Shevuos, Chapter 5, Mishnah 1. This chapter deals with the laws of shevuas hapikadon - a person who swears falsely, denying that he holds property belonging to someone else. In this first mishnah we will learn several of the introductory principles of shevuas hapikadon.
Much like the earlier mishnayos in this tractate, which deal with other oaths, the mishnah lists a series of details regarding who is subject to the oath of deposit:
"Shevuas hapikadon noheges ba'anashim uvanashim" - the oath applies to men and to women alike, unlike the oath of testimony, which applies only to men.
"Bircokim uvikrovim" - whether the two parties are unrelated to one another or whether they are relatives.
"Bikesheirim uvipesulim" - whether they are fit to testify or disqualified from testifying. Here too, in contrast to the laws of testimony.
"Bifnei beis din veshelo bifnei beis din":
The oath applies whether it was taken in the presence of a court or not in its presence. However, this ruling applies specifically when the oath comes from his own mouth - the defendant, when asked whether the deposit is in his possession, swears on his own.
As was mentioned earlier, even when the claimant tells the defendant that his object is in his possession and asks him to swear about it, and the defendant answers "amen" - this is considered an oath from his own mouth. In any case where the oath is from his own mouth, whether he swore with his own lips or answered amen, he is liable whether it was in the presence of a court or not in the presence of a court.
But when the oath comes from the mouth of others - where the defendant does not answer amen, but rather the claimant says to him "I impose an oath upon you," and he denies it and says "I have nothing of yours" - there is a dispute:
Rabbi Meir: "Eino chayav ad sheyichpor bo beveis din" - he is not liable for the oath of deposit until the denial takes place in the court itself, and not outside it.
But the Sages say: "Bein mipi atzmo bein mipi acheirim... keivan shekafar bo chayav" - there is no difference between one who swore of his own accord and one who was made to swear by others; once he denied and rejected the claim, whether in court or outside of court, he is liable for the oath of deposit.
Intentional and unintentional oaths:
From here the mishnah moves on to discuss intent: "Vechayav al zedon hashevuah ve'al shigegasah im zedon hapikadon". Two forms of liability are presented here:
Intentional regarding the oath: deliberate - he knows he is lying at the time of the oath, he knows that his fellow's money is in his possession, and he knows that if he swears falsely he will be obligated to bring an offering because of it.
Unintentional regarding the oath but intentional regarding the deposit: he knows that he is not telling the truth, but he is unaware of the consequence - that he will be obligated to bring an offering.
By contrast, he is exempt in these two situations:
He believed his oath was true, and genuinely thought that his friend's item was not in his possession because he had forgotten about the deposit and had not given it any thought - he is exempt.
He did not know at all that it is forbidden to swear falsely - as astonishing as this sounds, if a person does not understand that the Torah forbids such a thing, this too is considered inadvertent and he is exempt.
What the one who swore becomes liable for:
For that intentional act the Torah obligates a sacrifice - a ram worth at least two shekels. Beyond bringing the sacrifice, he must of course return the principal that he owes, and also pay a penalty of a chomesh: an additional twenty-five percent of the item's value, which together with the principal amounts to a fifth of the total sum. So he must pay the principal and the chomesh, in addition to the sacrifice.
In summary: In this mishnah we learned that the oath of a deposit applies to men and to women, to unrelated parties and to relatives, to those fit to testify and to those disqualified; that when the oath comes from his own mouth - including answering amen - he is liable whether it was before a court or not before a court, while regarding one who was made to swear by others, Rabbi Meir and the Sages disagree, Rabbi Meir requiring a denial in court and the Sages holding him liable in any case once he denies; that liability applies to an intentional oath and to an unintentional oath combined with intent regarding the deposit, but not to a completely inadvertent oath; and finally, that the one who swore is liable to bring a ram as a sacrifice, and to return the principal plus a chomesh.