In the previous section we studied the obligation of ahavas Yisrael, that every Jew is bound to love every other Jew with a love that is eternal and without limits. Alongside it we saw the words of the Gemara that concerning one's "friend in Torah and mitzvos" who has sinned and has not repented of his sin, it is said, "it is a mitzvah to hate him." In this section we will clarify the reason behind that hatred, and why it stands in no contradiction to ahavas Yisrael.
An explanation one might have thought of:
At first glance one might have suggested that this hatred is nothing more than a protective measure. A God fearing Jew who sees his fellow, who is likewise God fearing and respected by others as a talmid chacham, doing something wrong, is liable to be drawn after him and to learn from his conduct, since after all the two of them are both observant Jews. Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak therefore comes to give good counsel, so that one not be dragged along and fall together with him: "it is a mitzvah to hate him," for once he has developed hatred toward him in his heart, there is no longer any chance that he will learn from his deeds.
But this cannot be said, for several reasons:
If the concern is that he might learn from his deeds, it makes no difference whether the man is his friend in Torah and mitzvos or not. Even a co-worker who keeps no mitzvos at all, whom one meets and talks with every single day, carries the same danger of being drawn after him. Why, then, did they specify precisely "his friend in Torah and mitzvos"?
Such a concern does not justify hatred. Keeping one's distance would be enough: not to deal with him, not to be in his company, and then one would not be drawn after him. From the fact that they said "it is a mitzvah to hate him," it is clear that something more than the fear of being influenced is at stake here.
Is it conceivable that the Torah would command a person to cause another certain harm and painful feelings, perhaps even real damage, on the basis of a mere doubt, that maybe he will not withstand the enticements of his yetzer? There is no such arrangement in the Torah.
More than that: one who transgresses the mitzvos brazenly is called a rasha, and Pirkei Avos says, "do not associate with a wicked person," which is the language of withdrawing from connection with him, not the language of hatred.
The true reason: the severity of a talmid chacham's sin:
You must say, then, that the reason the Gemara says it is a mitzvah to hate specifically "his friend in Torah and mitzvos" is a reason unique to that case. It is explained on the basis of the Gemara in Bava Metzia, which draws an extreme distinction between talmidei chachamim and amei ha'aretz:
Talmidei chachamim: their unintentional sins are treated as intentional ones. A talmid chacham who knows how to learn and does learn, and who stumbled because he did not know that the thing was forbidden, is himself to blame for that very ignorance, since he was obligated to learn. In the words of the Mishnah in Pirkei Avos, "an error in study amounts to willful transgression."
Amei ha'aretz: their intentional sins are treated as unintentional ones. An "am ha'aretz" refers to a Jew who has no understanding at all of what learning is, was never raised with it, and does not even know which side of a sefer to hold. He is far from the whole matter through no fault of his own, and when he transgresses intentionally he does not grasp the gravity of what he is doing at all, and so it is reckoned for him as an unintentional act.
In light of this: a talmid chacham, who is the "friend in Torah and mitzvos" of which the Tanya speaks, transgressed words of Torah, and his fellow came and rebuked him: how can you violate an explicit ruling in Shulchan Aruch? And nevertheless he does not change his way of life on that point. He can no longer claim, "I did not know." The unintentional act, which had already been reckoned for him as intentional, has now become a fully intentional one, and he stands there deliberately transgressing the will of Hashem. Only about this extreme situation is it said, "it is a mitzvah to hate him."
It is worth emphasizing how rare such a situation is. The Rambam already testified regarding the Jews of his generation, and how much more so in ours, that most of them fall into the category of "tinokos shenishbu," captured children: they simply do not know. Most of those who transgress words of Torah were raised in a way that was not correct, and it is exceedingly difficult for a person of thirty, forty, fifty or seventy to change his way of life. They therefore belong to the category of amei ha'aretz, and one cannot say about any of them that he transgresses intentionally. Even someone who drives on Shabbos, and continues to do so after it was pointed out to him, must have his act regarded as unintentional, stemming from a lack of awareness of the force of the matter, its severity and its meaning. Only by a talmid chacham is such a thing reckoned as intentional.
From here it emerges that there is no contradiction whatsoever between the obligation to love every Jew, which we studied in the previous section, and the Gemara's statement that "it is a mitzvah to hate him." The Gemara is speaking of a rare and extreme case in which two conditions are met at once: that he is "his friend in Torah and mitzvos," and that he was rebuked and even so has not repented of his sin and does not abandon it. So it is stated explicitly in the Sefer Chareidim, that only after rebuke, if he persists in his conduct, is it a mitzvah to hate him.
It is to this person that the words of David HaMelech, which we will see at the end of the chapter, also refer (and there we will see one further extreme case), and likewise the verse, "when you see the donkey of the one you hate lying under its burden." "The one you hate" means that Jew whom it is a mitzvah to hate, and only a tiny minority of a minority fall into this category. And all the more so regarding a Jew who is not his "friend in Torah and mitzvos": him it is forbidden to hate at all, and there is a mitzvah to love him and to help him.
"But one who is not his friend and is not close to him":
In contrast to the extreme case described above, a Jew who is not his friend in Torah and mitzvos but just the opposite, who is distant from Torah and mitzvos and even actually transgresses them, concerning him it is said that one must draw him close. But there is one important condition here: "and is not close to him."
What is that condition? Toward a person who is very close to him, an intimate friend who has become like a part of him in a thousand and one ways, opening up a relationship of extra love and unconditional closeness can be dangerous: instead of influencing him, he is liable to become the one influenced. In such a situation he has to guard himself with a certain measure, so that he does not turn from the influencer into the influenced. But when the other is not close to him, a neighbor in the building, a person with whom the connection is technical and general, and all the more so a Jew he does not know at all, there is no concern that the other will influence him, and so the obligation rests upon him to be the one who influences.
About this situation Hillel HaZaken said: "Be of the disciples of Aharon, loving peace and pursuing peace, loving the creatures and drawing them close to Torah." This statement seems familiar and simple, but one must dwell on each and every word of it and appreciate its importance.
Before that, an interesting proof that the Acharonim bring for the principle of "you shall love your fellow as yourself," upon which all of this rests, that anyone who is not his "friend in Torah and mitzvos," even if he is a sinner and a transgressor who violates the Torah, there is a mitzvah to love him: the Gemara in Sanhedrin discusses one who committed a transgression punishable by one of the four court-administered death penalties, and how he is to be put to death. In stoning, for example, whether he is to be pushed down clothed or unclothed, in which manner his pain will be lessened and in which manner his death will come more quickly. A genuine discussion of such details.
In summary: in this section we clarified why one cannot say that the hatred is only so that a person not learn from the other's deeds. For if so, there would be no difference between his friend in Torah and mitzvos and anyone else; distancing oneself would have sufficed; there is no place for causing certain harm on the basis of a doubt; and Pirkei Avos says "do not associate with a wicked person," not the language of hatred. The true reason lies in the Gemara's distinction between talmidei chachamim, whose unintentional sins are as intentional ones, and amei ha'aretz, whose intentional sins are as unintentional ones. Therefore only regarding "his friend in Torah and mitzvos" who was rebuked and did not repent of his sin, an exceedingly rare situation in our generation, which is largely made up of "tinokos shenishbu," is it said, "it is a mitzvah to hate him," and this is no contradiction to ahavas Yisrael. By contrast, one who is not his friend in Torah and mitzvos and is not close to him, there is a mitzvah to love him and to draw him near, in the way of Aharon HaKohen.
In the next section we will complete the proof from the sugya of the Gemara in Sanhedrin, and we will examine the words of Hillel HaZaken, "loving peace and pursuing peace, loving the creatures and drawing them close to Torah," word by word.