We have arrived at chapter 13 of Likkutei Amarim, the first section of Tanya. Over the previous twelve chapters we learned the definition and the essential makeup of the beinoni, the "intermediate" person. In this chapter we will learn about three distinct levels that exist within the beinoni. This chapter also begins to address some of the questions the Alter Rebbe raised back in chapter 1, at the very opening of Tanya. The chapter begins on daf 18a (page 35).
The Alter Rebbe opens the chapter by reminding us of a source he had already quoted in chapter 1, on the first page of Tanya. There, when he listed the categories of "tzaddikim, beinonim and resha'im," he noted that there is a more detailed breakdown: a tzaddik who has good, a tzaddik who has suffering, a rasha who has good, a rasha who has suffering, and the beinoni. In that context he cited the Gemara at the end of the ninth chapter of Berachos, where the Gemara explains the difference between tzaddikim, resha'im and beinonim: "צדיקים יצר טוב שופטן, רשעים יצר הרע שופטן ובינונים זה וזה שופטן" ("tzaddikim, their good inclination judges them; resha'im, their evil inclination judges them; beinonim, this one and that one judge them"). The Gemara brings a proof verse for each one (in the Gemara this is cited in the name of Rabbi Yose HaGelili):
"Tzaddikim, the yetzer tov judges them" - they have no yetzer hara at all. For this the Gemara cites the verse "ולבי חלל בקרבי" ("and my heart is void within me"), a phrase the Alter Rebbe himself will use later in this chapter. As is well known, the word "chalal" carries two explanations: from the root meaning empty, or from the root meaning dead. This is the level of the tzaddikim.
"Resha'im, the yetzer hara judges them" - as the verse in Tehillim says, "נאום פשע לרשע בקרב לבי . . אין פחד אלקים לנגד עיניו" ("transgression speaks to the wicked man within my heart . . there is no fear of God before his eyes"). With the rasha there is no fear of God present at all; the only judge, the only voice with an opinion, is the yetzer hara.
And here we come to the phrase the Alter Rebbe deals with in chapter 13: "beinonim, this one and that one judge them" - there are two who judge the beinoni. This is derived from the verse "כי יעמוד לימין אביון" ("for He stands at the right hand of the pauper") - the Holy One stands at the pauper's right hand to assist him with siyata dishmaya, "להושיע משופטי נפשו" ("to save him from those who judge his soul"). From the wording "shoftei nafsho," judges in the plural, Rabbi Yose HaGelili proves that the beinoni has two judges: "this one and that one judge them."
And it is precisely on Rabbi Yose HaGelili's choice of words that the Alter Rebbe will now focus:
"ובזה יובן לשון מאמרז"ל בינונים זה וזה שופטן [פי' יצר טוב ויצר הרע] דכתיב כי יעמוד לימין אביון להושיע משופטי נפשו" ("With this we can understand the wording of the statement of our Sages: beinonim, this one and that one judge them [meaning the yetzer tov and the yetzer hara], as it is written, 'for He stands at the right hand of the pauper, to save him from those who judge his soul'"). And the Alter Rebbe draws attention to the precision of the Sages' language: "ולא אמרו זה וזה מושלים ח"ו" ("and they did not say, God forbid, that this one and that one rule over them"). The Sages did not say that in the beinoni both the yetzer tov and the yetzer hara rule.
The difference between a judge and a ruler: in a courtroom there is a panel of several judges, one saying this and another saying that. Where there is a ruler, however, he speaks and the thing happens. He is not merely offering an opinion; when the ruler speaks, his word filters all the way down to the lowest ranks, down to the level of execution. A judge, by contrast, is only one voice. There is another judge who says the opposite or objects, and beyond that one can appeal to a higher court. His words do not automatically translate into action on the ground, unlike the ruler's.
This is why the Sages were careful not to say about beinonim that "this one and that one rule." It is not that the yetzer tov and the yetzer hara rule within him, because if we were to say the yetzer hara rules, that would mean it actually holds sway over the person's body, and then he is not a beinoni at all: "כי כשיש איזו שליטה וממשלה ליצר הרע בעיר קטנה אפי' לפי שעה קלה נקרא רשע באותה שעה" ("for when the yetzer hara has any control or dominion in the 'small city' even for a brief moment, he is called a rasha at that moment"). [As we learned at length in chapter 11 regarding the "rasha who has good": it is enough for the yetzer hara to have control and dominion in the "small city," the body, even for one brief moment, for him to be called a rasha at that moment. It therefore cannot be that the yetzer hara rules in a beinoni.]
Accordingly, in the beinoni the yetzer hara is nothing more than a "judge." It has an opinion and it tries to make its voice heard, but that does not mean it will necessarily succeed in having its ruling carried out.
In the Alter Rebbe's words: "אלא היצה"ר אינו רק עד"מ כמו שופט ודיין האומר דעתו במשפט" ("rather, the yetzer hara is only, by way of analogy, like a judge and jurist who states his opinion in a case"). A court case is taking place inside the person's heart, in the sense that there is an opinion from the right and an opinion from the left, and the opinions are divided. The yetzer tov demands, for example, that he go and pray, and the yetzer hara voices the opposite view in this "trial." "ואעפ"כ יכול להיות שלא יהיה פסק הלכה כך למעשה" ("and nevertheless, it may well be that the final ruling will not be that way in practice"). The yetzer hara states its opinion, but that does not obligate anyone, because there is another opinion on the bench: "מפני שיש עוד שופט ודיין החולק עליו" ("because there is another judge and jurist who disagrees with him") and says the opposite.
Let us return to Rabbi Yose HaGelili's words:
Of the tzaddik he said "the yetzer tov judges them" - and clearly the yetzer tov also rules, since there is only one judge and one opinion, with no opposition whatsoever, and therefore its words go straight into action.
Of the rasha he said "the yetzer hara judges them" - the exact reverse: the only judge is the yetzer hara stating its opinion, and since there is nobody to oppose it, that opinion goes straight into action.
Of the beinoni he said "this one and that one judge them" - there is this opinion and there is that opinion. It is a constant war and a constant struggle, a dynamic situation that never settles permanently into one state; there are divided opinions all the time.
Let us preface a point that will sharpen the distinction between these types of people, and which follows from what we learned in the earlier chapters. The Holy One created the human being, and in doing so He fixed his essential makeup: which character traits he would have, good ones or bad ones. This is fixed; it does not change and it cannot change. A person created with an essence of good traits belongs to the domain of good, and he falls into the category of tzaddik.
But there is someone created with an essence of bad traits, and such a person cannot be a tzaddik. His free choice expresses itself in this: that even though he has bad traits, he will not bring those traits into actual practice.
[True, it is hard for him, and he cannot be compared to someone born with good traits. But precisely because of that, when he succeeds his achievement is "more precious than anything precious," because he labored over it, he struggled, he exerted himself and he prevailed. Every person is created for a different purpose in the world.]
As for the beinoni, in his very inner makeup there is a constant war. At every moment the judges are stating their opinions: the yetzer tov demands that he do something good, and immediately the second judge sounds off with the opposite.
[Here also lies the answer to the complaint, "This is how You made me, what do You want from me?" The Holy One did not create the person in a way that forces him to fail in practice. He was given a certain set of givens, but they are not givens that obligate him to sin; they are givens that require him to work and to exert himself.]
In the Alter Rebbe's words: "וצריך להכריע ביניהם" ("and one must decide between them"). Since there is a war, a decision in favor of one of the two sides must be reached, "והלכה כדברי המכריע" ("and the halacha follows the words of the one who decides").
This concept appears in the Gemara at the conclusion of tractate Berachos, in the discussion about myrtle and oil, over which one recites the blessing first, where Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel disagreed. One of the Tannaim (Rabban Gamliel) decides that one should bless on the oil first and brings a reason for his position, and the Gemara states: "and the halacha follows the words of the one who decides." In other words, when opinions are divided and a third party comes and decides between them, the halacha follows his words.
Just how absolute this rule is can be seen from the story brought there immediately afterward. It is related that a certain man recited the blessing on the myrtle first, and they immediately turned to him and said: "What, do you not hold of the well-known rule that the halacha follows the words of the one who decides?" In other words, it is simple and obvious that the halacha follows the one who decides. And this is the very formulation the Alter Rebbe employs, "the halacha follows the words of the one who decides." We will soon see who that deciding voice is in the trial taking place within the soul of the beinoni.