TheWholeTorah.aiBeta

Zevachim Chapter 14, Mishnah 9: Consecrating and Offering Korbanos Relative to the Permissibility of Bamos

Chavrusa Learning
Listen0:00 / 0:00

Zevachim Chapter 14, Mishnah 9. In the previous five Mishnayos we learned that there were times when it was permitted to bring individual korbanos on a bamah - a private altar - and times when it was prohibited. From this, three possibilities open up regarding a person who designates an animal and obligates himself to bring his korban:

  1. At the time of designation, bamos were permitted, and at the time of the actual offering, they were already prohibited.

  2. At the time of designation, bamos were prohibited, and even at the time of the offering they were prohibited.

  3. At the time of designation, bamos were prohibited, whereas at the time of the actual offering, they were already permitted.

The Mishnah will discuss all three of these possibilities.

Three separate issues regarding Torah mitzvos:

  • Mitzvas aseh - A positive commandment to bring the korbanos to the place where they belong. This is mentioned in the pesukim several times, and the technical mitzvah to point to here is in Vayikra chapter 17, verse 5: "Vehevi'um laShem el pesach ohel mo'ed". Someone who does not do this fails to fulfill the Torah's command to bring the korban to its proper place.

  • Lo sa'aseh - A prohibition against offering korbanos outside the proper boundary, as stated in Devarim chapter 12: "Hishamer lecha pen ta'aleh olasecha bechol makom asher tireh" - not to offer olah offerings anywhere as a person desires, instead of offering them in the place where they belong. Wherever the Torah uses the language of "hishamer", "pen", or "al", these are the signposts that we are dealing with a technical negative commandment, a Torah prohibition.

  • Chiyuv kareis - As we have seen earlier in this chapter, there is also the possibility of a liability for kareis, meaning premature death or being cut off by Heaven. Its source is in Vayikra chapter 17: "Ish ish mibeis Yisrael asher yishchat" - slaughtering, and similarly later on regarding offering up - "Ve'el pesach ohel mo'ed lo hevi'o", and he does not bring his korban to the entrance of the Ohel Mo'ed, to the place where it belongs. And the pasuk concludes: "Venichras ha'ish hahu mikerev amo". Kareis means a lack of children or premature death, as has already been explained.

These three matters hover over each of the cases in the Mishnah.

Two fundamental principles for understanding the Mishnah:

We will preface with a look at these principles, because experience shows that it is difficult to follow the Mishnayos without them:

  1. The mitzvas aseh is determined by the time of designation: A person who obligated himself to bring a korban at a time when the only place to bring it is Shiloh, is obligated at that moment to bring it to Shiloh. If by the time he actually comes to offer his korban, Shiloh is no longer standing, and we are in the period of Nov when bamos were permitted, he is now permitted to offer his korban on a bamah - but he transgresses a mitzvas aseh, since from the moment he became obligated and Shiloh was standing, he should have brought it there and then, and he did not do so. Even if it is not his fault, the bottom line is that he did not fulfill the mitzvas aseh - like someone who woke up late in the morning and missed the time for reciting Shema, who nullified a mitzvas aseh even though he should have acted differently.

  2. The liability for kareis depends on both times: The liability for kareis takes effect only if at the time the person designated the animal and obligated himself in the korban, the matter was already subject to kareis, meaning that bamos were prohibited at that time, and also at the time he offered the korban, the matter remained prohibited. It is worth remembering that the liability for kareis applies only when he did this intentionally.

The three cases in the Mishnah:

"Kol hakodashim shehukdeshu bish'as issur bamos vehukrevu bish'as issur bamos bachutz, harei eilu be'aseh velo sa'aseh vechayavin aleyhen kareis" - He designated the animal at a time when it was prohibited to bring it on a bamah, for example, during the time of Shiloh when he obligated himself to bring this cow for an olah offering, and he also offered it during a time of prohibition of bamos, on a private altar outside the proper place. In this case, all three boxes are checked: he transgresses a mitzvas aseh, since he should have brought it to Shiloh from the time he became obligated in it; a lo sa'aseh, since he offered it in a place that is not proper to offer it, outside of Shiloh; and he is liable to kareis, since at the time of designation there was already a potential for kareis if he would offer it on a bamah - and indeed he offered it on a bamah.

"Hukdeshu bish'as heteir bamos vehukrevu bish'as issur bamos, harei eilu be'aseh velo sa'aseh ve'ein chayavin aleyhen kareis" - At the time of designation, bamos were permitted, and by the time he offered it in his courtyard, the Mishkan had already moved to Shiloh and the matter was prohibited. He transgresses the mitzvas aseh of the command to bring his korban to the place where it belongs in Shiloh, and the lo sa'aseh of not bringing it in a place where it does not belong - and he brought it to his courtyard, where its place is not. But there is no punishment of kareis for it, since, as stated, it is derived from the pesukim that if at the time of designation there is no punishment of kareis for offering on a bamah, even if he ultimately offered it on a bamah - he is not liable for kareis.

"Hukdeshu bishaas issur bamos vehukrevu bishaas heter bamos - harei elu ba'aseh ve'ein bahen lo ta'aseh" - if they were consecrated at a time when bamos were forbidden and sacrificed at a time when bamos were permitted, these involve a positive commandment but no negative commandment. At the time of consecration, bamos were forbidden, for example, the Mishkan still stood in Shiloh, whereas at the time he actually sacrificed the offering in his courtyard, the Mishkan was no longer in Shiloh but in Nov, and sacrificing on a bamah was permitted. Thus, at the time of the obligation, the act was forbidden, and at the time of the action, it was permitted. Therefore, he violates only a positive commandment, and not a negative commandment, and consequently, he is not liable to kareis. The reason he is liable for the positive commandment is, as mentioned, that at the time he became obligated in this olah offering, there was a designated place to bring it - Shiloh - and he was required to do so but did not. Even though it was not his fault, the bottom line is that he did not fulfill the positive commandment; but at the time he actually sacrificed it, the act was permitted, and therefore he does not violate a negative commandment and is not liable to kareis.

In summary: In this Mishnah, we examined the three components of sacrificing an offering in its proper place - a positive commandment ("and they shall bring them to Hashem, to the entrance of the Ohel Moed"), a negative commandment ("take heed to yourself lest you offer your burnt offerings in every place that you see"), and the liability of kareis ("and that man shall be cut off from among his people") - and we learned how they are distributed across the three cases: consecrating and sacrificing at a time when bamos are forbidden - a positive commandment, a negative commandment, and kareis; consecrating at a time of permission and sacrificing at a time of prohibition - a positive commandment and a negative commandment without kareis; consecrating at a time of prohibition and sacrificing at a time of permission - a positive commandment alone.