Mishnah 7:4. Not all Mishnayos are easy, and this Mishnah is particularly difficult. We will do our best to explain it, and if it is not completely clear - half of the responsibility falls on us for not being clear enough, and half on the learner, who should return to it in the next cycle of Shas and toil over it within the language of the Mishnah itself. This is a challenging Mishnah.
The Case Discussed in the Mishnah:
A bird that was dedicated as a bird olah, whose law is to be completely burned, and the kohen treated it from the beginning of the process to the end like the service of a bird chatas. Everyone agrees that the offering is invalid, since it was dedicated as an olah and performed as a chatas. The question is, if a person were to eat from the meat of this invalid offering - would he be liable for me'ilah?
The Rule Regarding Me'ilah:
Olah: From the moment it is dedicated it is subject to the law of me'ilah, and it never leaves this status. Even after it is completely offered it remains the consecrated property of Hashem until the end, since it is entirely meant to be burned on the altar.
Chatas: Although it is initially subject to the law of me'ilah, once it is performed properly it becomes entirely food for the kohanim, and there is no longer any me'ilah involved. It is no longer the consecrated property of Hashem, but rather kohen's food. And even if a non-kohen eats it - this is not permitted, but he is not subject to me'ilah, since it is no longer the private property of Hashem, as it were.
The View of Rabbi Eliezer:
Rabbi Eliezer says what is expected: an olah that was treated like a chatas remains an olah - an invalid olah. From the moment it was dedicated as an olah it is the consecrated property of Hashem, subject to me'ilah, and nothing has changed. Simple and clear.
The View of Rabbi Yehoshua:
According to Rabbi Yehoshua, an olah that was performed like a chatas somehow becomes a chatas. The minimalist approach to understanding his words is that it becomes a chatas just enough that there is no longer any me'ilah involved, exactly like a properly offered chatas which is not subject to me'ilah. Meaning, it is still an invalid offering, but one who eats from it is not subject to me'ilah, as if it were a chatas.
The Reasoning of Rabbi Yehoshua - The Explanation of Tosafos:
The question must be asked: what is the reason for this? After all, there is no precedent or parallel for this in all of Shas. Tosafos suggests that bird offerings generally come in pairs - an olah and a chatas brought together, such as a zavah who brings a pair of birds. It is permitted to dedicate the pair of birds without designating which of them is the olah and which is the chatas; and when the kohen performs the service of the chatas - that bird becomes a chatas, and when he performs the service of the olah - that bird becomes an olah. It emerges that there is a certain level of interchangeability between these two birds.
Since there is a certain level of interchangeability with olah and chatas birds, Rabbi Yehoshua understands (and this is how Tosafos explains it) that if they treated an olah like a chatas from beginning to end - they performed it like a chatas and for the sake of a chatas - it becomes a chatas. And it is worth noting: this is not talking about someone who brought two birds and did not designate which of them is the olah and which is the chatas, but rather a person who chose to specifically say, even though he was not obligated to do so: "This bird is my olah and this bird is my chatas," and the kohen took the one designated for an olah and treated it like a chatas. Nevertheless, Rabbi Yehoshua holds that it becomes a chatas, at least to a certain extent, and the mechanism for this is the fact that olah and chatas birds are interchangeable to a certain degree.
What exactly happens according to Rabbi Yehoshua? Tosafos suggests two possibilities:
Not much happens: it is still an olah, just an invalid olah, but it becomes a chatas to the extent that it is no longer subject to me'ilah.
A second possibility, which is harder to understand: perhaps it becomes a chatas completely because it was treated like a chatas, and not only does it not have me'ilah, but it is a chatas in every respect. That is, on a Torah level it would be fit to be eaten, and it is only invalid on a rabbinic level for a specific reason.
These are the two approaches in Tosafos, and the matter is difficult; we will not delve into them any further. This is the case of our Mishnah and this is its background.
It is worth emphasizing: the way our Mishnah is presented is much more opaque, as it does not reveal Rabbi Yehoshua's reasoning at all - all this comes from Tosafos. The Mishnah only presents the case: what is the law regarding a bird olah that was treated like a chatas. Rabbi Yehoshua says that it is not subject to me'ilah, and Rabbi Eliezer says that it is subject to me'ilah. Twice, Rabbi Eliezer attempts to prove logically why Rabbi Yehoshua cannot hold his position, and twice Rabbi Yehoshua rejects the proofs and says they have no substance - but he does not explicitly establish why he believes the status of the offering changes.
In any event, the halachah follows Rabbi Yehoshua, as is usually the case in a dispute between Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Eliezer. In practice, therefore, this bird is not subject to the law of me'ilah.
Let us learn the Mishnah inside:
"Olas ha'of she'asah lematah kema'aseh hachatas leshem chatas" - a bird that was consecrated as an olah, and all the service of a chatas was performed upon it with the proper intent of a chatas, as if it were a chatas. Everything was done exactly according to the law of a chatas, except that the wrong bird was taken. "Rabbi Eliezer omer: mo'alin bah" - besides it being invalid, if instead of it being burned outside the Mikdash someone comes and eats from it, he is also liable for the punishments of me'ilah. "Rabbi Yehoshua omer: ein mo'alin bah" - one who eats from it is indeed acting unlawfully, but there are no consequences of me'ilah, and if he did so inadvertently, he does not bring an asham me'ilos.
Rabbi Eliezer's first attempt - a kal vachomer:
First, let us understand the kal vachomer itself: in the world of the stringencies of me'ilah, which of the two types of birds is the lenient one and which is the stringent one? Rabbi Eliezer says that the lenient one is the chatas, since a chatas that was processed properly ceases to be subject to me'ilah. Both start out subject to me'ilah, but after the chatas is processed properly and its blood is placed on the Altar, the bird becomes food for the kohanim and is no longer subject to me'ilah. Thus, the chatas is relatively lenient compared to the bird olah, which from the moment it is consecrated as an olah is subject to me'ilah and this will never change. The olah, therefore, is more stringent, and from here stems the kal vachomer: if an olah was processed like a chatas - it certainly is subject to me'ilah.
And in the words of the Mishnah: "Amar Rabbi Eliezer: mah im chatas ha'of she'ein mo'alin bah lishmah" - a bird chatas, if processed properly, is no longer subject to me'ilah, and therefore it is the lenient one in the context of sensitivity to me'ilah; "kesheshinah es shmah - mo'alin bah" - and when it was processed unlawfully, where it was treated like an olah, everyone agrees, including Rabbi Yehoshua, that it is subject to me'ilah. "Olah shemo'alin bah lishmah" - the olah is stringent in the category of me'ilah, for even if it is processed properly it remains subject to me'ilah and never ceases from it; "kesheshinah es shmah - eino din sheyim'alu bah" - therefore, when it was treated like a chatas, it certainly is subject to me'ilah. This is a classic kal vachomer, and we will not expand on it further.
Rabbi Yehoshua's rejection:
Any refutation of a kal vachomer is based on the claim that the lenient element is not lenient in every dimension, or that the stringent element is not stringent in every dimension. And so Rabbi Yehoshua says: this proof is not a contradiction to my position that an olah upon which the service of a chatas was performed is no longer subject to me'ilah. "Im amarta bechatas sheshinah es shmah leshem olah - sheken shinah es shmah ledavar sheyesh bo me'ilah" - with a chatas that was treated like an olah, before the slaughter it was subject to me'ilah, and even if it supposedly becomes an olah, the olah itself is subject to me'ilah, and therefore there is no reason for the me'ilah to disappear. "Tomar be'olah sheshinah es shmah leshem chatas, sheken shinah es shmah ledavar she'ein bo me'ilah" - here it was treated like a chatas, which, if processed properly, is not subject to me'ilah; thus the olah was made into something that is not prone to me'ilah, and that is more lenient.
Rabbi Eliezer's Second Attempt - Kodeshei Kodashim Slaughtered in the South:
Rabbi Eliezer seeks to bring proof from a completely different type of case - from standard animal offerings. The rule is that a chatas, asham, and olah must be slaughtered in the northern part of the Azarah, and if they were slaughtered in the south, they are invalid. Kodeshei kodashim (offerings of the highest sanctity) are subject to the laws of meilah (misuse of consecrated items) from the moment they are consecrated, whereas kodashim kalim (offerings of lesser sanctity) are not subject to meilah from the moment of their consecration. With an asham, for example, there is a law of meilah before the slaughtering, but after it is processed properly, there is no longer meilah for the meat. However, if it was slaughtered in the south of the Azarah, it is invalid. Since it was consecrated as an asham and subject to meilah, and then ruined during its slaughter, it never ceases to be subject to the law of meilah, even if they treated it like a shelamim, because it is an invalid asham.
In the words of the Mishnah: "Vahari kodeshei kodashim sheshechatam badarom veshechatam leshem kodashim kalim - yochichu" - behold, kodeshei kodashim that were slaughtered in the south and were slaughtered for the sake of kodashim kalim will prove it - an asham that was slaughtered in the wrong place in the Azarah and processed from start to finish as if it were kodashim kalim, such as a shelamim, will prove that a change of designation does not cancel the law of meilah. The cases parallel each other well: just as with a bird olah that was processed unlawfully as a chatas, Rabbi Yehoshua suggests that it loses its status of meilah, so too it would be fitting to say this regarding an asham that was slaughtered for the sake of a shelamim - yet even Rabbi Yehoshua admits that it is subject to meilah. What, then, is the difference between an asham processed as a shelamim and an olah processed as a chatas?
"Sheken shinnah et sheman ledavar she'ein bo meilah - ume'alu bahen" - since he changed their designation to something that is not subject to meilah - yet one who misuses them is liable for meilah - even though he treated the asham as a shelamim, whose meat has no meilah, one who eats from the meat of the asham is still liable for meilah, since it is an asham and not a shelamim, and there is no practical difference that they treated it as a shelamim. "Af attah al titemah al ha'olah, sha'af al pi sheshinnah et shemah ledavar she'ein bo meilah - sheyime'alu bah" - you too should not wonder about the olah, that even though he changed its designation to something that is not subject to meilah - that they should be liable for meilah for it - there is no distinction between the cases: it is true that they treated the bird olah as a chatas, which has no meilah when processed properly, but this is no different or more lenient than the animal offering, an asham that was treated as a shelamim, and therefore one must be liable for meilah when eating from this olah.
Rabbi Yehoshua's Rejection:
Rabbi Yehoshua admits that an asham slaughtered for the sake of a shelamim remains subject to meilah, but it is not comparable to the case before us. The reason: even though there is no meilah for a shelamim, this is only partially true - the meat is indeed permitted to be eaten by the kohanim and the owners, but the eimurim, which are the sacred portions, are subject to meilah, because they belong to Hashem. It turns out that one who treats his asham as a shelamim, even if it were to become a shelamim, would not be completely free from the law of meilah, since the eimurim are subject to meilah; this is a transition from a status of full meilah to a status of partial meilah. This is not similar to an olah that was treated as a chatas, since no part of the bird chatas goes up on the Altar, and once its melikah (nipping of the neck) is performed and it is brought properly, there is no possibility that any part of it would be subject to meilah. Therefore, the two cases are not comparable.
In the words of the Mishnah: "Amar lo Rabbi Yehoshua: im amarta bekodeshei kodashim sheshechatan badarom veshechatan leshem kodashim kalim, sheken shinnah et sheman ledavar sheyesh bo issur vehetter" - Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: if you said regarding kodeshei kodashim that he slaughtered in the south and slaughtered for the sake of kodashim kalim, since he changed their designation to something that contains a prohibition and a permission - one who treats an asham as a shelamim changes its designation to something that has a prohibited component, meaning subject to meilah - the eimurim - and a permitted component, the rest of the meat which is not subject to meilah; it is not something entirely free of meilah. "Tomar ba'olah sheshinnah et shemah ledavar shekulo hetter" - will you say this regarding an olah that he changed its designation to something that is entirely permitted - this cannot be compared to an olah that was treated as though it were a chatas, for if it is processed properly there is no component of meilah in it, since a bird chatas has no meilah at all after it is brought properly. Thus, there is no proof from here either. And here the Mishnah concludes.
In summary: We learned regarding a bird olah that was processed using the procedure for a chatas and for the sake of a chatas - an invalid offering that everyone agrees is invalid - whether one who eats from it is liable for meilah. Rabbi Eliezer holds him liable, since the olah remains an olah and never leaves the law of meilah, and Rabbi Yehoshua exempts him, and this is the halachah. Rabbi Yehoshua does not explain his reasoning in the Mishnah, but merely rejects Rabbi Eliezer's two attempts to prove it from logic - from an a fortiori argument (kal vachomer) from a chatas that was processed as an olah, and from kodeshei kodashim that he slaughtered in the south for the sake of kodashim kalim. From the Gemara it becomes clear that his reasoning is that the bird olah practically becomes a bird chatas, at least partially, and therefore it is not subject to meilah. The reason for this, according to Tosafos, is that there is a sort of mutual interchangeability between a bird olah and a bird chatas, since there is no need to designate which of them is the olah and which is the chatas - even though in our case he did designate them - and from here we see that an olah can become a chatas, at least partially. And the two Tosafos dispute the extent of this: whether it becomes a chatas only to the degree that there is no meilah in it, or whether it becomes an actual chatas, and by Torah law it would be permitted to be eaten and is only invalid by Rabbinic law.