Yevamos, chapter nine, mishnah 3. Our mishnah deals with the shniyos - the secondary forbidden relations, relatives whose prohibition comes only from the words of the Sages. The mishnah will discuss cases in which a woman is forbidden to the husband but permitted to the yavam, or the reverse, and the penalty imposed on a woman who transgresses the prohibition of shniyos.
The wording of the mishnah regarding the laws of shniyos:
The mishnah opens: "Shniyos midivrei sofrim" - the secondary forbidden relations are prohibited by rabbinic law. From here the mishnah details three situations, for it is possible that the yavam and the husband come from two different mothers, and therefore their degree of relationship to the woman is not the same:
"Shniyah la'ba'al v'lo shniyah la'yavam" - if she is a secondary relation to the husband but not to the yavam, then "asurah la'ba'al u'mutteres la'yavam" - she is forbidden to the husband and permitted to the yavam.
"Shniyah la'yavam v'lo shniyah la'ba'al" - if she is a secondary relation to the yavam but not to the husband, then "asurah la'yavam u'mutteres la'ba'al" - she is forbidden to the yavam and permitted to the husband.
"Shniyah la'zeh v'la'zeh" - if she is a secondary relation to both of them, then "asurah la'zeh v'la'zeh" - she is forbidden to both of them.
The penalty for a woman who transgresses the prohibition of shniyos:
The mishnah continues and lists what a woman who married in violation of the prohibition of shniyos loses:
"Ein lah kesubah" - she does not receive her kesubah, since this is a forbidden union.
"V'lo peiros" - she does not collect from the husband the produce that he consumed from her melog property.
"V'lo mezonos" - she is not supported by him.
"V'lo bela'os" - melog property wears out in the husband's hands through his permitted use of it, and even so the husband does not have to replace what wore out, even though this was a forbidden relationship and it would seem improper for him to benefit from it. But whatever remains intact of the melog property she does receive.
It is worth appreciating the initial assumption regarding the produce: the produce of melog property is consumed by the husband in exchange for his readiness to redeem her should she be taken captive. Since in a forbidden marriage he is not obligated to redeem her, the reason for which he acquired the produce no longer applies, and so there was room to say that he must return it to her. The mishnah teaches that under these circumstances she is penalized, and she does not receive back the produce that would seemingly have been coming to her.
On the other hand, the mishnah establishes two additional rulings: "V'ha'vlad kasher" - the child born from this relationship is a valid Jew, since the prohibition is only rabbinic. "V'kofin oso l'hotzi" - the husband is compelled to give her a get and divorce her.
From the shniyos to Torah prohibitions:
From here the mishnah moves from the shniyos, whose prohibition is rabbinic, to the prohibitions of kehunah and other prohibitions - even for an ordinary Israelite - which are forbidden by Torah law. Surprisingly, precisely in these cases we are more lenient, based on the principle that a matter which is rabbinic requires reinforcement, whereas a matter which is from the Torah does not require reinforcement, as is the situation here.
The mishnah lists four cases of Torah prohibitions:
"Almanah l'kohen gadol" - a widow who married a Kohen Gadol.
A divorcee or a chalutzah who married an ordinary kohen.
A mamzeres who married an Israelite.
A Jewish woman who married a mamzer.
In all of these the mishnah rules: "Yesh lahen kesubah" - they do have a kesubah and all the other entitlements that accompany it, which were listed above.
The question of the chalutzah:
A question arises regarding the inclusion of a chalutzah married to an ordinary kohen in the list of Torah prohibitions, for the prohibition of a chalutzah to a kohen is rabbinic. There are two approaches to this:
The chalutzah is an exception: even though her prohibition is only rabbinic, since she closely resembles a divorcee, the Sages gave her the same laws.
The mishnah included the chalutzah in the list even though she does not belong there, and in truth her status is like that of a shniyah - she loses her kesubah and so on - and she was mentioned together with the divorcee only because that is the usual way of expressing it, but halachically her law is not like that of a divorcee.
In summary: we learned that the shniyos are prohibited by the words of the Sages, and that the prohibition is measured with respect to each man separately - the husband and the yavam. A woman who transgresses the prohibition of shniyos loses her kesubah, the produce, her support and the worn items, and nevertheless her child is valid and the husband is compelled to divorce her. In contrast, in cases of Torah prohibitions - a widow to a Kohen Gadol, a divorcee or chalutzah to an ordinary kohen, a mamzeres to an Israelite and a Jewish woman to a mamzer - they do have a kesubah, since a rabbinic matter requires reinforcement while a Torah matter does not require reinforcement. Finally, we examined the two approaches to understanding the status of the chalutzah in this list.