We continue with chapter 2, mishnah 5. The mishnah compares the obligations of a private individual with those of the king (the nasi), the anointed Kohen and the Sanhedrin regarding the par helem davar. This time the mishnah deals with a case in which the transgression under discussion is one that would obligate a korban oleh v'yored - the sliding-scale sin offering.
The three transgressions for which one brings a korban oleh v'yored:
"Shmias hakol" - literally "hearing the voice," meaning hearing the voice of the adjuration, which is called elsewhere "shevuas ha'eidus" (the oath of testimony). Its source is the wording of the verse at the beginning of chapter 5 in Vayikra: "v'shamah kol alah" - he heard the voice of the curse and the oath. One who has testimony in his possession and swears that he has no testimony that could help his fellow collect money in beis din, and afterwards admits that he lied and wishes to repent - he brings this offering.
"Bituy sefasayim" - this is "shevuas bituy" (the oath of expression), and its name too is derived from the wording of the verse: "o nefesh ki sishava l'vatei bisfasayim l'hara o l'heitiv" - "or a person who swears, expressing with his lips, to do harm or to do good." A person takes a formal oath that he will do something or will not do it, that he did or did not do something, and his oath is false: whether he did what he swore he had not done, or he does what he swore not to do, or he fails to do what he swore to do.
"Tumas mikdash v'kodashav" - one who enters the Beis HaMikdash while he is tamei, or who eats kodashim in a state of tumah. This transgression was already mentioned earlier, and we return to it because of the dispute that will be brought in the mishnah before us.
The korban oleh v'yored varies according to the situation of the sinner:
One who can afford it - brings a female lamb or a female goat.
One who cannot afford that - brings two turtledoves or two young pigeons.
One who cannot afford even that - brings a minchas chotei, a simple meal offering of a tenth of an eifah of fine flour.
The wording of the mishnah:
"Ein chayavim al shmias hakol, v'al bituy sefasayim, v'al tumas mikdash v'kodashav" - the beis din, that is the Sanhedrin, and the anointed Kohen, who issued a mistaken ruling and an act was performed on its basis (in the case of the Sanhedrin - by the community, and in the case of the anointed Kohen - by himself), and that transgression is one of these three transgressions: they do not bring a par helem davar for it, nor its equivalent, and even the anointed Kohen does not bring his special sin offering for an erroneous ruling in matters of tumah, oaths or testimony.
The view of Rabbi Yose HaGelili:
"V'hanasi kayotzei bahen, divrei Rabbi Yose HaGelili" - the nasi is the king, the most exalted man in society, who stands at its head and answers to no one but the Holy One, Blessed is He. In the view of Rabbi Yose HaGelili, a king - just like the anointed Kohen - never brings a korban oleh v'yored at all; such a thing simply does not exist.
The reason is that the korban oleh v'yored is stated in the language of one who cannot afford it, "lo sasig yado" and "lo sagia yado," which implies that the Torah is speaking about a poor man:
Regarding the king: this does not apply to him, since he stands at the head and has access to money, and he cannot be poor.
Regarding the Kohen Gadol: he too cannot be poor, because of the requirement to elevate him and make him wealthy, as it says "hakohen hagadol me'echav" - greater than his brothers in beauty, in strength, in wisdom and in wealth. And if he has no wealth - they make him wealthy, so there is no possibility of his being poor.
It should be emphasized that these are not merely logical considerations, but a derivation based on the verses. This is the view of Rabbi Yose HaGelili, and the halachah does not follow him. In the end we will have before us four views on the question of who brings what with regard to oleh v'yored, and this matter is somewhat complex.
The view of Rabbi Akiva:
"Rabbi Akiva omer: hanasi chayav bechulan chutz mishmias hakol" - in his opinion the nasi, meaning the king, does indeed bring an olah v'yored under ordinary circumstances: if he swore falsely in a shevuas bitui, or entered the Mikdash while in a state of tumah, and the like. But he is not liable for shemias hakol, that is, for suppressing testimony. And why? "Shehamelech lo dan v'lo danin oso, lo meid v'lo meidin oso" - this is a quotation from the Mishnah in Sanhedrin, that there is a rabbinic ruling that the king does not sit in judgment and is not judged, and likewise he does not testify about others and no one testifies against him or in his favor.
And the reasons for these rulings:
He is not judged: this dates from the days of Yannai the king, Alexander Yannai, who treated the courts with contempt and they said: "What will you do about the matter under discussion?" We are concerned that if the king were to stand trial and not accept the ruling of the Sanhedrin, its authority and legitimacy would be undermined, and we cannot allow such a thing to happen again.
He does not sit in judgment: we are concerned that the judges would be afraid to disagree with him, since one may not contradict the king, and in the end he would not listen to them - and that is not proper.
He does not testify: this reason may well be from the Torah, based on the separate obligation to give honor to the king, which is derived from the verse "som tasim alecha melech" - that the king be above you. His testifying detracts from his honor, since it places him in the position of assisting someone else.
No one testifies about him: since the king neither sits in judgment nor is judged, testimony concerning him is simply not relevant.
To summarize: since there is no possibility of the king testifying or serving in a court, Rabbi Akiva holds that there is no basis to hold him liable for suppressing testimony, since in any case it was never in his power to give effective testimony. We have learned the three transgressions for which one brings an olah v'yored and the levels of the offering, the exemption of the Sanhedrin and the anointed Kohen, and the dispute between Rabbi Yosi HaGelili and Rabbi Akiva regarding the law of the nasi.
The practical halachah is more complex, and this is not the place for it. Additional views and a clarification of the halachah will be presented at the end of the chapter, after Mishnah 7.