In the previous Mishnah we learned a unique halachah: if one dedicates a conditional guilt offering (asham talui), and later discovers he made a mistake - the consecration takes effect. The reason for this is that at the time he dedicated it, his heart was troubled and he sought certainty, as if to say, "It does not matter to me, I wish to atone for my sin and receive protection from it," and therefore the consecration takes effect regardless, even if it later becomes clear that it was a consecration in error. This ruling, as we learned, is an exception. Our Mishnah comes to teach that in other matters, this is not the case.
A definite guilt offering consecrated in error:
There are three definite guilt offerings:
The asham me'ilos (guilt offering for misuse of consecrated property).
The asham gezeilos (guilt offering for robbery).
The asham shifchah charufah (guilt offering for a designated maidservant).
The case under discussion: A person ate meat assuming he was acting properly, and was later informed that the meat was hekdesh (consecrated property). He said, "If so, I will bring an asham me'ilos to atone for this," and he separated an animal for this purpose. If it later became clear in retrospect that those people were mistaken, and it turned out that the consecration of the definite guilt offering was made in error - since it was consecrated under the assumption that he had committed a transgression, and in fact he had not - what is the ruling?
"Ad shelo nishchat" - If it had not yet been slaughtered: It goes out and grazes in the herd. Since the consecration was made in error, it is invalid, and there is no hekdesh here at all; the animal remains chullin (non-sacred) and returns to its previous state.
"Mishenishchat" - Once it was slaughtered: It requires burial. Retroactively it became clear that the consecration did not take effect, meaning the animal was chullin, and it is forbidden to slaughter chullin in the Azarah (Temple courtyard). Here, they slaughtered a chullin animal in the Azarah, and the law for chullin slaughtered in the Azarah is that they are forbidden from benefit and require burial.
"Mishenizrak hadam" - Once the blood was sprinkled: If the blood of that guilt offering was already sprinkled, and before the meat was eaten it became clear that it was consecrated in error and there was no place to bring it initially - the meat goes out to the place of burning, which is the place where they burn in the Azarah.
Two approaches to explaining the last two rulings:
The approach of the Bartenura: He adopts one of the approaches in the Gemara, according to which the last two rulings contradict each other completely - we are dealing with the exact same case of chullin slaughtered in the Azarah, and we find two rulings for it: one requires burial and the second requires burning. Therefore, they are two Tannaim, even though their names are not specified and there is no indication of a transition between views: according to the first opinion, chullin slaughtered in the Azarah requires burial, and according to the second opinion, it requires burning, and the matter does not depend at all on whether the blood was sprinkled.
The approach of the Rambam: Another approach is brought in the Gemara, that there is only one Tanna here, and even though there are two separate rulings before us - strictly speaking, chullin slaughtered in the Azarah requires burial. However, when the blood has already been sprinkled, there is a concern regarding the error of the onlookers: they will think it was a sacrifice, and certainly a sacrifice that was invalidated for some reason, and they will wonder why it is being buried; from here they will err in understanding the halachah and conclude that an invalidated sacrifice is buried and not burned. In truth, it was not an invalidated sacrifice at all. Therefore, to prevent misunderstandings, the Sages enacted to burn what turned out to be chullin slaughtered in the Azarah, rather than to bury it. The Rambam rules according to this latter approach, and this is the halachah.
The shor haniskal:
From here the Mishnah moves to two matters that are not sacrifices in and of themselves: the shor haniskal (an ox condemned to be stoned) and the eglah arufah (the decapitated calf). A shor haniskal is an animal that was condemned to death in a beis din, and the rule is that after it is put to death, it is forbidden from benefit and it is impossible to extract economic utility from its carcass, but rather it is obligatory to bury it.
What is the shor haniskal? Simply put, the meaning is an ox that they stone, but in practice the ruling applies to any animal, and it becomes a shor haniskal in one of three ways:
If it killed a person - whether a cow that gored a person or a chicken that pecked a baby's head and he died from the pecking. In any case, the animal is condemned to death, and a standard Sanhedrin of twenty-three is convened to judge and convict it.
If a male committed bestiality with it.
If a female committed bestiality with it. In the latter two scenarios, due to its participation in an act of bestiality, the animal is condemned to death.
What is the law if it was sentenced to death, and at the last moment the sentence was annulled - for example, the witnesses who testified that the animal killed a person were proven to be false and contradicted, and their testimony is not accepted in court, and it turns out that it should not be executed? The Mishnah says that a stoned ox is not so: if it was sentenced in error, its law is not like one who consecrates a conditional guilt-offering in error, where its consecration takes effect, but rather its law is like a definite guilt-offering:
"Im ad shelo niskal" - if the exoneration came before the animal was put to death, and it turns out that it is not liable to death at all, "yetze veyir'eh ba'eder" - it returns to the herd like a regular non-sacred animal (chullin), without any restriction.
"Misheniskal" - if it was already executed, and afterward it became clear that its execution was based on false claims and it did not do what it was accused of, "mutar bahanah" - there is no prohibition of deriving benefit from it, and one may derive benefit from its carcass in any way.
Eglah Arufah:
In the section of Eglah Arufah, it says that if a corpse is found outside the city and the murderer is unknown, the elders of the closest city take a calf, bring it down to a nachal eisan - according to Rashi, hard and unworked ground, and according to the Rambam, a valley with water flowing in it - decapitate it there, wash their hands and declare that they are clean of this bloodshed, and pray for the atonement of Israel.
What is the law if he designated an animal for an Eglah Arufah, and before it was decapitated the murderer was discovered, and there is no longer a need for an Eglah Arufah? The Mishnah says: "Eglah arufah einah ken" - its law is not like a conditional guilt-offering whose consecration takes effect even in error:
"Im ad shelo ne'erfah" - "tetze vesir'eh ba'eder", since the consecration for an Eglah Arufah was done in error and is not binding, and it has no substance.
"Mishene'erfah" - "tikaver bimkomah", like any Eglah Arufah, and it is "asurah bahanah".
The reason for this law is explained in the Mishnah: "Al hasafek ba'ah mitechilatah, kiperah sefekah vehalchah lah" - it came for a doubt from its inception, it atoned for its doubt, and it has gone on its way. This is exactly like the concept of a conditional guilt-offering: when one brings a conditional guilt-offering, it is well known that at some future point the truth might become clear whether he indeed ate the forbidden fat (chelev) or not, and yet he brings it in the meantime, and it makes no difference whether the truth is revealed a minute later or a hundred years later. So too with an Eglah Arufah: at the time it is brought they do not know who the murderer is, and they are aware that in the future the murderer might be discovered and witnesses might come; but the directive is that as long as it is currently unknown who killed him, the elders perform the procedure of the Eglah Arufah.
It turns out that the entire reason for bringing it in the first place was because it was unknown who the murderer was, and once the act was done - it is done: the mitzvah was fulfilled, and the calf atoned for its doubt. If the truth is discovered afterward, this is not a surprise, since the Eglah Arufah did what was placed upon it, and the law of an Eglah Arufah applies to it - it is forbidden for benefit and is buried in its place.
In summary: In this Mishnah we learned that the novel concept of a conditional guilt-offering, that its consecration takes effect even in error, does not apply in other matters. For a definite guilt-offering that was consecrated in error: before it is slaughtered, it grazes in the herd; once it is slaughtered, it requires burial, like the law of non-sacred animals (chullin) slaughtered in the Temple courtyard (Azarah); and once the blood is sprinkled, it goes out to the place of burning, and the Rishonim dispute whether this is due to two conditions (the Bartenura) or due to a rabbinic decree out of concern for the error of onlookers (the Rambam). A stoned ox that was sentenced in error - before it is stoned, it goes out and grazes in the herd, and once it is stoned, it is permitted for benefit. However, an Eglah Arufah - before it is decapitated, it goes out and grazes in the herd, and once it is decapitated, it is buried in its place and is forbidden for benefit, because it came for a doubt from its inception, it atoned for its doubt, and it has gone on its way.