We begin our study of Maseches Horayos, chapter 1, mishnah 1. This lesson builds on the introduction that preceded it, and anyone who has not yet heard that introduction would do well to listen to it first.
Background:
We have already learned that when the Great Sanhedrin rules that a certain act is permitted, when in fact it is one of the forty-three prohibitions in the Torah for which one who transgresses intentionally is liable to kareis - being cut off by Heaven, or dying before one's time - and the community acts on that mistaken ruling, and afterward the Sanhedrin retracts and admits, "We erred, the act is forbidden" - then a special offering is brought, called the par he'elem davar shel tzibbur, the bull brought for a matter that was hidden from the community.
The question of our mishnah:
Our mishnah discusses a case in which it was not the majority of the community that followed the mistaken ruling, but only a single individual. For example: the Sanhedrin ruled that cheilev (forbidden fat) may be eaten, and a private individual ate cheilev on the strength of that ruling, and afterward the Sanhedrin retracted and admitted its error. Here there is no place for a par he'elem davar, since it was not the majority of the community. The question, then, is this: does that individual bring a personal chatas (sin offering), since in the end he did transgress a prohibition, or is he exempt because he relied on the ruling of the Sanhedrin?
Our mishnah was taught according to the view of Rabbi Yehudah, and in his opinion that person is exempt from bringing a chatas. The reason for the exemption is not because he was considered coerced, but rather a derivation from the verse - from an extra letter in the wording of the text, as will be explained below: it is required that "be'asosah" refer to an act of his own initiative, an error he made on his own, and not one that came from relying on the Sanhedrin. For this technical reason, one who relies on a mistaken Sanhedrin is exempt.
The halachah, however, does not follow Rabbi Yehudah. The halachah follows the view of the Chachamim, who are not mentioned at all in our mishnah, who hold that even though he relied on the Sanhedrin and did the very best thing he could have done, in the end he transgressed the Torah and needs atonement, and therefore he is obligated to bring a chatas. It makes no difference that he acted in good faith - that is precisely the definition of shogeg, an unintentional error, and nevertheless he is obligated to bring an offering.
It is worth mentioning that a person who transgresses a Torah prohibition intentionally, with premeditation, cannot solve his problem by bringing a chatas. A chatas is brought only for those transgressions that carry the penalty of kareis, and only when they were committed unintentionally, without any intent to transgress the Torah.
The text of the mishnah:
"Horu beis din la'avor al achas mikol mitzvos ha'amuros baTorah" - the beis din, meaning the Sanhedrin, ruled that it is permitted to do something that is in truth a transgression of one of the mitzvos of the Torah. Although the wording of the mishnah suggests that this applies to any mitzvah in the Torah, this is merely a quotation of the wording of the verse that deals with the subject: "If one person sins unintentionally from among the people of the land, in doing one of the mitzvos of Hashem," and because of that expression - "one of the mitzvos of Hashem" - the mishnah adopted this wording as well. In practice, however, we are speaking only of transgressions that carry the penalty of kareis.
"Vehalach hayachid ve'asah shogeg al pihem" - a private individual followed their lenient ruling, acted according to it, and thereby transgressed the Torah unintentionally. And this applies in every case:
"Bein she'asu ve'asah imahem" - whether they too acted this way and he acted together with them.
"Bein she'asu ve'asah achareihen" - or they acted, and he followed after them and acted afterward.
"Bein shelo asu ve'asah" - or they never actually acted on the leniency they ruled, but only issued the ruling in theory that the act is permitted, and he followed their ruling.
In all of these cases - "patur, mipnei shetalah beveis din" - he is exempt, because he relied on the court.
And where do we learn this from? The verse says: "If one person sins unwittingly from among the people of the land, in doing one of the commandments of Hashem that may not be done." Seemingly it should have said "ba'asos achas" (in doing one), so what is the extra letter "heh" in the word "ba'asosah" coming to teach? From here Rabbi Yehudah derives that it must be an act of his own soul - that he himself erred, and not that he relied on the court. But as noted, the Sages do not accept this derivation, and the halachah is not decided according to it.
The second part of the Mishnah - one who knows they erred:
"Horu beis din veyada echad mehen shetau" - the Sanhedrin issued its ruling that the matter is permitted, and one of the judges present knows that they erred. "O ra'ui lehora'ah" - and even someone who is not among the seventy-one members of the Sanhedrin, but was fit to be counted among them. Bear in mind that around the Sanhedrin sat the students, next in line, who would fill a seat whenever one became vacant. These are people who could have been judges, and therefore had they raised an objection, their words would have been weighed seriously.
"Vehalach ve'asah al pihem" - even though he knew that the Sanhedrin had erred, he said to himself: the Sanhedrin ruled that it is permitted, and I will act according to their words. And in all the variations - "bein she'asu ve'asah imahen, bein she'asu ve'asah achareihen, bein shelo asu ve'asah" - even if they never acted but only ruled that the matter is permitted, and he heard and acted according to their lenient ruling - "harei zeh chayav, mipnei shelo talah beveis din" - he is obligated to bring a chatas, because he did not rely on the court.
What is going on here? We are dealing with a person who knows that the court is mistaken. For some reason he did not raise his objection before them, and so they never weighed his argument. Since he himself knows that the matter is forbidden, he is not permitted to do it, and nevertheless he did it, relying on the court's permission. Now, had he said to himself, "I have an excellent ticket out of trouble - the court permitted it, so I will do it in any case," that would be a deliberate act. Such a person transgressed the Torah intentionally and brazenly, and he is not obligated in a chatas at all, since he acted deliberately. That, then, is not the case of our Mishnah.
The case of our Mishnah is a person who mistakenly thought that he must listen to the court, even though he knows they erred. And one must be careful to avoid a misunderstanding: we are speaking of a person to whom the court would have listened had he raised his objection, and he had a legitimate objection, only that he did not raise it. The proper procedure is that he raise his question, the judges weigh it, analyze it and discuss it. If they accept his words, they will retract the leniency and change their ruling; and if they reject it after it has been weighed, then indeed the person is required to listen to the Sanhedrin. True, it may be that if in his heart he holds the matter is forbidden he will not be able to act leniently, but in any event he was entitled to rely on the Sanhedrin and say: "I am commanded to listen to the Sanhedrin, and therefore I will act this way."
Let us make this clear: he knew that the Sanhedrin's ruling rested, for example, on a printing error in the Torah scroll from which they read. He did not bring this to their attention, but rather thought to himself: "I am obligated to listen to them, for this is one of the 613 mitzvos - that if the Sanhedrin say something, even if it appears to you that they are mistaken, even if they say about left that it is right and about right that it is left, one is obligated to listen to them. And even though I know they erred because of the printing error in their Torah scroll, I am commanded to listen to the Sanhedrin." And this itself is a mistake, and since he erred, he is an unwitting sinner, and in that particular case he must bring a chatas.
For what he should have done was to raise his question before the Sanhedrin, and once they had ruled on it the matter would have been settled. We are therefore dealing with a clearly defined case: a person who would have been fit to be counted among the Sanhedrin had he been invited, or who is in fact a member of it, and who had a question that he did not raise - and all of this before the judges had settled on a definitive opinion. Had he relied on the leniency that he knew to be mistaken, that would have been a deliberate act; but since he mistakenly thought that he must follow it because that is how the law appeared to them, he is an unwitting sinner, and therefore obligated in a chatas.
"Zeh haklal":
The Mishnah summarizes and establishes the principle: one who relies on his own opinion and not on the opinion of the court and transgresses is obligated in a chatas; and one who relies on the court is exempt. And all of this, as noted, is within the framework of Rabbi Yehudah, who holds that an individual is exempt from a chatas when the Sanhedrin instructed him to act this way.
And what does the principle come to add? Let us begin with the first case - one who relies on himself, who is obligated. There are people who think they are wiser than the Sanhedrin, and sometimes it is even true. Suppose there is a man wiser than all the members of the Sanhedrin, only that for some reason they did not invite him to be counted among them, because they considered him a nuisance. That man says: "Those fools in the Sanhedrin are always wrong, but this time, when they said that cheilev is permitted, they were right - once they got it right." And he eats the cheilev, and the Sanhedrin too permitted eating it.
And when the Sanhedrin retracts and admits, "We erred," it becomes clear that he never relied on their leniency at all. He would have eaten the chelev whether or not they had ruled that way, since he relied on his own reasoning. The fact that the Sanhedrin agreed with him - or that he agreed with them - is nothing more than coincidence, and he never depended on them. Therefore, even according to Rabbi Yehudah, who exempts an individual who relied on the ruling of the Sanhedrin, that exemption applies specifically to one who depends on the Sanhedrin; but this man depended on himself, and once it becomes clear that he erred, he must bring a chatas.
Now for the second clause - "v'hatoleh b'veis din patur" - "and one who depends on the court is exempt." What does it add to what we have already explained? The answer will lead us into the next Mishnah, but the essence of the matter is this: on Monday the court ruled that a certain thing is permitted; on Tuesday they retracted and said, "We erred, it is forbidden"; and on Wednesday a man came who had heard the lenient ruling on Monday but had not heard of their retraction on Tuesday, and acted according to the old ruling. Is he still covered by the mistaken ruling of the Sanhedrin and exempt from a chatas? The Mishnah answers: yes, indeed. Since he relied on the Sanhedrin's earlier permission, he is making that very same error, and it makes no difference that in the meantime they have already retracted and changed their view, and even if in the meantime they brought the par helem davar. He depended on them, and therefore he is entitled to the exemption derived from the verse, as Rabbi Yehudah says, and he does not bring a chatas.
As for the halachah, as we noted at the outset, we do not follow any of these opinions. The halachah is that a person who unwittingly transgressed a Torah prohibition whose penalty is kareis - whether the Sanhedrin permitted it or forbade it - must bring a chatas if he erred and acted. The exception is the case in which the Sanhedrin ruled leniently and the majority of the Jewish people erred along with them: in that case the par helem davar is brought, and it is what exempts the individual from bringing his own private chatas.
In summary: In this Mishnah we learned the law of an individual who acted according to a mistaken ruling of the Sanhedrin. According to Rabbi Yehudah, one who depends on the court is exempt from a chatas - derived from the exposition of "ba'asosah," that the act must be entirely his own - and this applies in every case: they acted and he acted with them, they acted and he acted after them, or they did not act at all and he did. By contrast, one who knew that they had erred, or who was qualified to issue rulings and did not raise his objection, is liable, because he did not depend on the court but rather erred in the very assumption that he was required to listen to them. And this is the rule: one who depends on himself is liable, even when the Sanhedrin happened to agree with him; and one who depends on the court is exempt, even when the Sanhedrin retracted in the meantime. As for the halachah, we follow the Sages: one who sins unwittingly is liable to bring a chatas, unless the majority of the community erred and a par helem davar was brought.
In the next Mishnah we will examine the case from which the added clause "v'hatoleh b'veis din patur" emerges.