We have reached the final Mishnah of the tractate - Chapter 6, Mishnah 9. In the previous Mishnah, we learned that money can be exchanged to purchase either a female sheep or a female goat, provided it is in its first year, since they are treated equally regarding the chatas offering. Our Mishnah presents four separate cases where one might have thought that one item in a pair is the choicest and preferred option, simply because the Torah always mentions it before the other. Indeed, when studying the Chumash, we often find that the commentators understand the first item mentioned to be the older, more important, or stronger of the two. Therefore, there is reason to assume that if the Torah consistently places A before B, A must be more important in some way.
The First Case - Sheep and Goats:
When bringing offerings, there is a halachic requirement to bring from the choicest of one's flock, so this question has practical implications. The Torah almost always mentions sheep before goats. From this, one might have thought that wherever there is a choice between sheep and goats - such as when bringing a chatas - sheep are considered the choicest and preferred option. For example, if a person has both goats and sheep in his courtyard and says, "I take upon myself to bring an olah," we might have said that he has obligated himself specifically to bring a sheep, since sheep are considered the choicest and he must bring the best. Our Mishnah comes to teach that this is not the case. Although the Torah does almost always place sheep before goats, there is a glaring exception, from which we learn that they are of equal stature and neither is preferred over the other.
The words of the Mishnah: "Rabbi Shimon omer: Kevasim kodmin la'izim bechol makom" - Rabbi Shimon points out that almost everywhere in the Chumash, the mention of sheep precedes the mention of goats. "Yachol mipnei shehen muvcharin mehen" - One might mistakenly say that the reason for this is because sheep are considered and valued as choicer than goats. "Talmud lomar" - A verse comes and teaches the exact opposite: "Ve'im keves yavi korbano lechatas".
The Mishnah assumes that the student is familiar with the verses and knows that the source of this quote is Leviticus 4:32, which is stated in the context of an individual's chatas offering, discussing the option to bring a sheep. However, four verses earlier, in verse 28, it is already stated that one can bring a goat for a chatas: "He shall bring his offering, a female goat." Thus, we see that the goat was mentioned before the sheep, teaching us that there is no preference for one over the other. Both options are equally good, and one can choose either goats or sheep interchangeably: "Melamed sheshneihen shekulin" - They are both equal in importance, and there is no preference for one over the other.
The Second Case - Turtledoves and Young Pigeons:
The second case deals with another pair of animals brought as offerings - birds. When a person is required to bring birds as an offering, they usually come in a pair: one as a bird chatas and one as a bird olah. In every scenario where there is an obligation to bring birds, the person bringing the offering has two species to choose from: a turtledove or a pigeon. The turtledove is a migratory bird and the pigeon is a domesticated bird. One who chooses a turtledove must bring an adult turtledove, whereas one who chooses a pigeon must specifically bring young pigeons, which are not yet mature.
Regarding the identification of the species: "Tor" is almost certainly translated as "turtledove", most likely the European turtledove, a migratory bird that arrives in the Land of Israel for half the year, and it is a beautiful and attractive bird. As for "yonah" - taxonomically and scientifically, there is no real difference between a pigeon and a dove, and they should not be confused with the turtledove. Bnei yonah are domesticated pigeons that were raised here in the Land of Israel, whether they were black or white.
When bringing a pair of birds, one must choose either two turtledoves or two young pigeons, and they may not be mixed. The question is whether one of them is preferred over the other. Here too, the Mishnah notes that the turtledove is almost always mentioned before the young pigeon. Therefore, one might have mistakenly thought that turtledoves have a certain precedence or preference, but this is not the case.
The words of the Mishnah: "Torin kodmin livnei yonah bechol makom" - It is true that in almost every mention in the verses, turtledoves precede young pigeons. "Yachol mipnei shehen muvcharin mehen" - One might mistakenly say that the turtledove is more important and valued, and that it is preferred over the young pigeons. "Talmud lomar" - Another verse comes, reversing the order and teaching the exact opposite: "Uvnei yonah o tor lechatas" - When bringing a bird chatas, one can bring a young pigeon or a turtledove, and here the young pigeons are placed before the turtledove. "Melamed sheshneihen shekulin" - They are both of equal status, and there is no reason to prefer one over the other from a halachic standpoint.
The Third Case - Father and Mother:
The third case departs from the subject of offerings dealt with by the tractate, but its concept is very similar. There is a mitzvah to honor one's father and a mitzvah to honor one's mother. As in the two previous cases, the father is almost always mentioned before the mother everywhere in the Chumash. From this, one might have thought that honoring the father takes precedence in importance over honoring the mother, but this is not the case.
The language of the Mishnah: "Ha'av kodem la'em bechol makom" - similar to the structure of the two previous cases, when the verses speak about a father and mother, the father is almost always mentioned first. "Yachol shekevod ha'av odef al kevod ha'em" - one might have mistakenly said that honoring the father takes precedence and carries more weight than honoring the mother. "Talmud lomar: 'Ish immo ve'aviv tira'u'" - here the mother precedes the father. "Melamed sheshneihem shekulim" - the two of them are of equal status.
A famous Baraisa in tractate Kiddushin points out that there are two separate mitzvos: the mitzvah of honor and the mitzvah of reverence. The verse dealing with reverence mentions the mother before the father, whereas the verse dealing with honor mentions the father before the mother. The Baraisa explains: it is human nature for a person to tend to give more honor to his mother, who cares for him and his physical needs, and to give more reverence to his father, who disciplines him and teaches him Torah. Therefore, the verses came to balance each other out. However, even though this is the case from the perspective of human nature, this is not the halachic outlook: the weight given to parents, both in honor and in reverence, is equal for the mother and the father.
The definition of the two mitzvos:
Honor: a positive mitzvah, if one can say so - the things a person must actively do for his parents: feeding them and giving them to drink, clothing them and covering them, bringing them in and taking them out. That is, giving them food and drink, dressing them, covering them with a blanket, helping them stand up, sit down, and leave the house, and the like. These are active actions, and the obligation is equal toward both parents.
Reverence: the things a person must not do to his parents: not interrupting their words, not arguing with them, and not sitting in their place.
In light of the Mishnah's ruling that they are equal, a question arises: if both the father and the mother ask at the exact same time for him to bring them a cup of wine, who takes precedence? The halachic answer is that the father takes precedence. Why, as this does not seem to match our Mishnah? The answer is that the mother also has an obligation to honor the father, stemming from a wife's obligation to her husband. And since she too is obligated to pour him the cup, it turns out that when both ask simultaneously, the father takes precedence over the mother - due to the obligation placed upon her toward him.
If someone will say: if so, there is no equal status here at all, since in practice we always prioritize the father - this is a mistake, and a bit of an analytical mind is enough to realize this. First, this only applies to things such as bringing a cup of wine, where the law of pouring the cup also applies to the wife toward her husband; but in other matters, where the wife is not obligated toward her husband, the child has no preference to prioritize the father over the mother. Furthermore, and this emphasizes the point: if the parents are divorced, the woman has no obligation toward the husband, since she is no longer his wife. In such a case, if the parents are divorced and both ask for a cup of wine at the same time - for example at a grandchild's wedding, when the grandfather and grandmother are sitting there and are not married to each other - there is no obligation to prioritize the father, and one can prioritize whomever he wishes.
The fourth case - his father and his Rav Muvhak:
The final case deals with the pair of a person's father and his Rav Muvhak. This needs clarification: it is a Torah mitzvah to honor Torah scholars, and this is a mitzvah Deoraisa that applies to everyone - both the father and the son have an obligation to honor the rabbi because he is a Torah scholar. However, there are additional, special requirements placed upon the student in honoring his rabbi, when the rabbi has the halachic status of a 'Rav Muvhak'. It is difficult to translate this expression precisely word-for-word, but the halachic definition is that the student learned the majority of his Torah knowledge from this rabbi.
It is worth noting that in the 21st century, there is generally no such relationship with rabbis, except in cases such as a baal teshuvah whose community rabbi taught him everything at the beginning of his journey, in which case he is his Rav Muvhak. But most of us learn the majority of our Torah knowledge from diverse sources: from audio recordings, from reading books, and from the community rabbi, and in every year of study in yeshivah there was a different rabbi. Therefore, we generally do not have a Rav Muvhak nowadays. Nevertheless, if a person does have a Rav Muvhak, there are special halachic rights granted to him.
Our Mishnah sets the Rav Muvhak against the father, from the perspective of the student. Let us assume that the student's name is Yitzchak, his rabbi's name is Moshe, and his father's name is Avraham. The question is, to whom does Yitzchak give precedence in honor: to his rabbi Moshe or to his father Avraham? The answer is that with a Rav Muvhak, generally the rabbi takes precedence. The reason: Moshe is both his Rav Muvhak and a Torah scholar, and therefore not only does the student Yitzchak have an obligation to honor his Rav Muvhak, but the father Avraham also has an obligation to honor him because he is a Torah scholar.
However, it should be noted: if Avraham the father is a Torah scholar himself, he does not have a special obligation to honor the rabbi. The stated law is therefore said specifically when the father is not a Torah scholar - not even a Torah scholar of a lower caliber than the rabbi. This is similar to the situation between the son and his parents: the son is obligated toward the father and toward the mother, and since the mother is also obligated toward the father, the father takes precedence. The same applies here: the son is obligated toward the rabbi and toward the father, and since the father is also obligated toward the rabbi, the rabbi takes precedence. This is all on the assumption that we are dealing with a Rav Muvhak, and that the father is not a Torah scholar. If it is not a Rav Muvhak, or if the father is a Torah scholar even of a lower caliber - the father takes precedence.
And therefore the Mishnah says, in the context of Torah study and similar to the structure in the case of the father and mother: "Im zachah haben lifnei harav" - it is difficult to translate this expression literally; it means that the son merited to sit before a Rav Muvhak, and that rabbi taught him most of what he knows. "Kodem la'av bechol makom" - in such a case, from the perspective of the student Yitzchak, his rabbi Moshe takes precedence over his father Avraham in all situations. "Mipnei shehu ve'aviv chayavim bichvod rabbo" - since both of them, the student and his father, are obligated in the honor of the rabbi: the student because he is his Rav Muvhak, and the father because the rabbi is a Torah scholar. But as stated, if the father is also a Torah scholar and has no special obligation to honor the rabbi, this law does not apply, and the son prioritizes honoring his father.
This law applies both regarding honor and regarding saving the person from loss: redeeming him from captivity or returning his lost object when both are before him, and the like. Therefore, in a scenario where his teacher takes precedence, the son must first return his teacher's lost object and redeem him from captivity.
The Gemara's conclusion regarding the reason for this is well-known, and with it we will conclude: Indeed, a father is entitled to honor, as he gave life to his son, and the son owes him his life, as it were, in matters of honor - but the father only brought him into this world, whereas his teacher brings him to the life of the World to Come, and this virtue is more significant. This is why his primary teacher takes precedence in honor even over his father.
And with this, with heavenly assistance, we have concluded Tractate Kerisos. Next in line: Tractate Me'ilah.