Siman 689, Se'if 2 · A review of the underlying principle: shomea k'oneh

Shulchan Aruch, Siman 689, se'if 2
"And there are those who say that women do not fulfill the obligation on behalf of men."
(Shulchan Aruch)

A review of the underlying principle: shomea k'oneh

• Hearing it from someone who is obligated: A person fulfills the mitzvah of megillah by listening to someone else read, on the principle of shomea k'oneh (one who hears is like one who recites). This works only if the reader himself is obligated in the mitzvah, and provided the reader intends to be motzi (to fulfill the obligation for) the listener and the listener intends to be yotzei (to fulfill his obligation).
• Answering amen: There is no requirement to answer amen to the berachos. That is a matter pertaining to the berachah alone. It is proper to answer, but it does not hold back one's fulfillment of the mitzvah.
• The berachos are not indispensable: Even someone who did not hear the berachos before and after the megillah has still fulfilled the mitzvah of hearing the megillah, although l'chatchilah one should hear them and answer amen.
• A katan: Someone who is not obligated, such as a katan (a minor), cannot fulfill the obligation for someone who is, because he is not on the same level of obligation. According to most poskim a katan can be motzi other ketanim, since their obligation is equal, both being on the level of chinuch, though even here there is discussion.

Reading the Shulchan Aruch's wording closely, and the question it raises

• The precise wording: The Shulchan Aruch says that women do not fulfill the obligation for men, and by implication a woman does fulfill the obligation for other women. The problem is only with being motzi someone who stands on a higher level of obligation.
• The question: Chazal taught that women are obligated in mikra megillah because "they too were part of the miracle." The decree of destruction was against all the Jews, children and women included, and the Ribono shel Olam saved them; therefore they are obligated in the thanksgiving, which is the reading of the megillah. If so, their obligation would seem to be identical to that of men, so why, according to the "yesh omrim," can they not be motzi men?

The three mitzvos where we say "they too were part of the miracle"

• The four cups: There is no issue here of fulfilling someone else's obligation through a reading, so this question does not arise.
• Ner Chanukah: The mitzvah of ner Chanukah is "a man and his household," and one person's lighting suffices for the entire household. Even when the wife lights and her husband stands next to her and does not light, she fulfills the obligation on his behalf.
• Mikra megillah: Precisely here, one opinion holds that a woman cannot be motzi a man, and that itself demands an explanation: what is different here?

First explanation: because of kavod hatzibur

"And it is not comparable to ner Chanukah, for megillah is different, since it is like the reading of the Torah, and she is disqualified because of kavod hatzibur (the honor of the congregation)."
(Mishnah Berurah, s.k. 7)

• The comparison to krias haTorah: The reading of the Torah is not a personal mitzvah but a communal one, generated by the very existence of a tzibur. Although a woman does not count toward a minyan, she is part of the community, and strictly speaking one might have said she could read. Nevertheless, the Gemara in Maseches Megillah states that a woman does not receive an aliyah and does not read from the Torah, because of kavod hatzibur.
• What kavod hatzibur means: The disqualification does not stem from any deficiency in the woman herself, but from the fact that in those times it would have looked like a slight to the congregation for a woman to take this honor when no man could be found to do it. The men are the ones who carry the roles in the shul, and it is not fitting for a woman to go up in their place.
• An illustration of this concept: Strictly speaking, the one reading the megillah may sit, but it is proper that he stand, because sitting during the reading looks like a slight to the congregation. An honor given to a person should be carried out in a manner befitting it.
• Why this is hard to grasp today: In our times this reason is difficult to appreciate, and out of that difficulty some have set up women's minyanim where women receive aliyos. Even so, we do not budge from the words of the poskim, who ruled that a woman does not receive an aliyah because of kavod hatzibur, and the same applies to reading the megillah.

And why can she not be motzi even a single individual?

"Therefore, even for an individual she cannot fulfill the obligation, because of lo plug."
(Mishnah Berurah, s.k. 7)

• The logic: At first glance the reason of kavod hatzibur applies only to a congregation, so in her own home she should be able to read and be motzi her husband. To this the Mishnah Berurah responds that there is a principle of lo plug rabbanan (the Rabbis did not draw distinctions): once Chazal established that a woman does not read for a congregation, they did not distinguish between one and many.
• Why they did not distinguish: The underlying basis, kavod hatzibur, is itself hard to grasp, and all the more so people would not understand why she cannot be motzi in a minyan but can be motzi an individual. So they set one uniform rule: a woman does not read for men at all, not even for a single man.

Tznius as an additional element within kavod hatzibur

• Those standing at the bimah: Strictly speaking, during krias haTorah four people stand at the bimah, one to the reader's right and one to his left, because the Torah was given through an intermediary, as the Gemara explains. In practice people are not so careful about this, and sometimes only three or two stand there.
• Why it would be unbecoming: If a woman were to stand up there with men on either side of her, it would not be appropriate. For this reason some say that kavod hatzibur is not purely a matter of honor but also includes an element of tznius.
• The same applies to megillah: At the megillah reading too it is common for another person to stand next to the reader, to hold the megillah or to take over partway through, and then a man and a woman would be standing together at the bimah, which is unbecoming.
• Kol b'ishah ervah: This point was raised, although it is not the subject of our sugya here. Some are lenient regarding a reading done for a mitzvah, since a person's attention is on the mitzvah and not on the voice, and this is not singing for enjoyment. Still, the main reason given here is kavod hatzibur and the tznius bound up with it.

Second explanation: the level of a woman's obligation in megillah

"And it is possible that a woman is not obligated in the reading but only in hearing, as will be explained later, and she is therefore considered 'not obligated in the matter' relative to a man."
(Mishnah Berurah, s.k. 7)

• What is novel in this explanation: According to the first explanation a woman's obligation is identical to a man's, and only an external factor prevents her from reading in public. According to this explanation the deficiency is in the law itself: a man is obligated in reading the megillah, while a woman is obligated only in hearing it.
• The practical difference: A man who is alone with no one to read for him must read it himself. A woman who is alone with no one to read for her is not obligated to read, since her obligation is one of hearing.
• The proof from the text of the berachah: It is brought later that a woman reading for herself recites "lishmoa megillah" (to hear the megillah) and not "al mikra megillah" (on the reading of the megillah). This shows that her level of obligation is not the same as a man's.
• The source of this view: This is the position of some of the Geonim, and they bring proof from a sugya in Maseches Arachin and from a Tosefta. Some have said that there is a textual error in that Tosefta; according to those who hold this view, there is no error there.
• A woman is motzi another woman: In any case a woman can fulfill the obligation for another woman, since both are on the same level of obligation. The rule is that one who stands on a higher level can be motzi those equal to him and those below him, but cannot be motzi one who stands above him.

The logic behind this view: what exactly is "they too were part of the miracle"?

If their obligation stems from having been part of the miracle, we need to understand why their level of obligation should be lower. This depends on the two ways of understanding "af hen hayu b'oso hanes":

1. They were included in the danger and were saved: According to this explanation there is no difference at all between men and women, since the Ribono shel Olam saved them all equally.
2. They brought about the miracle: On Chanukah, Yehudis cut off the head of the general and from there the revolt began, and that was a real action. On Purim, Esther went to Achashverosh, requested to make a feast and persuaded him, but her action was through speech and not an active deed. According to this approach the women's share in bringing about the miracle is not equal to the men's, and from here comes a lesser level of obligation.

• The objections raised: It was pointed out that Esther put her life at risk, and that we should judge by the result. Regarding her going to Achashverosh as well, it is said that she was "karka olam," passive ground, meaning she performed no action; furthermore, she was taken to the palace before the decree was issued, and not in order to save Klal Yisrael. Mordechai too gathered the Jews and gave them instructions through speech, while the deed itself was the Jews' battle against their enemies. And the fast is not an action either, but a matter of refraining.
• The conclusion: This is not the only view, and one is not compelled to accept this reasoning. There is no blanket statement here that women are on a lesser level in mitzvos; after all, in ner Chanukah and in the four cups their obligation is equal. The discussion is about megillah alone, and only according to one opinion.

In practice: the wording of a woman's berachah

• The problem with the wording: According to those who hold that a woman is obligated in the actual reading, the berachah "lishmoa megillah" is deficient, since it makes no mention of mikra megillah.
• The ruling of most Acharonim: It is best that she recite "lishmoa mikra megillah," which contains both the language of hearing and the language of reading, thereby grasping the rope at both ends.

In passing · A niddah in shul and in matters of kedushah

• A position that was rejected: There was a faction in Ashkenaz that maintained a woman who is a niddah may not come to shul at all. All the poskim reject this, since divrei Torah are not susceptible to tumah. Therefore a woman who is a niddah does come to shul, and it presents no obstacle.
• The words of the Ramban: The Ramban in his commentary on the Torah mentions a custom that a woman who is a niddah does not remain in the house at all but in a special tent outside it, and he explains that the reason is tznius, so that her husband should not come to her. The Jews of Ethiopia practice this to this day, and it is not a custom that sprang out of thin air.
• Distinguishing tefillah from actual matters of tumah: Tefillah, reading from the Torah and learning are spiritual matters, and divrei Torah are not susceptible to tumah. Different from these are actual matters of tumah, for example a woman whose husband is a kohen, where care must be taken regarding her touching food, since a kohen is held to a stricter standard in matters of tumah.
• Practices rooted in Kabbalah: The practices concerning a cemetery and concerning ruchos ra'os and mazikin (evil spirits and harmful forces) come from Kabbalah and have no source in the Gemara. This does not mean one should not observe them, only that they are an addition beyond the basic halachah.
• What happened at Matan Torah: It says "do not approach a woman," and they separated for three days. That was said on account of seminal emission, which is a tangible tumah, and before Matan Torah the laws of tumah and taharah had not yet been given. It was a hora'as sha'ah, a directive for that moment, since they were about to hear the voice of the Ribono shel Olam and a special state of purity was required. The Gemara says that all those with physical defects were healed at Matan Torah, and there were changes in the natural order; some have said that there were no women who were niddos at that time as well, though this is not clear-cut.