Siman 489, Se'if 1 (2)

Shulchan Aruch, siman 489, se'if 1

"On the second night, after Maariv, we begin counting the Omer... and if one forgot to count at the beginning of the night, he goes and counts all night long, and it is a mitzvah for each person to count for himself."
(Shulchan Aruch, se'if 1)

Understanding the phrase "he goes and counts all night long"

It does not mean continuous counting: the expression "goes and counts" is not telling us that he counts without interruption throughout the night.
It means there is no time limit: there is no particular hour within the night that cuts off the counting. Whenever during the night he remembers, he can make up the counting he missed at Maariv.

The reason: "they shall be complete" (Mishnah Berurah, s.k. 4)

"He goes and counts all night long, for as long as the night has not passed he has not yet left the category of the verse 'they shall be complete.'"
(Mishnah Berurah, s.k. 4)

The starting point: ideally one should begin counting from tzeis hakochavim (nightfall), in order to fulfill "they shall be complete," that the counting be whole. This does not refer only to the weeks being complete, but also to the day one is counting being complete.
The difficulty: someone who remembers at midnight has already let six hours of the day slip by, and on the face of it that is no longer "complete."
Reckoning the twenty-four hour day: a "day" in the language of Scripture is twenty-four hours ("and there was evening and there was morning, one day"). As long as dawn has not arrived, twelve hours have not gone by, that is, the majority of the day has not passed.
The principle of the majority: as long as half has not passed, you can still call the thing whole. The claim is not that this is complete in the fullest sense, since obviously it is not one hundred percent, but rather that it has not left the category of "complete." But once the whole night has passed, and at sunrise thirteen hours are already gone, it is very hard to call that complete.

(Compare the law of lechem mishneh on Shabbos: someone who has one loaf and a half and does not have two whole loaves - some say he should take only the one loaf, and others say he should set out the loaf and a half, because one and a half still counts as two. Nobody disputes that two whole loaves are preferable; the only question is whether there is any value in a loaf and a half. This same principle appears in halacha in a number of places.)

"It is a mitzvah for each person to count for himself" (Mishnah Berurah, s.k. 5)

The first explanation: a special revelation that shomea k'oneh does not apply to the counting

"To count for himself: for it is written 'and you shall count for yourselves,' which implies that the mitzvah falls upon each and every individual. And it would seem from this that the counting is not like other mitzvos that consist of speech - for example kiddush and havdalah and the like - where if one heard it from his fellow and intended to fulfill his obligation he does so, on the principle of shomea k'oneh (one who hears is like one who recites). Here the Torah revealed that he has not fulfilled his obligation as long as he has not counted himself."
(Mishnah Berurah, s.k. 5)

Mitzvos performed through speech: in kiddush and havdalah the essence of the mitzvah is the saying. The Rambam explains that "remember the day of Shabbos to sanctify it" means to sanctify it by pronouncing words of praise and kiddush.
The principle of shomea k'oneh: Chazal taught the novel rule that even though the person himself says nothing and only listens, it is as if he said it. So too with the reading of the Torah, with Megillas Esther, and with the reading of Shir HaShirim: a person listens and does not speak, and it counts as though he had spoken.
The conditions of the rule: he must actually hear, the one reciting must intend to discharge his obligation, and the listener must intend to fulfill his obligation.
What is different about sefiras ha'omer: from the extra word "lachem" ("for yourselves") the Torah revealed that in sefiras ha'omer it is not enough to hear it from the chazzan; each person is obligated to count himself.

The second explanation: the verse comes to exclude beis din

"But some of the later authorities wrote that the Torah's intent was only that we should not say that this mitzvah applies to beis din alone, as with shemittah and yovel where it says 'and you shall count for yourself,' but rather that it applies to each and every individual."
(Mishnah Berurah, s.k. 5)

Other countings in the Torah: the Torah has the counting of a niddah and the counting of a zavah, and it has the counting of shemittah and the counting of yovel. Regarding shemittah and yovel it says "and you shall count for yourself seven cycles of seven years," and yet no private individual counts "today is year one of the shemittah cycle."
What Chazal revealed: Chazal expounded that the "and you shall count for yourself" stated by shemittah and yovel is incumbent on beis din, and the individual is exempt.
Why one might have erred regarding the Omer: the Omer offering is a communal offering, so one could have argued that its counting too is incumbent on the community, on beis din and on the kohanim, and has nothing to do with the individual.
The conclusion of this explanation: the verse comes to teach that even though the Omer offering is a communal offering, the counting rests on each and every individual. And since the verse tells us nothing more than that, sefirah is like any other individual mitzvah: just as the reading of Megillas Esther is incumbent on each and every individual and nevertheless one person reads while the congregation listens and thereby fulfills its obligation, so too the chazzan counts "today is one day of the Omer" and the listeners fulfill their obligation through shomea k'oneh.

"According to this, if one heard his fellow count and intended to fulfill his obligation, and his fellow also intended to discharge it for him, he has fulfilled his obligation, as everywhere else where we hold that shomea k'oneh."
(Mishnah Berurah, s.k. 5)

The distinction between the counting and the berachah

"All this is with regard to the counting. But as for the berachah recited over the counting, everyone agrees that one can fulfill his obligation through his fellow, even if he himself is capable of reciting it, just as with all berachos."
(Mishnah Berurah, s.k. 5)

Two separate things: there is a berachah and there is a counting, and the two must not be confused. Regarding the berachah there is no dispute at all that a person fulfills his obligation by listening to his fellow, as with all berachos, provided that the one reciting is obligated in the matter and the listener is obligated in the matter.
Where the doubt lies: the entire discussion is about the counting itself, where the chazzan says "today is one day of the Omer" and the listener does not count with his own mouth.

"Nevertheless, the practice throughout all Israel is that each person recites the berachah and counts for himself, and they do not rely on the chazzan."
(Mishnah Berurah, s.k. 5)

The practical difficulty with the custom, and understanding the Mishnah Berurah's wording

The difficulty: the chazzan recites the berachah and counts out loud, and the congregation hears him. If they fulfill their obligation with his berachah, and according to one view with his counting as well, then it would seem that whoever afterwards recites the berachah and counts for himself is making a berachah in vain and performing a counting in vain.
It depends on the rule of mitzvos requiring intent: merely saying the words is not the issue; everything hinges on whether a person who did not intend to fulfill his obligation nevertheless fulfills it against his will.
The explanation lies in the phrase "the practice throughout all Israel": since this has become a fixed custom throughout all Israel, repeated by every person on each of the forty-nine days and every single year, and recorded in halacha as the custom, the listener need not state explicitly that he does not wish to fulfill his obligation. The custom itself makes his intent plain, that he is not relying on the chazzan and does not intend to discharge his obligation with the chazzan's counting. Therefore the chazzan can recite the berachah and count, and the congregation recites the berachah and counts for itself, and nothing is amiss. This is the resolution of the later authorities, and with it all the doubts are settled.
Someone who is aware of the doubts: one who knows all these questions and has in mind, before the chazzan begins, that he does not wish to fulfill his obligation through what the chazzan says, certainly has no problem. The question concerns the ordinary person who comes to shul and hears the chazzan.

Counting in any language

"The later authorities wrote that for the counting any language is permitted, provided that he understands that language; and if he does not understand, then even if he counted in Lashon HaKodesh he has not fulfilled his obligation."
(Mishnah Berurah, s.k. 5)

The source of this ruling: the Magen Avraham and the Chok Yaakov, cited in the Shaar HaTziyun (note 6), who wrote that if he does not understand he has not fulfilled his obligation.
The discussion is about the counting: this is not speaking about the berachah but about the counting itself, and one who counts in another language and understands that language has fulfilled his obligation.

"Even though everywhere else one fulfills his obligation in Lashon HaKodesh even if he does not understand, as we wrote above in siman 62."
(Mishnah Berurah, s.k. 5)

The superiority of Lashon HaKodesh: Lashon HaKodesh has an advantage over all other languages, because the sacred writings were given in it, and the berachos and all the mitzvos performed through speech were formulated in it. Therefore someone who heard Megillas Esther and does not understand the Hebrew precisely has still fulfilled his obligation.
A proof from the Gemara: the Gemara itself says that we do not know the precise meaning of certain words in the Megillah, such as "ha'achashteranim bnei haramachim," which are Persian words. The general idea is clear but the precise translation is unknown, and nonetheless one fulfills his obligation by listening, since these words were written in Tanach and their status is that of Lashon HaKodesh.
The difficulty: if so, why should we say that one who counts in Lashon HaKodesh but does not understand the numbers, who says "today is seven days of the Omer" without knowing what "seven" means, has not fulfilled his obligation? For this reason there are authorities who dispute this ruling.
The Mishnah Berurah's resolution: the counting is not exactly like other recitations, though he did not spell out why.

The underlying principle: counting is not speech but a kind of action

The claim of the later authorities: some of the later authorities wrote that the whole discussion of shomea k'oneh in sefiras ha'omer never even gets started, because counting is not defined as a recitation.
The proof: the rule is that anything said in Lashon HaKodesh discharges the obligation even if the listener does not understand. Since with the counting they said that if he does not understand he has not fulfilled his obligation even in Lashon HaKodesh, this shows that the counting is not simple speech but speech of a different sort.
The definition: the counting is a kind of action. It is not literally a physical act, but neither is it mere speech, and therefore the rule of shomea k'oneh does not apply to it, since that rule was stated regarding ordinary recitation.
The example of lulav: someone who shakes the lulav and hears the berachah from his fellow has fulfilled his obligation for the berachah. But someone who merely heard his fellow recite the berachah and shake, and did not shake himself, has certainly not fulfilled his obligation, since the shaking is incumbent on him. The berachah is speech, but the act that goes with it is not merely speech.
The example of tefillin: someone who watched his fellow put on tefillin and recite the berachah, and answered amen, does not thereby fulfill his obligation. His fellow performed an act and he did not.
The conclusion of this approach: in their view it is clear that one who hears his fellow count "today is one day of the Omer" has not fulfilled his obligation at all, just as he does not fulfill his obligation through his fellow's donning of tefillin.

(The definition is a subtle one, and there is room to debate exactly how to formulate it, but the foundation is that counting does not fall into the category of mere speech.)

Two ways to justify the custom: there is no problem with the chazzan standing and reciting the berachah and counting, either because the fixed custom makes it clear that the congregation does not intend to fulfill its obligation with his counting, or because counting is not speech at all and therefore one cannot fulfill the obligation by listening.

In passing · mitzvos requiring intent, and the blowing of the shofar

The basic rule: the poskim disagree about the rule that mitzvos require intent, and whether it applies to Torah mitzvos alone or to rabbinic mitzvos as well. Nobody disputes that ideally all mitzvos require intent; the discussion concerns someone who had no intent at all, not someone who intended the opposite.
The case: a baal tokea who knows all the halachos, but who did not announce at the outset that he intends to discharge the congregation's obligation and that the congregation should intend to fulfill its obligation. Has the congregation not fulfilled its obligation? Not every shul makes such an announcement.
The ruling: even though he did not announce it, the baal tokea presumably intends to discharge the obligation of all who hear him. And according to most poskim, a person who comes to shul on Rosh Hashanah comes in order to hear the tekios, and as long as he does not intend the opposite, we presume that he wants to fulfill the mitzvah of hearing the shofar, and he has fulfilled his obligation.
One who passes by outside the shul: as we learned earlier, even someone passing by outside the shul who heard and had intent has fulfilled his obligation.
An a fortiori argument for a rabbinic mitzvah: with shofar the matter is weightier because it is a Torah obligation, and all the more so with rabbinic mitzvos, where many are lenient about the requirement of intent.
The relevance to sefiras ha'omer: with regard to sefiras ha'omer nowadays there is a dispute whether it is a Torah obligation or a rabbinic one, and therefore the question of one who hears the chazzan remains standing; and as explained, the resolution of the later authorities rests on the force of the established custom.