We continue in Tractate Bava Metzia, Chapter 6, Mishnah 7, which continues the discussion of when a person is considered a paid watchman and when an unpaid watchman.
Lending on a Pledge:
The first case is "Hilvahu al hamashkon" - a person who lends and receives a pledge in his hand. The pledge is a guarantee through which the lender ensures that the debt will be repaid to him, and therefore he holds it in his possession. The question is: while the pledge is in the lender's possession, is his status that of an unpaid watchman or a paid watchman? The Mishnah rules: "Shomer sachar" - a paid watchman, because he receives a monetary benefit from the very act of holding the pledge.
How so? The Gemara explains that the lender receives a "mitzvah reward," but not in the way one might initially think: while he is occupied with arranging the loan, he is exempt from dealing with other requests directed at him, such as requests for charity, since one who is engaged in a mitzvah is exempt from another mitzvah. Because he is busy with the mitzvah of lending, he is exempt from other mitzvot. Consequently, at the time of granting the loan, he derived a benefit, and receiving the pledge is an inseparable part of it, and therefore he is a paid watchman over that deposit.
Should the student ask: does this benefit not exist only at the very first moment? The answer is that even one who receives advance payment for watching objects benefits only at the first moment, yet nonetheless remains a paid watchman throughout the entire duration of the watch. So too here: he had a monetary benefit in being exempted from giving charity, and this makes him a paid watchman - according to the opinion of the Tanna Kamma.
The Opinion of Rabbi Yehudah:
Rabbi Yehudah does not accept this logic, and distinguishes between lending money and lending produce:
"Hilvahu maot - shomer chinam" - one who lends money and takes a pledge as collateral is only an unpaid watchman over it, for he does not receive a true monetary benefit that turns him into a paid watchman. The exemption from giving charity is not common at all: that in the short window of time in which he is giving the loan, a charity collector will come, and he will be able to turn him away without money, and a moment later he will no longer be there - this is a reality that is uncommon, and therefore his status is that of an unpaid watchman.
"Hilvahu peirot - shomer sachar" - here Rabbi Yehudah concedes, for a completely different reason. We have already learned in the previous chapter that lending a seah for a seah - a seah of apples in exchange for a seah of apples - is forbidden under normal circumstances, but there are cases where it is permitted, such as "a market price has emerged" or "he has some." It is in this manner that we are speaking here: one lends a seah of apples and asks for a seah of apples in return, and takes a pledge to guarantee their return. Since he does not need the produce at this time, and it is liable to spoil over time, it turns out that by handing it over to the borrower he will receive new, fresh produce in its place; the borrower serves him, as it were, as a sort of human refrigerator. Thus there is a monetary benefit here, since he prevents himself from a loss due to the spoilage of perishable goods. This is the explanation of Rabbeinu Bachya.
The halachah is decided according to the Tanna Kamma: one who takes a pledge is a paid watchman across the board, whether in a loan of money or a loan of objects and produce.
The Opinion of Abba Shaul - Renting Out the Pledge of a Poor Person:
In this clause, Abba Shaul introduces a fascinating novelty. Usually, the holder of a pledge has no right to use it: use without the owner's knowledge is akin to robbery, and the user is considered a robber. And even if explicit permission was given, the matter is still forbidden: the borrower, who handed over his bicycle as a pledge and allowed the lender to ride it while it is in his hands, ends up giving the lender an additional benefit beyond the return of the principal, and this is akin to interest. Consequently, under normal circumstances, the holder of collateral has no right to use it.
However, Abba Shaul teaches that there is an exceptional case: when the borrower is a poor person, and when the pledge is among the things that can be rented out for a reasonable sum and do not wear out or become degraded as a result of the rental. For example, the poor person handed over his axe or his hammer as a pledge; with an axe one can chop plenty of wood, and with a hammer strike countless nails. If a person is found who is willing to rent the tool from the lender and pay a daily sum for it, the lender may use this money to reduce the principal that the borrower owes him: if he borrowed one hundred, and renting out the hammer for two days brought in ten, he can settle for a return of only ninety. This is, of course, a great favor for the borrower.
And even if the borrower did not give explicit permission, Abba Shaul says that we can safely assume he agrees to this - because he is poor, because a substantial fee is received, and because the item is not worn out. Therefore, it is permitted for the lender holding the item to rent it out for a fee in order to help the borrower pay off his debt little by little. The reason for this is "mipnei shehu k'meishiv aveidah" - because he is like one returning a lost object: returning lost property is about preventing a loss for a fellow Jew and returning what he would otherwise lose, and exactly the same applies here - the borrower would have lost the principal, whereas now his repayment amount is reduced by renting out the collateral.
In fact, amazingly, this is how the halachah is ruled: when the conditions are met - the borrower is poor so it can be assumed he would be happy to pay off his debt in this way, the collateral brings in a substantial amount, and it does not wear out as a result of the rental - not only is this permitted, but it is a mitzvah for the lender to rent out the collateral in order to help the poor person pay off his debt.