Chullin, Chapter 2, Mishnah 7. Until now the chapter has occupied itself with the physical act of shechita: the knife, the neck, the organs, and the many ways the cutting itself can fail. Our mishnah shifts the discussion to something no witness can see, namely what a person is thinking while the act is performed. The underlying rule is that a beast slaughtered as a service to avodah zarah becomes wholly forbidden, and no benefit of any kind may be taken from it, and this holds no matter who wielded the knife, an Israelite or a gentile. The situation the mishnah puts before us is a mixed one: the animal belongs to a worshipper of idols, but the shechita itself is carried out by a Jew acting on his behalf.
The Basic Case: A Jew Slaughtering for a Non-Jew
"Hashochet lenochri, shechitato kesheira." When a Jew performs the shechita for a non-Jew who worships avodah zarah, the shechita is valid and the meat is permitted to Jews. We do not assume that the owner had it in mind to have the animal offered in the service of his idol.
"Rabbi Eliezer posel." Rabbi Eliezer disagrees and rules the shechita invalid, with the result that Jews may derive no benefit whatsoever from the animal. Since the owner is an idol worshipper, we presume that this is precisely why he wanted the animal slaughtered.
Rabbi Eliezer Extends the Ruling
Rabbi Eliezer's suspicion holds even where the gentile's share in the animal is minuscule. "Afilu shechatah sheyochal hanochri mechatzar kaved shelah, pesula, shestam machshevet nochri la'avodah zarah." Imagine a beast belonging to a Jew, with one small portion, the diaphragm, in gentile hands. The Jew slaughters it so that his gentile partner may eat that portion, while he himself eats the remainder, which is his own. Rabbi Eliezer declares the shechita invalid, on the grounds that when a gentile leaves his intention unstated, we assign it to idolatry. A claim on a single small cut of meat is enough to raise the concern that he meant that cut as an offering to his idol, and the moment such a concern arises the shechita collapses and nothing from the beast may be eaten.
Notice what the first two opinions share. They argue only about whether we suspect the non-Jew of idolatrous intent. Both agree that if such intent was in fact present, the animal is forbidden even though somebody else did the slaughtering. In other words, the owner's thought alone is enough to create the problem.
Rabbi Yosi: Only the Slaughterer's Mind Matters
Rabbi Yosi challenges that shared assumption. In his view, the owner's improper intentions have no effect on the animal unless he himself performs the shechita, and he proves it with a kal vachomer.
"Amar Rabbi Yosi: kal vachomer hadevarim!" His argument unfolds in two halves. "Bimkom shehamachshava posselet bemukdashin", in a domain where intention does disqualify consecrated animals, "ein hakol holech ela achar ha'oved", everything is decided by the one performing the service alone. "Makom she'ein hamachshava posselet bechullin", in a domain where intention lacks that same disqualifying reach with ordinary animals, "eino din", is it not all the more logical, "shelo yehei hakol holech", that nothing be decided, "ela achar hashochet", other than by the slaughterer?
The proof is drawn from pigul. A kohen who performs the avodah of a korban while intending that its meat be eaten past the time allotted for it thereby ruins the offering. That thought is destructive at each of the four avodot involving the blood: the shechita, kabbalat hadam (collecting the blood), holachat hadam (conveying it to the mizbe'ach), and zerikat hadam (applying it to the mizbe'ach). The opening for a stray thought to spoil a korban is thus quite wide. Yet even so, "ein hakol holech ela achar ha'oved": the only intention that registers is that of the officiating kohen, and not that of the person who brought the offering.
Set that beside chullin, an unconsecrated animal. Here a disqualifying thought operates in a much narrower field: idolatrous intent takes hold at two stages only, the slaughtering itself and the sprinkling of the blood, rather than at all four. Now reason it through. In the realm of korbanot, where intention reaches further, the one mind that counts belongs to the kohen performing the avodah. In the realm of chullin, where intention reaches less far, surely the one mind that counts must belong to the shochet, and not to whoever happens to own the beast.
The logic in a sentence: it is easier to disqualify a korban through pigul than to disqualify an ordinary animal through idolatrous intent, simply because there are more stages at which the disqualifying thought can land. Even so, in the case of the korban the power to spoil it belongs exclusively to the one performing the service and not to the owner. All the more so, then, with chullin: only the person actually holding the knife, not the owner, can invalidate the animal with a thought of avodah zarah.
Rabbi Yosi's ruling in practical terms: should the man who owns a chullin animal have had avodah zarah in mind, while the shochet who did the slaughtering had no such thought, the meat remains permitted.