We are beginning Chapter 3, Mishnah 1. In the previous chapter we discussed who is invalid for the service of the sacrifices, and we noted that the Mishnah there spoke from the receiving of the blood - receiving the blood into a service vessel - and onward. We emphasized there that the slaughtering itself can be done by any person, and our Mishnah says this explicitly.
The text of the Mishnah:
"Kol hapesulin sheshachtu - shechitasan kesherah" - all those people who are invalid for receiving, conveying, and sprinkling, if they performed the act of slaughter itself on a sacrifice, their slaughter is completely valid.
"Shehashechitah kesherah bezarim" - by someone who is not a kohen.
"Benashim" - by a woman.
"Uva'avadim" - and even a Canaanite slave, a person who was not born Jewish but has practically become part of the Jewish household (as will be explained below).
"Uvitmei'im" - and even impure people are valid to perform the slaughter.
"Afilu bekodshei kodashim" - even with the most holy sacrifices: the sin-offering, the guilt-offering, and the burnt-offering.
"Uvilvad shelo yehu temei'im noge'in babasar" - on the condition that after the slaughter of the animal, the impure person does not touch its meat, for if he touches it - he makes it impure and invalidates it.
Initially or after the fact:
The wording "all the invalid people who slaughtered, their slaughter is valid" sounds like an after-the-fact expression, after the action has been done. However, in practice, the matter is permitted initially: a non-kohen or a woman is allowed to perform the slaughter to begin with. The reason the Mishnah used after-the-fact language is because of the impure person, for whom this is indeed the case - his slaughter is only valid after the fact, since by rabbinic decree an impure person may not slaughter initially, out of concern that he will ultimately come into contact with the sacrifice and make it impure.
Those valid for slaughter:
Slaughter is valid by a non-kohen - by someone who is not a kohen, and all these laws are based on verses. Women are similarly valid to slaughter, and there is no problem with this, and this is the law even with non-sacred food (and even though nowadays a woman does not slaughter an animal for food, there is an extraneous reason for this).
And regarding slaves, a distinction must be made:
Hebrew slave: The Mishnah is not referring to him, since a Jewish servant is merely a regular Jew who is in a type of debtors' prison. There is nothing non-Jewish about him, and therefore his slaughter is as valid as the slaughter of any other non-kohen.
Canaanite slave: A person who started out as a gentile, but in the meantime was circumcised and immersed in a mikvah, and now he is essentially Jewish. He is obligated in mitzvos like a Jewish woman - he keeps kosher, observes Shabbos, and so on, and in these obligations he is equal to any Jewish woman. Because of this, his slaughter is valid.
Gentile: Invalid to slaughter, even for non-sacred food, for regular food in our times. And similarly, a Canaanite slave who has not yet immersed in a mikvah or who was not circumcised - is invalid, since he is on a lower level than a valid slave.
Slaughter by an impure person - a logistical question:
We said that impure people are valid for slaughter even with the most holy sacrifices, and this raises a practical question: After all, an impure person cannot enter the Temple courtyard, even if his tumah is minor. How, then, can he perform the slaughter? We also cannot say that he should stand outside and reach his hand inside, because even partial entry into the Temple is forbidden to an impure person. Therefore, we must establish a forced scenario, such as an especially long knife, where the person stands outside and the knife reaches inside. But in any case, in principle, an impure person can slaughter, and there is no problem with the slaughter itself.
"Uvilvad shelo yehu temei'im noge'in babasar":
To understand things in more detail, we will preface with a few rules. A live animal cannot contract tumah at all, and therefore if it carried a corpse on its back, it is still valid to serve as a korban. However, once it is dead, it can contract tumah. There are a few technical matters here that cloud the picture somewhat, so we will establish the rules clearly.
Even a dead animal that was slaughtered does not contract tumah until its meat has become susceptible, meaning it was prepared to receive tumah. This susceptibility requires that the animal, or any other food, becomes wet in a way that the owner is pleased with or comfortable with, and that the wetness is from one of the seven qualifying liquids, known by the acronym Yad Shachat Dam:
Yud - wine.
Dalet - honey (bee honey).
Shin - oil (olive oil).
Chet - milk.
Tet - dew.
Dalet - blood, and this is the one relevant to our topic.
Mem - water.
Since blood is one of the qualifying liquids, seemingly the korban after slaughtering - having blood on its neck - is from now on susceptible to contracting tumah. However, there is a special, separate rule that the blood of korbanos does not qualify, and it does not make things susceptible to contracting tumah. Nevertheless, there is an additional, separate matter here: korbanos have a special status, and they are susceptible to contracting tumah in any case. The bottom line is that a tamei person who touches the animal makes it tamei. There are additional technical details, such as a person who is an av hatumah using a knife, in which case the knife itself becomes a source of tumah and the animal becomes tamei in any case - but the principles are the principles.
"Lefichach hem poslin bemachashavah" - therefore they invalidate with intention:
The intention of the one performing the slaughtering is significant, even if he is a non-kohen, a woman, a slave, or tamei. If he had an intention for outside its proper place or outside its proper time, and the like - he invalidates the korban, for his intention is significant since he is valid to perform the slaughtering. However, it must be remembered that they are not valid for the kabbalah - the receiving of the blood - or for the services that follow it.
"Vechulan shekiblu es hadam" - and all of them who received the blood:
If these invalid individuals received the blood, and at the time of receiving, that woman or that non-kohen had an intention for outside its proper time or outside its proper place - it makes no difference. The intention is irrelevant here, for the receiving itself is invalid.
"Im yesh dam hanefesh, yachazor hakesher vikabel" - if there is lifeblood, a valid person should go back and receive it:
If there remains blood suitable to be used for korbanos, this is the lifeblood - the blood that spurts out after making the cut in the neck. This is a short window of time, but we will establish that there are two spurts of blood, and there will certainly be at least two. If the first spurt was received by a non-kohen - this is ineffective, and his intentions are irrelevant. But if the second spurt can be received by a kohen, and he is obligated to do so if it is in his power, this receiving is valid and the blood is valid.
Therefore, the valid person, the kohen, must hurry and catch the second spurt, receive the blood, and continue with the service of the korban as usual. Meaning, even though the first spurt was received by a woman or by a non-kohen, and even if they had invalidating intentions - it matters not, because as long as the lifeblood is available, one can continue with the second spurt and proceed from there.
In summary: In this Mishnah we learned that slaughtering, unlike the other services, is valid when performed by non-kohanim, women, slaves, and those who are tamei, and even for Kodashei Kodashim; that this allowance is l'chatchilah, except for a tamei person for whom it is allowed only b'dieved; that a Canaanite slave who was circumcised and immersed is valid for slaughtering, while a non-Jew is invalid; that the tamei person does not touch the meat, based on the rules of susceptibility to tumah; and that since these invalid people are valid for slaughtering - their intention invalidates it, but for the receiving of the blood their intention is not significant, and if lifeblood remains, a valid person should go back and receive it.