Kerisos Chapter 3, Mishnah 1. We now transition to the topic of a chatas and an asham talui. A chatas is brought when a person unintentionally transgresses one of the prohibitions carrying the punishment of kares, without any intent to violate the Torah, and at this point, an obligation to bring a chatas takes effect upon him. However, if he is unsure whether he became obligated to bring a chatas, he brings an asham talui, a sacrifice that suspends the punishment. He brings it until it becomes clearly known to him that he became obligated to bring a chatas, at which point he brings the actual chatas itself.
The Source of the Law and the Wording of the Verse:
The verse dealing with this chatas states: "Ve'im nefesh achas techeta bishgagah" - "And if any one person sins unintentionally", meaning a person who transgressed one of the prohibitions we are discussing, but did so unintentionally. The verse continues: "O hoda eilav chataso asher chata, veheivi es korbano" - "Or his sin, which he has sinned, is made known to him, he shall bring his sacrifice". We must be precise: the verse does not say "noda" with the letter nun, which implies that the person realizes it on his own, but rather "hoda" with the letter hei, which implies that even others make it known to him. From here we derive the novel concept: if others tell him that he committed the transgression, even if he himself was not aware of it, he becomes obligated to bring a chatas.
However, there is a condition to this: "Hoda eilav" - "is made known to him", the knowledge must reach "him", deep into his heart. He must accept the fact that he sinned. But if others inform him and he rejects their words, the matter is much more complex, and this is what the Mishnah before us discusses. This is the essential principle: the word "to him" teaches that he must accept in his heart that he acted improperly, and if he denies the act itself, he might not become obligated at all.
The Wording of the Mishnah:
"Amru lo: achalta cheilev - meivi chatas" - If they said to him, "You ate cheilev", he brings a chatas. Even though it says "they said" in the plural, it means even one witness, and even a woman testifying. Cheilev is the forbidden fat for which the punishment for eating it intentionally is kares, and here he ate it unintentionally and did not pay attention to it, and therefore he is obligated to bring a chatas. This refers to a case where he remained silent and did not respond at all to the information given to him, and because of this he is obligated: we assume that he heard the words and accepted them, since he did not reply.
The Rishonim debate the exact mechanism by which he becomes obligated to bring a chatas by the power of the words of others:
By the principle of shtikah k'hoda'ah (silence is considered admission): This is how Tosafos learned. Since he did not respond, he implicitly admits that there was indeed a prohibition here, and he accepts the matter upon himself, and therefore he becomes obligated to bring a chatas.
By the principle of eid echad ne'eman b'issurin (one witness is believed regarding prohibitions): This is how the Ramban and the Rashba learned. There is a rule that even a single witness, and even a woman, is believed in matters of prohibition and permission. Therefore, once they informed him that he transgressed the prohibition of eating cheilev and he has nothing to reply against this, he becomes obligated to bring a chatas.
"Eid omer achal ve'eid omer lo achal" - One witness says he ate and one witness says he did not eat:
If two witnesses came, one says that he ate the cheilev and the other says that he did not eat - we have an equal reason to believe either side. He cannot bring a chatas, because perhaps he is not obligated in it. But here the special law of an asham talui enters: someone who does not know if he became obligated to bring a chatas - perhaps yes and perhaps no - brings an asham talui. And so too later in the Mishnah: "Ishah omeres achal ve'ishah omeres lo achal" - one woman testifies that he ate and one testifies that he did not eat, and there is no resolution, and therefore, if he does not claim otherwise, he brings an asham talui.
The Condition of "Nikba Isuro":
An important point accompanies this: we do not bring an asham talui for every doubt where perhaps a transgression was committed for which one is liable to kares, but rather it is required that it be "nikba isuro" - that we know with certainty that there was a forbidden item here, and only regarding the person himself is there a doubt whether he stumbled in it. The classic case: two partners went to the refrigerator, and each of them took from the fat and ate it. It turned out that one of the two ate the forbidden cheilev and the other ate the permitted fat, and it is unknown which of them did what. Both of them are in doubt, and therefore both of them bring an asham talui. This is a situation of "nikba isuro": it is known with certainty and everyone agrees that there was cheilev in the refrigerator, and it is only unknown which of the two partners ate it.
On the other hand, if it is not known at all whether there was chelev in the refrigerator to begin with - for example, there were two portions of fat there, and one of the partners received one of the last two portions from the butcher, and the butcher calls and informs them: "It is possible that what you bought was prohibited and it is possible that it was not, I do not know" - here there is no certainty that chelev arrived at the refrigerator. There is no "kavua", no fixed and absolute kares prohibition in the mixture, and therefore an asham talui is not brought at all. This is a separate law in its own right.
Hence the question in our case: One witness says there was chelev and the other says there was not - is this considered "established"? The Ramban, as well as most scholars, maintain that it is: from the moment one person testifies to it, it is verified for that side that there was chelev, and we are concerned about this and he brings an asham talui. But there are those who disagree and maintain that it is not, unless both witnesses testify together: "We know with certainty that there was chelev in the refrigerator, and we only do not know whether this person ate the chelev or the permitted fat". Without that "established", the matter does not reach the threshold that obligates an asham talui to begin with.
"Ed omer achal vehu omer lo achalti" - one witness says he ate, and he says I did not eat:
One witness says to him, "You ate chelev", and he replies, "I did not eat". The witness insists that he is certain of his testimony, and he insists that he is certain he did not eat - and in this case he is exempt. And the reason for this: "It becomes known to him" is required, that he internalizes the matter and believes it. If he does not believe and does not accept the words, he is not required to bring a chatas at all. One cannot force upon a person something that his heart does not accept, and this is the exposition of the verse "to him".
"Shenayim omerim achal vehu omer lo achalti" - two say he ate, and he says I did not eat:
Two witnesses are the gold standard for establishing a halachic fact in Beis Din. Two came and said: "We saw Reuven eating chelev. It is possible that he did not know what he was doing and it is possible that this was unintentional, but we saw him eating and we know that it was chelev, and now he is obligated to bring a chatas". And Reuven replies: "I did not eat". Rabbi Meir says that he is obligated: once two witnesses testified, this is an absolute fact that cannot be contested, whether he admits or does not admit. And the Sages disagree and say that he is exempt, since "to him" means that he must accept the matter and believe it, and it seems this is a special law regarding a chatas: one who does not believe that he did the act is not obligated to bring a chatas, even though two witnesses testify against him.
Rabbi Meir's argument: "Im hevi'uhu shenayim lemitah chamurah - lo yevi'uhu lekorban hakal?" - If two brought him to the severe death penalty, shall they not bring him to the lenient offering? If two witnesses testified that they saw him committing a transgression whose punishment is death, and he denies it - we believe them and put him to death, and this is a stringency above which there is none. Thus, the weight of two witnesses is absolute in Beis Din, and the denial of the accused does not help him at all. Is it not all the more so that they should be believed to obligate him in the lenient offering?
The Sages' refutation: "Mah im yirtzeh lomar mezid hayisi" - What if he would want to say, "I was intentional". There is a halachic rule called migo, whose meaning is: believe the claim that I am making, since if I had wanted to lie, I could have made a better claim. Here, one who commits a transgression like eating chelev intentionally and on purpose is exempt from a chatas. If this person had wanted to lie and exempt himself from the chatas, he could have said: "You are right, I ate the chelev as you saw, but I knew what I was doing, and I was intentional, and I am not obligated to bring a chatas" - and thereby he would have closed the discussion, since they have no way to prove what went through his heart. And since he did not make such a claim, he should be believed in his claim that he did not eat at all.
In the Gemara we find two ways of understanding the opinion of the Sages:
The Sages do not need the migo at all. In their opinion, there is a special law regarding a chatas - we require "to him", that he accept the matter upon himself, and if he does not believe and does not accept it, there is no practical difference if two witnesses informed him. And only because Rabbi Meir came with a kal vachomer argument, did they reply to him that his argument should also be rejected, because this kal vachomer has a weak point due to the migo. This approach is easier to understand, since the normal rule is that a migo is not effective against two witnesses, but rather against one witness or against other types of claims.
The Sages indeed maintain that the derivation from "to him" is not sufficient in itself, but rather "to him" in combination with the migo - the two things together are what exempt him from the chatas.
In any case, the halachah is certainly that even if two witnesses testify that he ate, if he says that he did not eat - he does not bring a chatas.
In summary: In this Mishnah we learned the law of "or it becomes known to him" - that even the notification of others obligates a chatas, provided that it is accepted in the heart of the sinner. If he was silent - he brings a chatas (and the Rishonim debated whether this is from the law of silence is like an admission or from the law that one witness is believed regarding prohibitions); if they testified against each other - he brings an asham talui, subject to the condition that "its prohibition was established"; if he denied the words of the witness - he is exempt. And in the case of two witnesses, Rabbi Meir and the Sages disagreed, and the halachah follows the Sages by power of the derivation from "to him" and by power of the migo of "I was intentional".