We have reached chapter 38, which begins on daf 49b (page 98). One could say that this chapter is a concentration and summary of what we learned in chapters 35, 36 and 37, with the addition of points and ideas that were not stated earlier.
The Alter Rebbe opens: «והנה עם כל הנ"ל», «And with all of the above» - that is, based on everything we have learned in the last few chapters about the great importance of action and of dirah betachtonim (making a dwelling place for Hashem in the lower worlds), and especially based on the lengthy discussion in the previous chapter about the unique advantage of fulfilling mitzvos specifically here in this physical world - «יובן היטב פסק ההלכה הערוכה בתלמוד ופוסקים ד"הרהור לאו כדבור דמי"», «one will well understand the ruling set forth in the Talmud and in the poskim, that thought is not equivalent to speech.» In other words, there is a halachic ruling in the Gemara and in the poskim which we have not properly understood, and precisely what we learned in the previous chapter will explain it well.
What is this halachic ruling?
The Gemara (in Maseches Shabbos and in Maseches Berachos) rules that «hirhur lav kedibbur dami», thought is not considered like speech: a person who thinks in his mind the words that are meant to be said aloud has not thereby said them with his mouth, and thought alone is not enough. The Alter Rebbe brings several examples of things that must specifically be expressed in speech:
«ואם קרא קריאת שמע במחשבתו ובלבו לבד בכל כח כוונתו», «and if one recited Shema in his thought and in his heart alone, with the full force of his kavanah» - even though he invested every possible kavanah, since he did not articulate it with his mouth, «לא יצא ידי חובתו וצריך לחזור ולקרות», «he has not fulfilled his obligation and must recite it again.» He must say Shema over. (The Shulchan Aruch rules that lechatchilah one should make it audible to his own ears, and if he did not, he has still fulfilled the obligation, provided that he articulated the words with his lips.) With Shema one might still have argued that this is a halachah unique to Shema, since the Torah says explicitly «vedibarta bam», «and you shall speak of them.» From where would we know that the same applies where the Torah does not use a term of speech?
«וכן בברכת המזון דאורייתא», «and likewise with Birkas HaMazon, which is from the Torah» - regarding Birkas HaMazon the Torah does not use a term of speech, but rather «ve'achalta vesavata uveirachta», «you shall eat and be satisfied and bless.» Nevertheless the halachah is that it must be articulated in speech. Still, one might have said that the insistence here stems from its being a positive mitzvah from the Torah.
«ובשאר ברכות דרבנן», «and in the other berachos, which are rabbinic» - even with berachos that are only rabbinic the halachah is the same: a person cannot hold the apple in his hand, think in his mind «borei pri ha'eitz», and eat. He must articulate the words. (Birkas HaMazon after eating is from the Torah, and the berachah before eating is rabbinic, and in both one must articulate the words in speech.)
«ובתפילה», «and in tefillah» - and more than that: tefillah is «avodah shebalev», service of the heart, as the verse says, «ule'ovdo bechol levavchem», «and to serve Him with all your heart.» One might well have thought that here the heart alone would suffice. Yet even so the halachah is «שצריך להוציא בשפתיו», «that one must articulate the words with his lips.»
If this were the only half of the halachah before us, there would be no difficulty at all: this is the will of the Holy One Blessed Be He, and there is no room to ask why He wanted certain things done in action and certain things in speech. The difficulty comes precisely from the other direction.
The other side of the halachah:
«ואם הוציא בשפתיו ולא כיוון ליבו», «and if he articulated the words with his lips but did not direct his heart» - a person who said aloud all three parshiyos of Shema without kavanah, and likewise one who said all the words of Birkas HaMazon, or the first berachah, or the tefillah, without kavanah - «יצא ידי חובתו בדיעבד ואין צריך לחזור», «he has fulfilled his obligation after the fact and need not repeat it.» Lechatchilah, of course, one must have kavanah, but bedi'eved he has fulfilled the obligation and does not go back and recite it again. There are two places that are exceptions, where kavanah is indispensable: «לבד מפסוק ראשון של קריאת שמע», «except for the first verse of Shema», that is, «Shema Yisrael Hashem Elokeinu Hashem Echad», «וברכה ראשונה של תפילת שמונה עשרה», «and the first berachah of Shemoneh Esrei», up until «Magen Avraham», «וכדאיתא בריש פרק ב' דברכות: עד כאן מצוות כוונה, מכאן ואילך מצוות קריאה כו'», «as it says at the beginning of the second chapter of Berachos: up to here it is a mitzvah of kavanah, from here onward it is a mitzvah of recitation.» The emphasis here is on the continuation: from here onward it is a mitzvah of recitation alone.
And from here comes the question: within one and the same mitzvah, Shema for example, the will of Hashem is for both, for kavanah and for speech, since lechatchilah both must be present. Why, then, does one who had kavanah without speech not fulfill his obligation, while one who had speech without kavanah does fulfill it?
[A note on how this differs from the expression «hirhurei aveirah kashim me'aveirah», sinful thoughts are harsher than the sin itself, which we have already learned in earlier chapters. There the matter runs in the opposite direction. In practice a beis din does not judge a person for a thought, but only for the sin itself as an act in its own right. The meaning there is that since the thought takes place in the mind, the subtle, inner stratum of the soul, and it damages and defiles that inner stratum, its damage is in a certain respect more significant. But as far as actual punishment is concerned, a person is punished only for a sin he actually committed, not for a thought alone (apart from matters such as thoughts of avodah zarah, where the thought by itself is genuinely severe). So in fact the ruling is consistent on both sides: just as there he did not commit the sin in actuality and is not punished, so too here, one who thinks in his mind and does not articulate the words has not fulfilled the mitzvah; and conversely, one who articulated the words without kavanah has fulfilled it.]
The explanation, based on what we learned in the previous chapter:
In light of what we learned in the previous chapter the matter is well understood. We learned there (on daf 48b) that the descent of the neshamah into this world is for the sake of refining the body. That is the purpose and that is the goal. The Holy One Blessed Be He sent the neshamah down in order that it fulfill mitzvos in this physical world.
Therefore there is no room for the claim, «I fulfilled it with my neshamah, I thought it, my neshamah is fine, so what difference does it make that I did not fulfill it with my body?» - for speech is produced by the organs of the body. The answer is: that is exactly why the neshamah was sent down, to refine the body. It is not enough that the neshamah is in order; it is the body that needs to be set right.
In the Alter Rebbe's words: «והיינו משום שהנשמה אינה צריכה תיקון לעצמה במצוות», «and this is because the neshamah does not need the mitzvos as a tikkun for itself.» The neshamah itself does not require any rectification, and it was not sent here for its own sake, but «רק להמשיך אור, לתקן נפש החיונית והגוף», «only to draw down light, to refine the nefesh hachiyunis and the body» - so that the vital soul should be set right and so that kedushah should penetrate the physical body. And how is this accomplished? «על ידי אותיות הדיבור שהנפש מדברת בה' מוצאות הפה», «by means of the letters of speech that the soul articulates with the five organs of speech» - in the mitzvos that depend on speech, such as Birkas HaMazon, the other berachos, Shema and tefillah, the refinement comes about specifically through the physical instruments of speech, the organs of the mouth, «וכן במצוות מעשיות שהנפש עושה בשאר אברי הגוף», «and likewise through the mitzvos of action that the soul performs with the other limbs of the body.» That is the essential point.
To summarize: in chapter 38 the Alter Rebbe gathers together the ideas we learned in chapters 35 to 37, and on their basis he explains the halachic ruling that thought is not equivalent to speech. In Shema, in Birkas HaMazon, in the other berachos and in tefillah, kavanah without speech does not fulfill the obligation and one must repeat it, while speech without kavanah does fulfill the obligation bedi'eved (except for the first verse of Shema and the first berachah of Shemoneh Esrei, where kavanah is indispensable). And the reason is this: the neshamah does not need any rectification for itself, and its descent into this world is in order to refine the nefesh hachiyunis and the body, through the letters of speech formed by the organs of the mouth and through the mitzvos of action performed with the other limbs of the body.
In the next part we will continue with the Alter Rebbe's words in chapter 38.