Bava Basra, Chapter 9, Mishnah 10 (page 912). The Mishnah continues the discussion regarding the obligation to pay wages on time.
"Echad sechar adam, v'echad sechar behemah, v'echad sechar kelim" - Whether the wages of a person, the hire of an animal, or the hire of utensils:
This halachah applies equally to wages paid to a person, to the fee for hiring an animal, and to the fee for hiring utensils. Regarding all of these, two obligations are stated:
"Yesh bo mishum b'yomo titen secharo" - They are subject to the injunction of "on his day you shall give his wages," a positive commandment, an affirmative command to pay immediately at the end of the rental period, when the time to pay for what was hired arrives.
"V'yesh bo mishum lo salin pe'ulas sachir itcha ad boker" - And they are subject to the injunction of "the wages of a hired worker shall not remain with you all night until morning," a negative commandment, a prohibition against withholding the wages and delaying them overnight until morning.
When do these obligations apply:
"Eimasai" - When do these things apply? "Bizman shetva'o" - When he demanded it, meaning when the one owed the wages expects payment, demanding and requesting it. But if "lo tva'o" - he did not demand it, meaning he does not demand and does not request his wages - such as when there is an agreement between them to pay once a month as is accepted practice, or if he explicitly said, "Do not worry, you can pay me tomorrow," and the like - there is neither a negative commandment nor a positive commandment requiring immediate payment here. The choice is in the hands of the worker to forgo the payment and receive it at a later date, and the same applies to someone who rented out an animal or utensils.
Assigning payment to a storekeeper or a money changer:
What is the halachah when the employer directs the worker to a third party to receive his wages? Has he fulfilled his obligation, and what happens if that third party ultimately does not pay - is the employer exempt, or does the obligation revert to him?
The Mishnah states: "Himchahu etzel chenvani o etzel shulchani" - If he assigned him to a storekeeper or a money changer, meaning if the employer directed the worker to the storekeeper, who is the grocer, who pays him in goods in exchange for his wages, or to the money changer, who is the currency exchanger (a sort of modern-day bank). The employer says: "I do not have cash on hand, but you can receive goods at the storekeeper or cash at the money changer, and I will reimburse them for their value later." In such a case, "eino over b'lav" - he does not transgress the negative commandment, because since the employer enabled the worker to receive his wages, he does not violate these prohibitions.
It is understood that the third party must agree to take the responsibility upon himself; the employer cannot simply instruct another person, "Pay him in my place." But once he arranged this and the third party agreed to execute the payment, it emerges that the employer has made the wages available to the worker, and he is thus exempt.
The commentators debate whether the worker's consent is required: if the worker says, "I do not wish to go to that storekeeper or money changer," may the employer unilaterally determine that this is the method of payment, and if the worker is not interested - it is not his problem? Some say that the worker must agree to this. The Beis Yosef holds that there is no need for his consent: as long as the employer made the option to receive his wages available to the worker, the choice is in the hands of the worker whether to take the money or not, and the employer is exempt from the positive commandment and from the negative commandment of this obligation.
A hired worker in his time swears and takes:
From here the Mishnah moves to a new topic related to our subject. Under normal circumstances, when a person claims that another owes him money and the other denies it, and neither of them has proof, the rule is that the burden of proof rests on the claimant. Even if the claimant is certain of his claim and is willing to swear to it, while the defendant says, "I do not know," the claimant cannot extract the money.
However, in our Mishnah we find a rabbinic law, an enactment of the Sages that creates an exception to this rule. The exception applies within the time window, the specific period during which the employer is supposed to pay the worker. On the one hand, we assume the employer wants to pay in order not to transgress a Torah prohibition, but on the other hand, we assume he is preoccupied with many matters, whereas the worker has only one thing to worry about - receiving his wages. Therefore, if the worker claims he did not receive his wages and the employer claims he paid, the Sages established that within this time window, we assume the employer is mistaken, and the worker is believed with an oath that he did not receive his wages, since it is logical that he is not lying.
This is the wording of the Mishnah: "Sachir bizmano nishba venotel" - the worker, within the time frame when he is supposed to receive his wages, during that period, if he is willing to swear that he did not receive his pay - he swears, and the court obligates the employer to pay "a second time": according to the employer's claim this is the second time, but according to the worker's claim it is the first time.
"Avar zemano - eino nishba venotel" - if he did not raise his claim within the time window when he was supposed to receive his wages, and he comes later claiming he was not paid, we return to the regular rules: the fact that the worker claims he did not receive payment and is willing to swear to it does not allow him to obligate the employer to pay. Once the window closes, we have no reason to believe the worker more than the employer. True, the worker knows for certain whether he received his wages, since the matter is very important to him, but the employer as well - why would he cheat? We assume he wants to do what is right, and in the absence of proof, an oath cannot extract money, following the regular rules.
"Im yesh eidim shetava'o - harei zeh nishba venotel":
Here is an additional exception: if there are witnesses who testify that the worker demanded his wages within the time window, near the end of that period in which he must be paid, and the employer replied to him, "I will pay you later, do not worry" - this shows that the employer is not careful to pay on time and fulfill the Torah's requirement. Therefore, the worker may come to court during the following period and bring his witnesses. The witnesses cannot testify whether he was paid or not - they do not know that; but they do know that he demanded his money, and that the employer showed he is not particularly concerned with fulfilling the Torah obligation. Because of this, the assumption returns that there is good reason to believe the worker more than the employer, since the worker knows whether he was paid, while the employer can easily be distracted by the burden of running the business. This is therefore an additional time window given to the worker to claim his wages.
Obviously, this cannot go on forever. He cannot possibly come ten years later and say, "You did not pay me ten years ago" and swear that he did not receive his wages. Therefore, the halachah emerges, based on the Gemara, that the worker is given only that next period - the period following the one in which he was supposed to receive the payment - to raise his claim and say: "I have witnesses that I tried to get my money from you and you put me off," and then he will be believed. Beyond that second period, we return to the regular rules of litigants suing one another.
It is worth noting that the regular rules apply here fully: first, an oath de'Oraisa in a case of partial admission - if the employer admits that he paid a part, he will have to swear on the rest, and if he cannot swear, he must pay. Second, shevuas hesess, a rabbinic enactment whereby one who is sued for a monetary claim swears that he does not owe. If so, we have the ability to obligate the employer to swear. These are secondary points to the Mishnah.
Ger Toshav:
We move on to the next Mishnah, which contains an additional point: "Ger toshav yesh bo mishum beyomo titein secharo" - the mitzvah to pay on time does not apply only toward Jews, but also toward a ger toshav (a resident alien). A ger toshav is a non-Jew who has accepted upon himself to recognize the existence of God and does not worship idols. He is not Jewish, but since he more or less fulfills the Seven Mitzvos of Bnei Noach, he is permitted to live in the Land of Israel, and for this reason the Torah granted him a special protection that his wages be paid on time.
In contrast, the Mishnah continues: "Ve'ein bo mishum lo salin pe'ulas sachir itcha ad boker" - the negative commandment prohibiting delaying the worker's wages until morning does not apply to a ger toshav. This is how the Rambam ruled, and this is what is implied by the Mishnah: there is a positive commandment here to pay him immediately, but there is no negative commandment if he fails to do so.
The source for the positive commandment to pay a ger toshav is in that same passage in the book of Devarim, and it is technical in nature. The verse preceding the verse that obligates paying on time says "Lo sa'ashok sachir" - withholding (oshek) means that the employer has no intention of paying the worker at all, not just delaying the payment. The verse concludes with the words "Asher be'artzecha bish'arecha" (who is in your land, within your gates), and the expression "within your gates" appears in other contexts, such as "your stranger who is within your gates," which does not refer to a righteous convert (ger tzedek) but to a ger toshav - non-Jews who have not converted, whose status is that of foreign residents with legal standing. From here we see that the obligation to pay on time applies even to a ger toshav.