We are now beginning Tractate Zevachim, chapter 1, mishnah 1. In the lengthy introduction to the tractate, we discussed the general framework: the first four chapters of the tractate deal with thoughts that can invalidate a sacrifice. The focal point of the first chapter is the thought of "shelo lishmah" - intention for the wrong type of sacrifice.
The Four Invalidating Thoughts:
Four thoughts can invalidate a sacrifice, and they are divided into two categories. The first category includes two thoughts whose laws are completely identical, and they are discussed in our opening mishnah:
"Shelo lishmah" - intention for the wrong type of sacrifice. The eight types of sacrifices are: Olah, Chatas, Asham, Shelamim, Todah, Maaser, Bechor, and Pesach. One who sacrifices a Shelamim and intends that it is an Olah, or vice versa, can thereby invalidate the sacrifice.
"Shelo leshem be'alim" - intention for the wrong person: Reuven brought the sacrifice, and the kohen has Shimon in mind.
The two additional thoughts, which we will discuss later in the tractate, are:
"Chutz lizmano" - a thought that the animal will be burned on the altar or eaten by the people outside of its proper time.
"Chutz limkomo" - the thought of the kohen that the burning of the sacrifice on the altar or the eating of its meat, whether by the owners or by the kohanim, will be done outside of its proper place.
What is this "thought"?
According to the Rambam, this refers to a thought in the heart alone. However, Rashi learns, as do Tosafos in several places, that for the thought to be effective it must be explicitly expressed in speech - that he explicitly states the wrong type of sacrifice he has in mind regarding "shelo lishmah", or the wrong owners regarding "shelo leshem be'alim". We rule that the halachah follows the Rambam, and therefore it is sufficient for the thought to have passed through the kohen's head during the service.
The Four Blood Services:
The invalidation is relevant specifically during the four stages of the blood service:
"Shechitah" - slaughtering the animal.
"Kabbalah" - receiving the blood into a sanctified service vessel.
"Holachah" - bringing the blood to the altar.
"Zrikah" - placing the blood on the altar.
If during one of these four stages a thought arose in the kohen's mind with intention for the wrong type of sacrifice ("shelo lishmah"), the wrong person ("shelo leshem be'alav"), the wrong time ("chutz lizmano"), or the wrong place ("chutz limkomo") - this is the time when the invalidation can occur.
Between the Validity of the Korban and the Owner Fulfilling His Obligation:
Our Mishnah distinguishes between the question of whether the korban itself is valid, and the question of whether the person bringing it has fulfilled his obligation. Every korban must be verbally consecrated before its slaughter: the person says, "This is a chatas" or "This is an olah." With this, holiness takes effect upon the animal, and from then on it cannot be anything other than what was established by his words. If he said that it is an olah, it must be an olah.
And if a person obligated himself to bring an olah, having said prior to the animal's consecration, "It is incumbent upon me to bring an olah," and accepted upon himself a vow to bring an olah to Hashem - this is his obligation. In such a scenario, the Mishnah establishes that an intention not for its own sake, as well as an intention not for the sake of the owners, does not invalidate the korban: the service is continued, and the korban is offered on the altar and eaten according to its law. However, the person who bore the obligation to bring the korban, whether due to a vow of "It is incumbent upon me" or due to an obligation of atonement such as an asham, does not fulfill his obligation, and he will be required to bring another korban, even though the first korban is valid.
The Text of the Mishnah:
"Kol hazevachim" - all types of animal korbanos, "shenizbechu" - that were properly slaughtered, "shelo lishman" - with the intention of the wrong type of korban, "kesherim" - the korban is valid and its service continues. If the kohen said: "I thought these were shelamim, but in fact it is an asham" - it is a mistake, but the korban remains valid. The blood is offered, the sacrificial portions are burned on the altar, the meat is eaten, and everything proceeds as normal. With that, there is still a prohibition against thinking the wrong intention.
"Ela shelo alu labe'alim leshem chovah" - the owners, who had an obligation to bring this korban, did not fulfill their obligation. Even though the korban process continues, and it is offered and eaten, and even the owners themselves might eat from it, they will nevertheless be required to bring another korban if they were obligated to do so, since this korban does not exempt them from their obligation - for we learned from the verses that the kohanim are not permitted to have the intention for the wrong korban.
It is worth noting: a kohen who has no specific intention at all for a certain type of korban, but rather says, "Whatever it is supposed to be, that is what it is" - the korban is completely valid. We assume that every korban is designated to be what it is supposed to be, and as long as the kohen did not have a mistaken intention, the korban is valid. Therefore, we will see later that the instruction to the kohanim is specifically not to have intention for any particular korban, so that they do not stumble in error and invalidate the service.
"Chutz min hapesach umin hachatas":
Two korbanos out of the eight types are exceptions to the rule: with these, an intention of not for its own sake does not merely prevent the owners from fulfilling their obligation, but invalidates the entire korban. In such a case, the process is stopped, the blood and the sacrificial portions are not offered, but rather the korban is removed from the Temple and burned elsewhere. These are the pesach and the chatas. One who brings the pesach on the eve of Pesach and has intention for a different korban - everything is void and one must start anew. The same applies to a chatas: if at the time of receiving, carrying, or sprinkling the blood he thought for a moment about a different type of korban, everything is invalid, and the korban must be removed from the Temple and burned elsewhere.
"Hapesach bizmano vehachatas bechol zman" - this is the scope of the exception: for the pesach, the law applies only in its proper time, whereas for a chatas it applies at all times. The pesach is offered on the fourteenth of Nisan, the eve of the festival of Pesach, and specifically at this time it is particularly strict. For the pesach is a kind of subcategory of shelamim, as explained elsewhere: a person who designated a specific lamb for his pesach, and came to the Temple a week earlier and said, "This is my pesach for next week," and they slaughtered it there for the sake of shelamim - the korban is not invalidated. However, on the eve of Pesach itself, the day on which the pesach is slaughtered, if he brought the pesach and said, "This is my pesach," and they offered it for the sake of shelamim - the korban is invalid, and it must be removed.
When exactly is "its proper time" on the fourteenth? The Tanna'im disagree on this: does it refer only to the afternoon of the fourteenth, which is the only time the pesach can actually be offered, or the entire day of the fourteenth? The Bartenura, as well as Rashi, adopt the position that it refers only to the afternoon from the time of bein ha'arbayim, and therefore, even on the morning of the fourteenth, an intention not for its own sake does not invalidate a pesach, just like all other korbanos. The Rambam, however, possibly holds in accordance with the second opinion, that the entire day of the fourteenth is included, and at any hour of the day, even in the morning, if the kohanim had intention for a korban other than the pesach - everything is invalidated and must be removed.
As for the chatas at all times: the chatas belongs to all days of the year, and therefore, at any time a person brings a chatas and the kohanim have intention for the wrong korban, such as thinking it is an asham, the korban is completely invalid. But for all other korbanos, if the thought of the wrong type of korban entered the kohanim's minds, the service continues, the korban is valid and the kohanim eat its meat, except that the person will be required to bring another korban to fulfill his obligation, if an obligation was incumbent upon him.
The Opinion of Rabbi Eliezer:
"Rabbi Eliezer omer: af ha'asham" - Rabbi Eliezer disagrees and adds a third type to the list of offerings that are completely invalidated by a thought of shelo lishmah (not for its own sake), such that we do not continue with their offering, and that is the asham (guilt offering). Therefore he states: "Hapesach bizmano, vechatas ve'asham bechol zman" - Regarding the Pesach offering, he agrees that the law applies only on the fourteenth, while the chatas (sin offering) and the asham are a pair: on any day of the year, a thought of shelo lishmah invalidates both of them.
Upon what does Rabbi Eliezer base his words? The exceptions of the Pesach offering and the chatas were derived from the verses, whereas regarding the asham, there is no verse requiring that it be brought for its own sake, and because of this, the Tanna Kamma does not hold this way. However, one of the thirteen principles by which the Torah is expounded is a binyan av, also known as a mah matzinu. This is the simplest of derivations, and its essence is: when we do not have a good reason to assume that thing A and thing B are different from each other, we assume their laws are the same. Since the chatas and the asham both come to atone for a sin, Rabbi Eliezer holds that just as the chatas is completely invalidated by a thought of shelo lishmah, so too is the asham.
And so he states explicitly: "Amar Rabbi Eliezer: hachatas ba'ah al chet, veha'asham ba al chet" - The purpose of the chatas offering is to atone for a sin, and likewise the asham, whether a suspensive asham or an asham for robbery, comes to atone for a certain type of sin. Here we have a mah matzinu, so why should we assume their laws differ? "Mah chatas pesulah shelo lishmah, af asham pasul shelo lishmo" - Just as the chatas is invalidated by an intention for the wrong type of offering, so too the asham will be invalidated if it is not brought for the sake of the correct type of offering. The change in terminology, between pesulah and pasul, stems from the fact that a chatas is a female animal, whereas the asham is always a male, and this is the reason for the grammatical difference.
The Tanna Kamma disagrees with Rabbi Eliezer and holds that we cannot learn a mah matzinu here, since there are many differences between a chatas and an asham: with a chatas, the blood is applied above the chut hasikra (the red line), on the upper part of the altar, and it is applied on the four corners of the altar in a different manner than the asham. They are different offerings, and therefore there is ample room to assume that the law of shelo lishmah will also differ between them. For this reason, the Sages disagree with the mah matzinu of Rabbi Eliezer, and the halachah follows the Sages: the stringency of invalidating an offering due to a thought of shelo lishmah applies to the Pesach offering on the eve of Pesach, on the fourteenth, and to the chatas on every day of the year, but not to the asham.