from this is derived the prohibition against taking a fee for judging, for testifying, and for sprinkling and sanctifying, to the point that his judgments are void, his testimony is void, and his waters become mere cave water and his ashes mere hearth ashes. On the other hand, we learned three ways in which it is permitted to receive payment indirectly: supplementing the food of a kohen who became tameh and cannot eat Terumah, funding a ride for an elderly man who cannot walk, and giving a worker's wage - at the rate that the person is willing to settle for in exchange for the easier work, and not his full wage.