Bava Kamma, Chapter 3, Mishnah 10. This Mishnah contrasts cases where a person's animal causes damage in the category of Keren with cases where the person himself directly causes damage as a human damager, and it highlights several differences in the halachic rules applying to these two types of damage.
The Mishnah opens with a rule: "Yesh chayav al maaseh shoro upatur al maaseh atzmo" - there are situations where for the exact same act, if his ox did it he is liable for payments, whereas if he did it himself he is exempt. And also the reverse: "Patur al maaseh shoro v'chayav al maaseh atzmo" - if his animal caused damage in the category of Keren he is exempt, whereas if he caused the damage himself he is liable for certain types of payments.
Exempt for the act of his ox and liable for his own act:
"Shoro shebiyesh - patur" - if a person's animal caused humiliation to his fellow, for example if while goring it stripped him of his clothing, the halachah is that he is exempt. There is no liability for humiliation payments when a person's animal humiliates in the course of causing Keren damage, since this liability does not apply to an animal, and one only pays for the damage - the depreciation in value caused by the animal's act.
"V'hu shebiyesh - chayav" - if the person himself humiliated his fellow, such as by slapping him, the humiliation is included in the calculation of his payments. There are five categories of payment for one who injures his fellow, and one of them is boshet (humiliation) - the emotional suffering caused to the victim, for which the damager must compensate him.
It is worth analyzing precisely why the Mishnah specifically cited boshet, and not tzaar (pain), ripui (healing), and shevet (loss of livelihood) - the physical pain, medical expenses, and time lost from work - which also apply only to a human damager and not to an ox damaging in the category of Keren. The reason is to teach us that boshet requires a degree of intent: a person is only liable for boshet if he intended to cause damage. The example mentioned above: a sleeping person who rolled over and struck his fellow - he is liable for the damage, but exempt from boshet, because he had no intention whatsoever to cause damage.
Precision in the words of the Bartenura:
The Bartenura, actually quoting the words of the Rambam, writes: "Ein hamevayesh chayav ela kshemevayesh bekavanah" - meaning, a person is not liable for boshet payments unless he intended to humiliate. Yet the Gemara explicitly states that this is not the case, but rather it is sufficient that he intended to cause damage - even if he did not intend to humiliate - in order to be liable for boshet. This leaves us with a question on the Rambam, why he ruled contrary to the Gemara, and a double question on the Bartenura, why he cited this. We will return to resolve this later.
Blinded the eye of his slave:
The Mishnah continues: "Shoro shesimei et ein avdo v'hipil et shino - patur" - if a person's animal blinded the eye of his Canaanite slave or knocked out his tooth, there is no obligation to set the slave free. For the verse says: "And if a man strikes the eye of his slave... he shall let him go free for his eye" - specifically an "ish" (man), and not an animal. Therefore, if his animal damaged his slave, the slave remains in his place. But if the person himself blinded the eye of his slave or knocked out his tooth, or if he cut off his finger or his nose and the like, he must let him go free. This is another example of the difference between damage caused by his animal and damage he caused himself.
Liable for the act of his ox and exempt for his own act:
Ostensibly this is puzzling, since a person's responsibility for his own acts is far greater than his responsibility for the acts of his animal. However, this part of the Mishnah presents the rule of 'kim leih bederabah mineih', which means that we apply the more severe of the two punishments to the person.
The rule is stated when two matters stand for judgment simultaneously: one is a capital offense, the punishment for which, when the conditions are met, is death, and the second is a monetary claim. In such a case, the court does not judge the monetary part at all, but proceeds directly to the capital laws. The classic example: One who shoots an arrow at his fellow and kills him, and the arrow passed through his clothing. We have two matters before us - the taking of a life and the tear in the clothing - and the halachah establishes that we do not judge the clothing at all, but only the capital laws.
It is important to emphasize: this does not depend on the damager actually being put to death in practice. It is enough that the act is the type of action judged as a capital offense, and that both matters occurred simultaneously, for the court not to adjudicate the monetary aspect.
The two examples in the Mishnah:
"Shoro shechaval be'aviv uve'imo - chayav" - wounding means drawing blood, whether beneath the skin as a bruise or above the skin. If his animal wounded his parents, they are permitted to sue him and he is liable to pay according to the law. "Vehu shechaval be'aviv uve'imo - patur" - but if he wounded his parents himself, for example, if he struck his father, Heaven forbid, this is an act for which the Torah established the death penalty. And since a possible death penalty and a monetary liability for the damage stand side by side here, the court does not adjudicate the damage at all, and he is exempt from payment. Even if in practice he cannot be brought to trial, because there are no witnesses or there is only one witness - the law remains that he is exempt, and Heaven will exact punishment from him elsewhere.
"Shoro shehidlik et hagadish beShabbat - chayav" - if his animal set fire to his fellow's stack of grain on Shabbat, this is classic keren damage. This is not similar to the subcategory of regel that we saw earlier, regarding a dog that took a baked cake and dragged coals, because that is a dog's normal manner of eating; whereas here, it is not the normal manner of cows to do so, and it is an unusual act, and therefore it is keren damage. Nevertheless, there is liability for keren damage even when the animal caused a fire to spread. "Vehu shehidlik et hagadish beShabbat - patur" - but if the owner himself set fire to his fellow's stack of grain on Shabbat, since kindling is one of the 39 melachot and a desecration of Shabbat that can incur the death penalty, he is exempt from any monetary payment to his fellow.
And the reason for this, in the words of the Mishnah: "Mipnei shehu mitchayev benafsho" - in these two cases, striking a parent and kindling a fire on Shabbat, the act incurs a much more severe punishment, which is the possibility of the death penalty.
In summary: In this Mishnah we learned two directions of difference between the act of his ox and his own act. On one hand - embarrassment and blinding the eye of his slave, where he is exempt for the act of his ox and liable for his own act, and for embarrassment, intent to damage is even required. On the other hand - one who wounds his parents and one who sets a stack of grain on fire on Shabbat, where he is liable for the act of his ox and exempt for his own act, due to the rule of 'kim leih bederabbah mineih' (he is judged with the greater punishment), that we do not adjudicate the monetary liability where there is a capital liability. We also addressed the difficulty in the words of the Rambam and the Bartenura regarding intent for embarrassment.