Zevachim Chapter 7, Mishnah 6 - the final mishnah of the chapter, and the last on the topic we have been discussing: bird offerings. We just learned that a melikah (pinching the neck) can be invalid, and yet still prevent the bird from becoming a neveilah (an unslaughtered carcass). Our mishnah seeks to clarify another case: what is the law of a bird that underwent a proper melikah in all respects, but afterward it was discovered to be a tereifah - for example, a hole was found in its heart. Such a bird is not kosher for eating and is unfit for an offering, but the melikah was done properly, and at the time there was no reason to suspect its fitness. Only after the fact did it become known that it is unfit for an offering. Does the melikah prevent it from becoming a neveilah, or not?
The Precedent from the Law of Shechitah:
We have a precedent based on Tractate Pesachim: one who slaughters a cow, goat, sheep, or even a deer, and afterward it is discovered that it is a tereifah - it is not a neveilah. That is to say, once a valid shechitah (ritual slaughter) has been performed, the animal does not convey the tumah (impurity) of a neveilah at all, even though it is forbidden to eat for another reason. The question is what the law is regarding the melikah of offerings: how does it work when it becomes clear that the bird was a tereifah? There is a three-way dispute on this question, and all opinions are fundamentally based on the exegesis of verses in Tractate Pesachim. Nevertheless, the mishnah here presents a possible derivation from the general agreement that shechitah removes a tereifah animal from the status of neveilah, and from this it seeks to draw an analogy to the melikah of a bird. This derivation requires two steps: first, a transition from mammals to birds, and then a transition from shechitah to melikah.
The Text of the Mishnah:
The mishnah opens: "Malak ve-nimtzet tereifah" - a proper melikah was performed on a bird, and afterward an internal fatal flaw was found in it which would have killed it, and therefore it is unfit for an offering or for eating. The Tannaim disagree regarding its law:
Rabbi Meir: "Ein ha-melikah metammah be-veit ha-beli'ah" - the law of the bird is like the law of other animals: it is not a neveilah and does not convey tumah, even though it is forbidden to eat. The basis of his words is in the verse expositions in Pesachim.
Rabbi Yehudah: "Metammah be-veit ha-beli'ah" - based on other expositions, he disagrees and holds: since it became clear that the bird was unfit for an offering, there was no permission whatsoever to perform melikah on it, and it turns out that the melikah is nothing but an act of destruction. Therefore, one who eats this bird that was invalidated by its tereifah status becomes impure by eating a neveilah and conveying it through the tumah of the esophagus (beit ha-beli'ah).
It is worth noting that studying the Gemara to its conclusion makes it clear that the kal vachomer (a fortiori derivation) and the "mah matzinu" (analogy) that we will bring shortly are not the primary basis of Rabbi Meir's opinion, but rather the exposition in Sotah. With these arguments he seeks to prove that even Rabbi Yehudah, who does not accept his exposition, is obligated to accept his ruling - since Rabbi Yehudah admits that an animal that was slaughtered and found to be a tereifah is not a neveilah.
Two Steps in Rabbi Meir's Derivation:
Transition from animals to birds - via a kal vachomer.
Transition from shechitah to melikah - via a binyan av (a derived general rule), using the "mah matzinu" method.
The First Step - A Kal Vachomer from an Animal to a Bird:
The method of a kal vachomer is to determine the position of the subject at hand on the scale of severity of the topic being discussed, and here the scale is the intensity of tumah. What is the stronger source of tumah, a dead bird or a dead animal? The answer: the animal. A bird carcass does not convey tumah through contact, whereas an animal carcass - the carcass of a large land mammal - conveys tumah through contact and even through carrying, meaning by merely bearing its weight. Thus, the animal is a more severe source of tumah than the bird. From this comes the kal vachomer: if shechitah saves an animal from becoming a neveilah even when it is found to be a tereifah, then kal vachomer (all the more so) shechitah should save a bird from becoming a neveilah when it is found to be a tereifah.
And so the mishnah concludes: "Mah im nivlat behemah she-hi mitammah be-maga u-ve-masa, shechitatah metaheret et tereifatah mi-tumatah" - look at the severe side of the scale of tumah sources, an animal carcass, which conveys tumah intensely: through direct contact and through carrying its weight. Nevertheless, shechitah saves it from being a source of tumah, even though it is not permitted to eat because it is a tereifah. "Nivlat ha-of, she-einah metammah be-maga u-ve-masa, eino din she-tehei shechitatah metaheret et tereifatah mi-tumatah" - the bird carcass is a much lighter source of tumah, as contact and carrying do not convey tumah with it, and therefore it is logical that all the more so shechitah with a knife will save a bird that was found to be a tereifah from becoming a source of tumah. This concludes the first step.
The Second Stage - "Mah matzinu" from shechitah to melikah:
Until now we have moved from animals to birds, but a separate issue remains: the discussion is not about shechitah with a knife but about melikah. From where do we know that the melikah of a bird offering that is found to be a tereifah saves it from becoming a neveilah? For this purpose a second stage is needed, and it is not a kal vachomer but a binyan av, by way of "mah matzinu" (what do we find). The definition of "mah matzinu" is: when we have before us two matters where there is no reason to differentiate between their laws, we apply the law from one to the other. However, it is very easy to reject a "mah matzinu" with a refutation - it is enough to present any reason for differentiation, and any reason is sufficient, and therefore it is much easier to stop such a derivation than to stop a kal vachomer.
The principle stated here in the Mishnah is that the function of melikah is identical to the function of shechitah. Although there is a difference in the names and the method - melikah for a bird offering, and shechitah which is the fundamental method - their purpose is one: to kill the animal by way of an orderly slaughter, and to permit it for eating. If so, there is no reason to differentiate between shechitah and melikah, and the law should be identical: even melikah in a bird should save it from becoming a source of tumah, even if it is found to be a tereifah.
And in the words of the Mishnah: "Mimah matzinu bishchitatah shehi machshartah ba'achilah umetahares es treifasah mitumasah" - Just as we find regarding shechitah, that it makes it fit for eating and purifies its tereifah from its tumah - shechitah, in an animal and even in a bird, is what permits the meat for eating, and it itself also exempts the animal from becoming a source of tumah as a neveilah. "Af melikasah, shehi machshartah ba'achilah, tetaher es treifasah mitumasah" - So too its melikah, which makes it fit for eating, should purify its tereifah from its tumah - melikah functions in the exact same manner: to permit the bird for eating - a bird olah is consumed by the Altar, and a bird chatas is eaten by the kohen - and if so, since its action is identical, logically it too should exempt it from the tumah of a neveilah.
The Mishnah does not bring the answer of Rabbi Yehudah, but he would reject this derivation entirely on the basis of the verses.
The view of Rabbi Yose - the halachah:
The third view is the view of Rabbi Yose, and it is the halachah: "Dayah keneveilas behemah - shechitatah metaharatah velo melikasah" - It is sufficient for it to be like the neveilah of an animal - its shechitah purifies it, but not its melikah. Rabbi Yose agrees with Rabbi Meir regarding the kal vachomer: everyone agrees that the shechitah of an animal saves it from the tumah of a neveilah even when it is found to be a tereifah, and this law applies even in birds, since shechitah is shechitah. But he does not accept the extension of the law to melikah, and he does not concede that melikah performs the same action.
And so it is ruled as halachah: shechitah with a knife, in an animal and in a bird, functions so that it does not become a neveilah even if it is found to be a tereifah, on the basis of two separate verses. But melikah is different, and the melikah of a bird that is found to be a tereifah does not save it from the law of neveilah, and it is a source of tumah.
In summary: In this Mishnah we learned the law of a bird that was subjected to melikah properly and was afterwards found to be a tereifah. Rabbi Meir purifies it and it does not impart tumah in the esophagus, Rabbi Yehudah deems it tamei, and Rabbi Yose differentiates: shechitah purifies and melikah does not purify. We discussed the two stages of Rabbi Meir's derivation - a kal vachomer from the neveilah of an animal, which imparts tumah through touch and carrying, to the neveilah of a bird which is more lenient, and a binyan av through a "mah matzinu" from shechitah to melikah - and that the basis of his view is from derivations, whereas these derivations were stated as an argument against Rabbi Yehudah. The halachah is ruled according to the view of Rabbi Yose. With this, the chapter and the discussion of bird offerings are concluded.