We are beginning the study of the fifth chapter in Tractate Bava Metzia, which is called "Eizehu Neshech". The subject of the chapter is the prohibition against making a profit from a loan to a fellow Jew. The prohibition of collecting interest - ribis or neshech - appears to be a particularly major issue in the eyes of God, to the point that many verses are dedicated to it, and many negative commandments are involved in doing such a deed. Because of this, it is fitting to pause for a moment and reflect on the root of the matter, since it is not at all simple to understand why it is such a severe issue.
The Moral Principle Underlying the Prohibition:
The Torah is teaching a moral principle here, and we must clarify its reasoning. A person who lends his car to his friend and tells him: "I will lend you the car, but since I will be without it for a week, when you return it I will also ask for a hundred dollars as a rental fee" - this sounds completely fair. But when a Jew is in need of money, and his friend tells him: "I will lend you a thousand dollars, provided that you pay me a usage fee for my money remaining in your hands - another hundred", the Torah comes and establishes that this is a Torah prohibition. What is the difference, and why?
It seems that the foundation of the matter is that the Torah wishes to teach a moral value: A person must treat his fellow, his Jewish friend who behaves as an upright Jew, like a family member - like his brother or cousin. Lending a car is one thing, but when the other person needs money and one charges a fee for it, he is exacerbating his distress and deepening his lack, and this is unacceptable in the eyes of the Torah.
The Gemara, the Rambam, and Halachah continue and establish that it is an obligation to collect interest from a non-Jew. It emerges that there is no inherent moral flaw in an interest-bearing loan itself. The Torah is teaching a value: One must treat a Jew like a family member, and family members do not behave this way with one another - to demand interest and repayment at a time when one is desperately in need of money. This is the morality that the Torah teaches here.
She'eilah and Halva'ah - Two Separate Concepts:
In other languages, a single word is used for two concepts, whereas in the Torah there are two separate words:
She'eilah: The lender gives an object and expects to receive back the exact same item. A person who asks for a hammer from his friend for the purpose of building a shed, receives the hammer and returns that very same hammer. If he were to sell it and replace it with another, or use it for firewood, that was not the intention. The agreement is to use the object and return it.
Halva'ah: The giver understands in advance that the receiver will consume the item - he will spend it or eat it - and will return a replacement in exchange. One who asks to borrow orange juice or a hundred dollars will drink the juice and spend the money, and when he receives his paycheck next week, he will return a different hundred dollars in their place.
The Torah permits both methods. Instead of lending an object for free, a person is allowed to rent it out for a fee: It is permissible to rent out a hammer or a car and expect payment, and this is completely within the parameters of the Torah. But with a halva'ah, where something is given that is meant to be consumed like food or money, it is forbidden for the giver to demand that more be returned to him than what he gave. This is the subject of the Mishnah before us, and indeed the subject of the entire chapter.
Neshech and Marbis - Fixed Interest:
The Torah refers to this prohibition by two names: ribis (marbis or tarbis) and neshech. The terms overlap with each other, and there are simply two separate negative commandments applying to the same act. The classic case from the Torah: The lender gives money or apples and says: "Here is a hundred, and when you pay me back, give me a hundred and ten." This is called ribis ketzutzah - a technical term meaning that it was stipulated at the time of the loan that the repayment will be larger than the amount given, with a pre-fixed additional payment. This is a Torah prohibition, and such a situation constitutes both ribis and neshech, and one transgresses both of them.
The Mishnah will teach later on that one can transgress six negative commandments in such a transaction, all depending on the structure of the transaction, and both the borrower and the lender are liable for it, as well as the person acting as the arranger of the transaction or the one writing the contract. All of these transgress a Torah prohibition, and we will see the details below.
Why is it called "neshech"? From the word for biting, as it bites the borrower. The borrower thinks he is facing only a small loan and a tiny interest payment, but this small amount continues to swell, and he sinks deeper into debt until the matter takes over completely. This is comparable to a small snake biting the foot: seemingly just a light bite, but the venom spreads throughout the entire body and leads to total collapse.
Conversely, "marbis", from the word for increase and addition, does not focus on the borrower but on the lender who profits and receives more. He had a hundred apples and he receives a hundred and ten - it turns out he increases and grows his apples. However, in the verses, neshech and marbis are used with the same meaning: both are Torah prohibitions, and both deal with the prohibition of fixed interest - a loan given with the expectation of receiving more than what was given.
In the verses themselves, it is evident that when the Torah discusses this matter, it specifies neshech for cash and marbis for other items and produce: "Es kaspecha lo siten lo beneshech" - money shall not be given to another Jew with interest, "uvemarbis lo siten ochlecha" - and food shall also not be given with interest. It emerges from the verses that neshech refers to money, and marbis or tarbis refers to food, but the bottom line is that the terms are interchangeable and each applies to the other. Therefore, there are at least two negative prohibitions in every loan, whether in apples or in money, when the lender asks for more than he gave.
Rabbinic Safeguards:
Up to this point is the Torah prohibition. Since the Sages saw how significant the matter is in the eyes of Heaven, they enacted a broad safeguard around the prohibition of interest.
Avak ribis: A case where a person lends money or food without stipulating any addition upon repayment. He gives a hundred dollars, and there is no demand to return more than a hundred. However, the borrower is very happy with the money he received, and at the time of repayment he adds something - a thank-you gift, or perhaps he made a successful business deal and has extra cash on hand, so he gives a gift of a hundred and ten instead of a hundred. Since no obligation to pay more was established at the time of the loan, this is not fixed interest but avak ribis (the "dust" of interest), and its prohibition is Rabbinic.
The rule is as follows: any payment added to what was borrowed - in merchandise, services, or money - if it is stipulated in advance, it is fixed interest and prohibited by the Torah; but if it is not stipulated in advance and is actually given, it is avak ribis and its prohibition is Rabbinic.
Pseikah al hapeiros: The Sages also prohibited transactions that today would be called "futures contracts" - an agreement to pay now and receive the merchandise later, which in the language of the Gemara is pseikah al hapeiros, setting a price or future payment on a specific type of commodity. The reason is that this transaction is economically identical to collecting interest: if the buyer gives a hundred dollars today and the seller commits to supplying a bottle of wine later on, and in the meantime the price of wine rises and at the time of delivery it is worth more than a hundred dollars, the seller ends up losing. The buyer who gives a hundred dollars now is exactly parallel to a lender giving a hundred dollars now, and the future payment is made in merchandise whose value has increased, such that the seller returns not a hundred but a hundred and more in terms of value - and this is very similar to interest.
Therefore, the Sages prohibited commercial transactions of receiving money now and supplying later, unless one of two criteria is met - either the first or the second:
"Yesh lo": The merchandise is in the seller's inventory. The seller takes a hundred dollars now and commits to supplying the wine next week, but the wine is already resting in his cellar. In such a case he can say: "The wine that you are buying and that I will supply in a week is from now on the merchandise located in my cellar; I am transferring ownership to you right now, and I am not exposed to profit or loss. I am not obligated to hand it over to your domain now, but I could have." Since the merchandise is in inventory, he is completely backed: even if the price of wine rises a thousandfold, nothing will change, for the wine is already in his possession and he will not lose his money. Therefore, the Sages permitted this.
"Yatza hashaar": There is a known, established, and stable market price for the merchandise, familiar to all, and it can truly be purchased for this exact amount right now. For example, if the wine is found in all the stores and its price is a hundred dollars a bottle. This is a stable, known, available, and real price. Because of this, the one who receives a hundred dollars for the purpose of supplying wine next week could easily go to any store now, buy the merchandise, and hold it in inventory - and as we learned regarding "yesh lo", one who has the merchandise in his inventory is considered as if he transferred ownership right now and is protected and not exposed. This is indeed a theoretical two-step thought process, but since it was in his power to do so, he is not exposed, and the matter is permitted.
However, if there is no "yesh lo", as the merchandise is not in inventory, and there is also no "yatza hashaar", as there is no recognized and established market price for the merchandise being sold - it is Rabbinically prohibited to receive money now in exchange for later delivery, and this is pseikah al hapeiros.
Seah beseah: Another Rabbinic prohibition, closely related to our topic. Its loose translation is measure for measure - a cup for a cup or a gallon for a gallon (a seah is a specific measurement, and this does not matter for our purposes). A person is not permitted to say to his friend: "Lend me a barrel of beer now, and I will return a new barrel to you next week." The reason is that this is not a loan of money but a loan of beer, and if he commits to returning that exact same amount - should the price of beer rise next week, the lender will receive a value greater than what he gave. Even though there was no stipulation to return more beer, ultimately a greater value will be given, and this is akin to interest: the borrower could collapse completely if the price of beer rises, and the lender might profit.
Here too, the Sages permitted the transaction in two ways: with "yesh lo", where the borrower already has additional stock stored away, and it is as if he could have delivered it now if he wanted to; or with "yatza hashaar", where there is a fixed market price, so he could have exchanged the money he received, bought new beer, and delivered it. Since he has the ability to secure himself, it makes no difference whether he actually did so. Furthermore, in all seah for seah transactions, once the transaction is permitted - even if the price actually went up, it is permissible. That is to say, if someone received a hundred dollars in order to deliver wine the following week on the basis of "yesh lo" or "yatza hashaar", and at the time of delivery the price of wine had doubled and the buyer made a large profit, it is still permissible to deliver the wine to him, since the transaction was permissible at the time it was made. This is the background to our topic, in a nutshell.
Let us move on to the Mishnah itself:
The Mishnah opens: "Eizehu neshech v'eizehu tarbit". This can be confusing: after all, we learned that in the verses, neshech and ribbit are the exact same thing, and both are Torah prohibitions. However, in the Mishnah, neshech is treated as a Torah prohibition and tarbit as a rabbinic prohibition, and we will explain it accordingly.
"Eizehu neshech?" - this is the Torah prohibition, and it refers to fixed interest in two forms: lending money with the requirement to return more than was given, or lending commodities like apples with the requirement to return more than was given. In the words of the Mishnah: "Hamalveh sela bachamishah dinarim" - a person lends a silver sela, which is worth four dinars, and stipulates that the borrower will return five dinars to him next week. There is an interest payment of an additional dinar here, and this is a classic fixed interest prohibited by the Torah. And the second form: "Satayim chitin beshalosh" - he gives him two seahs of wheat today, and stipulates that he will return three seahs next week. Once again, it is fixed interest, since it was established at the time of the loan that the repayment would be greater than what was given, and therefore it is a Torah prohibition of lending with interest, which is called neshech.
And why is it called this? "Mipnei shehu noshech" - the borrower will eventually feel the pain of the bite, for the bottom line is that he will be poorer a week later when he returns the money or the wheat, since he is left with less than what he had initially, and he has sunk into a deeper hole.
We must understand why the Mishnah used this puzzling wording of "a sela for five dinars", rather than simply saying that one lent two dinars and returns three. The answer is that one might mistakenly think that the sela is considered merchandise, since the sela is one type of coin and the dinar is another type, and although there are usually four dinars in a sela, the exchange rate can change - and then it would only be a rabbinic prohibition. The Mishnah comes to teach us that this is not the case, but rather it is a Torah prohibition, as silver coins are considered completely interchangeable with one another.
In contrast, regarding gold coins: we already concluded discussing in the previous chapter that gold, when sold for silver, is considered produce and merchandise, and its status is that of a sales transaction. Therefore, in that case, even though the standard exchange rate is twenty-five silver coins for one gold coin, someone who says "I will give you a gold coin today in exchange for twenty-six silver coins in the future" violates a rabbinic prohibition and not a Torah prohibition, because gold relative to silver is considered merchandise, and its status is like fixing a price for produce and a sales transaction rather than a loan. This is the reason the Mishnah specifically used the case of the sela. This concludes the first part, and it is fairly straightforward.
"Ve'eizu hi tarbit?" - this is the second part, and it is less straightforward, and its prohibition is rabbinic. It is called this because it "increases produce", as the person increases the amount of merchandise in his possession. This is not a loan and it does not have the structure of "I give you and you return to me", but rather a commercial transaction: this one is a seller and that one is a buyer, and the seller supplies merchandise in exchange for the money he received for the purchase - and therefore the prohibition is rabbinic.
The Mishnah elaborates: "Keitzad? Lakach heimennu chitin bedinar zahav hakor" - the seller receives one gold dinar, which is worth twenty-five silver dinars, in exchange for a kor of wheat (a kor is thirty seahs, which does not matter for our purposes). "Vechen hashaar" - and this is the accepted market price that every storekeeper and every wheat seller in the market quotes: a gold dinar, which is twenty-five silver coins.
And since the market rate was established, this transaction is permitted even by rabbinic law. Taking twenty-five silver coins today, in order to deliver the wheat next week, is permitted on the basis of "yatza hashaar", since the price is fixed. If the seller wanted, he could have taken the money now, bought the wheat from any merchant, and it would be located in his utensils: he is covered and is not exposed to risk, and next week he will deliver the wheat to the buyer, as if he had already given it to him now, and all he has to do is bring it into his domain until then. And since this is possible at least theoretically, it is permissible. Up to here there is no problem, not even rabbinically.
However, the Mishnah continues: "Amdu chitin bishloshim dinar" - a week passed and the price of wheat rose, and instead of twenty-five silver coins which make up a gold dinar, the wheat now stands at thirty. And when the seller delivers the wheat that was paid for last week, the buyer will find himself wealthier, as he will be able to receive thirty even though he paid twenty-five. And this too is permissible - this is commerce, and this is the way of business, and everything is in order.
But this is not what happened in our Mishnah. "Amar lo: ten li chitay, sha'ani rotzeh limochran velikach bahen yayin" - the buyer says: I bought the wheat last week and I want to receive it now, since its price went up, and I will be able to sell it for thirty, make a nice profit, and buy a barrel of wine with the money that stands at thirty dinars. Instead of spending twenty-five last week, which would not have bought him a barrel of wine, now the seller owes him wheat, and by selling it he will purchase wine. And if the seller were to reply: "No problem, here is your wheat that has increased in value", this would be entirely permissible.
But the seller did not do this. Rather, "Amar lo: Harei chitayich asuyos alay bishloshim dinar" - I am not physically giving you the wheat, but rather we will record it in the ledger and I will credit you with the equivalent value, as if I gave you back the wheat and we sold it. It turns out that he alters his debt: he no longer owes a kor of wheat, but thirty dinars. The buyer paid twenty-five, and the seller agrees to return thirty - and even this by itself would be valid, since the current price of wheat is thirty, and it is an equal exchange.
However, the seller continues: "Vaharei lecha etzli bahen yayin" - I am not giving you the money now, even though you are asking for it to buy wine. Rather, I will arrange the entire transaction as a ledger entry: I no longer owe you a kor of wheat, but rather a barrel of wine. This is the exact same value, since at this very moment one can exchange a kor of wheat for a barrel of wine in the market, and instead of wheat, I will give you wine next time.
This is rabbinically forbidden, provided that "yayin ein lo" - that the merchant, who initially took the money and obligated himself to provide wheat, does not have any wine in his possession. Why? Because he is promising to provide wine in the future, whereas the allowances of "yesh lo" and "yatza hashaar" rely on the fact that he could have completely covered himself - by buying the product now and delivering it in a week. Here, however, he has nothing but an obligation and a debt to that person, "I promise to return thirty to you," and he has no cash on hand. Consequently, he could not have bought the wine even if he wanted to, nor does he have wine in stock. Thus, there is no "yesh lo" here, and even "yatza hashaar" does not help: although the price of wine is well known, a person cannot buy wine with a mere promise.
And since he does not have the ability to obtain the wine, yet he promises to supply it in the future, he is exposed: if the price of wine rises he could crash and suffer a massive loss, while the buyer who purchased the wheat earlier might make a fortune, just like any lender who gave his money - twenty-five - last week. Therefore, this is rabbinically forbidden: there is no "yesh lo" here, and "yatza hashaar" is irrelevant, since it does not help when one cannot actually go and buy the wine, as he has no cash on hand.
It is worth noting that the Mishnah presented this in a rather complicated manner, whereas it could have brought a much simpler case: Reuven owes Shimon money, and Shimon says, "Return my money, for I wish to buy wine with it," and Reuven replies, "I will owe you wine instead of the money." This too is the exact same rabbinic prohibition - a promise to supply wine later in exchange for a debt that exists now, and there is neither "yesh lo" nor "yatza hashaar" to help here, since he has nothing but a debt without cash.
However, the Mishnah used a two-stage process, two promises in the manner of fixing a price for produce: first an obligation to supply wheat, and then converting it into an obligation to supply wine - in order to teach us that this applies even if the debt was not created through a loan. After all, on a Torah level, nothing is forbidden due to interest except for loans; nevertheless, even if the debt began as a completely valid and legitimate commercial transaction, it cannot be converted into a promise of future payment and supply, and this is forbidden at least rabbinically.