Mishnah 4 of Chapter 1 comes to summarize the topic we have dealt with until now - the definition and rules of a service being 'shelo lishmah' (not for its own sake). The first three Mishnayos spoke explicitly only about slaughtering, and here it teaches that the law applies equally to all four of the blood services.
The Mishnah returns to the law of the Pesach and Chatas that are slaughtered not for the sake of the proper type of korban, and establishes that this is not limited to slaughtering, but applies also to receiving the blood, to walking - bringing the blood to the altar - and to sprinkling, which is placing the blood.
The Mishnah lists here three types of invalidating thoughts:
"Shelo lishman" - the service was done for the sake of a type of korban that is not the proper one.
"Lishman veshelo lishman" - one of the stages was done with two intentions: initially he intended for the proper korban, such as a Chatas, and in the middle of the slaughtering, receiving, or sprinkling he thought about an Olah.
"Shelo lishman velishman" - he started with the thought of an improper korban, and during that same service moved to the proper korban.
In all these cases - "pesulim" - they are invalid. The service is ineffective, and when it comes to a Pesach or Chatas the korban itself is invalid and must be disposed of - and the Pesach, as mentioned, when it is slaughtered at its proper time.
Two ways of understanding mixed intentions:
The Gemara raises the question of what the simple meaning of the words is, and it has two possibilities before it:
Mixing intentions within the same service itself: in the first part of the walking, the kohen intends for the proper korban and in the second part for an improper korban, or vice versa.
Mixing between services: at the time of the walking he intends properly, for the sake of the Pesach, but his thought is that the sprinkling, the placing of the blood, will be done afterward for the sake of a Shelamim or for the sake of another korban.
The Gemara does not give a conclusive answer, but the Rambam rules as halachah that both ways are forbidden and therefore invalidate - meaning both are applicable. It is worth noting that in Tractate Pesachim there appears a Mishnah that is almost identical to our Mishnah, and there the Bartenura adopts the principle of the second way.
"Keitzad" - the Mishnah's examples:
"Lishman veshelo lishman - leshem Pesach uleshem Shelamim" - he intends for a Pesach and afterward for a Shelamim. The law applies, of course, to any other korban, and the novel teaching is specifically with a Shelamim: a Shelamim korban is, as it were, hidden inside the Pesach, and in certain scenarios, when the Pesach cannot be offered, it is offered as a Shelamim and it is valid. Nevertheless, this thought is considered as being not for their sake, and the service is invalid.
"Shelo lishman velishman - leshem Shelamim uleshem Pesach" - he started with the thought that he is doing it for the sake of a Shelamim, and moved to doing it for the sake of a Pesach.
The sacrifice is invalidated through four things:
Here the Mishnah explicitly summarizes that there are four stages during which a sacrifice is invalidated by a thought of not for its own sake:
"Bishchitah" - the act of slaughtering.
"Uvekibul" - receiving the blood in a service vessel, the sanctified vessel.
"Uvehiluch" - bringing the blood to the altar.
"Uvezrikah" - applying the blood.
This is the opinion of the Tanna Kamma.
The Opinion of Rabbi Shimon:
Rabbi Shimon disagrees and holds that one of the stages is not essential: "Rabbi Shimon machshir behiluch" - if a person had thoughts of not for its own sake when bringing the blood to the altar, and had in mind an improper type of sacrifice, the sacrifice is valid.
His reasoning: "Iy efshar shelo bishchitah veshelo bekabbalah veshelo bizrikah, aval efshar shelo behiluch" - there is no possibility of offering a sacrifice without slaughtering, without receiving the blood in a service vessel, and without applying the blood, and therefore these three stages are essential; but it is possible to offer a sacrifice without any conveying of the blood at all, when the kohen's feet are planted in their place. As the Mishnah's example: "Shochet betzad hamizbe'ach vezorek" - he slaughters next to the altar and tosses the blood from where he stands. Since the conveying is not essential, a thought during it does not invalidate.
Although this sounds as if it is based on logic, in practice Rabbi Shimon relies on derivations and exegeses from the verses, in a technical and precise manner.
The Opinion of Rabbi Eliezer:
The Mishnah states "Rabbi Eliezer", even though the Gemara says that it is presumably Rabbi Elazar. And who is he? Most commentators explain that he is Rabbi Elazar ben Shammua, a contemporary of the Tanna Rabbi Shimon, whereas Rashi explains that he is Rabbi Elazar the son of Rabbi Shimon, who disagrees with his father.
In any case, he takes a middle position and makes it dependent on the nature of the walking: "Hamehalech bemakom shehu tzarich lehalech - hamachashavah poselet" - when he walks toward the altar, this walking is required, and therefore an improper thought at that time invalidates the sacrifice. "Uvemakom she'ein tzarich lehalech - ein hamachashavah poselet" - when he walks to a place that he does not need to walk to, in a direction that is unnecessary, the thought does not invalidate.
Summary of the Dispute - A Kohen Walking Away from the Altar with the Blood in His Hand:
According to the Tanna Kamma: The thought is decisive, since conveying is included among the essential stages.
According to Rabbi Shimon: The thought is not decisive, since a thought never has significance during the conveying stage, because it is not essential.
According to Rabbi Elazar: Since he is walking in an unrequired direction, the thought does not invalidate.
However, if he turns around and walks back toward the altar, even though he initially did not need to walk, the walking now becomes necessary because he moved further away. Therefore, even Rabbi Elazar will require the proper intention: if he now has in mind an improper sacrifice, it becomes invalid - in accordance with the opinion of the Tanna Kamma. Rabbi Shimon maintains his position that the entire act of walking is not essential, and even if he actually walks in this case, his intention does not invalidate the sacrifice.
Halachah: The halachah follows the Tanna Kamma, and therefore intention applies to each of the four stages of the blood service. If it is done not for its proper sake, with the intention for a different, improper type of sacrifice, the sacrifice is invalid when dealing with a chatas or a pesach offering in its designated time. For all other sacrifices, the sacrifice is not invalidated, but the owners have not fulfilled their obligation and will be required to bring another sacrifice to fulfill their duty.
In summary: In this Mishnah we learned that the law of "not for its sake" is not unique to slaughtering, but applies to all four blood services - slaughtering, receiving, walking, and sprinkling - and in all variations of mixed intentions: "not for their sake," "for their sake and not for their sake," and "not for their sake and for their sake." We discussed the two approaches to understanding mixed intentions and the ruling of the Rambam that both invalidate, the view of Rabbi Shimon who rules it valid in the case of walking because it is not essential, the intermediate position of Rabbi Elazar who makes the matter dependent on whether the walking is required, and the halachah which follows the Tanna Kamma.