Bava Kamma, Chapter 8, Mishnah 7 - the final mishnah of the chapter of HaChovel. We are concluding not just with a halachic point, but with a truly hashkafic point.
Financial payment does not exempt one from asking for forgiveness:
The mishnah states: "Af al pi shehu nosein lo - eino nimchal lo ad sheyevakesh mimenu" - even though the one who injures his friend has given him the appropriate financial compensation, he is not forgiven in Heaven until he asks the victim for his forgiveness. This does not apply only to injury, but to all interpersonal matters - embarrassment, theft, or insult - in any case where a person has paid the financial compensation required of him. The payment is one matter, and the personal offense is something else entirely: the insult, the hard feelings, the resentment, the disgrace, and the humiliation. This is not referring to the compensation for embarrassment, but to the inner pain - "How could you do such a thing to me?", "I thought we were friends." This personal pain hangs over the offender's head, until the victim forgives him.
The proof from Avimelech:
The mishnah brings a verse as a proof: "Ve'atah hashev eishes... vegomer". Out of context it is difficult to understand what this is referring to, so we will look at the background. Avimelech, the king of Gerar, took Sarah when Avraham and Sarah passed through his city. The people of Gerar were struck with a terrible plague and all their orifices were blocked, so that no harm would come to Sarah. Finally, Hashem appeared to Avimelech in a dream and told him that he would die unless he returned the woman to her husband.
However, returning the woman in and of itself was not enough. Avimelech was required to appease Avraham, and in fact Sarah too - who needed an apology just as much as him, and even more so. And this is indeed what he did. The verse continues and says that it is not enough to return the married woman to Avraham, but rather "veyispallel ba'adecha vechyeh" - Avimelech must ensure that Avraham prays for him so that he will be healed, which means that Avraham must forgive him wholeheartedly. Therefore, the verse details how Avimelech rectified his actions toward Avraham and even toward Sarah, by saying "I did not know" - and yet this was not enough, and Avraham's prayer on his behalf was also required.
"Uminayin shelo yehei hamochel achzari" - from where do we know that the forgiver should not be cruel:
From where do we know that the one who was insulted, hurt, and damaged must be willing to forgive and not act cruelly? The cruelty lies in the fact that the victim knows that if he does not forgive the one who hurt him, that person will suffer the consequences from Heaven and will not be forgiven - and therefore withholding forgiveness is a cruel act. Regarding this, the mishnah states that a person should not be cruel in withholding forgiveness, "shene'emar: veyispallel Avraham el HaElokim vayirpa Elokim es Avimelech vegomer". Avraham, who was the victim, prayed on behalf of Avimelech, and Hashem healed him - from here we see that the victim must forgive wholeheartedly, and even pray for the welfare of the one who hurt him.
The halachic ruling in the Rambam:
This is an actual halachic ruling, and the Rambam writes this black on white: "Asur le'adam sheyiheyeh achzari velo yispayeis, ela yiheyeh no'ach lirtzos vekasheh lichos" - a person must not refuse to be appeased, and from the outset he must be easy to pacify and hard to anger. He continues: "Uvesha'ah shemevakesh mimenu hachotei limchol - mochel belev shalem uvnefesh chafetzah" - when the offender asks for his forgiveness, the victim must forgive him with complete willingness and a willing heart, "va'afilu heitzar lo harbeh vechata lo harbeh" - even if the insult, damage, and pain were severe, and even if the act was truly wicked, "lo yikom velo yitor" - he must not seek revenge, nor even bear a grudge.
Motzi shem ra (defamation) - an exception to the rule:
It is interesting that the Talmud Yerushalmi brings one type of transgression whose law is different: someone who spread a bad name (motzi shem ra) about his friend. The damage has already been done and it is impossible to put the genie back in the bottle, and it is very difficult to stop its spread. In this case, the victim is not obligated to be equally forgiving, and this is indeed brought by the Rema.
Forgiveness as a Mark of the Jewish People:
In general, the trait of forgiveness is an essential component of what it means to be a Jew, and the Rambam states this explicitly: "Vezehu darko shel zera Yisrael velibam hanachon" - this is the way of the Jewish people, whose sensibilities are properly directed. Conversely, the Rambam writes that this is not the case among the nations of the world, and an unforgiving nature is contradictory to the Jewish way of life. Proof of this is found in the story of the Gibeonites in the Book of Samuel, who became what we call "Nesinim": it emerges from Mishnayos throughout the Talmud that they are forbidden to marry into the congregation of God, because those people were unappeasable and sought vengeance against Saul and his sons. Since they were unforgiving, they have no place among the Jewish people - proving that forgiveness is a central value in Jewish morality.
Asking to Be Injured:
This concludes the first part of the Mishnah. The second part deals with someone who received an instruction to cause damage. The Mishnah states "Ha'omer" - if a person says to his fellow:
"Sama es eini" - blind my eye.
"Katea es yadi" - cut off my hand.
"Shabeir es ragli" - break my leg.
In all of these cases, the one who causes the injury is liable. If Reuven says to Shimon, "Blind my eye," and Shimon goes ahead and blinds his eye - Shimon is liable, because we assume that Reuven was not speaking seriously. The context is of people showing off their courage and provoking one another: "Go ahead, try to hit me, try to take out my eye." Therefore, if he actually hits him or blinds his eye, he is liable, since we can safely assume that a person does not genuinely want to take a blow or have his eye taken out.
The Mishnah continues: "Al menas liphtor - chayav" - if he did so on the condition to be exempt, he is liable. If in the heat of an altercation Reuven says to Shimon, "Let's see it, give me your hardest punch," and Shimon replies, "And if I smash your face, will you forgive me?", and Reuven answers, "Yes, go ahead" - he is still liable. We understand that these words were said rhetorically and sarcastically, and when the assailant is the one asking for forgiveness as an advance waiver, it is part of that same provocation that the speaker does not truly mean, and the one causing the damage is liable.
However, when the injured party states explicitly in advance that he waives all liability or claims against the one injuring him, this is a sufficient waiver. For example, a person goes to the doctor, and the doctor says to him: "Are you sure you want me to extract the tooth? Perhaps it can be saved," and he replies: "No, I want you to extract it, and I forgive you and waive any claim I have against you." Here it is clear that the one agreeing to the extraction means what he says and intends to waive his rights.
It emerges, as the Gemara understands, that if the one requesting forgiveness is the damager - we operate under the assumption that the response "Yes, go ahead" is insincere. But if the context indicates that the request is sincere, the damager is exempt from his damages, since he acted upon the sincere request of the injured party.
Bodily Injury vs. Property Damage:
On the other hand, we learned: "Kera es kesusi, shabeir es kadi - chayav" - tear my garment, break my jug, he is liable. The idea here refers to a case where the person was previously appointed as a watchman: I gave my jug to my friend to watch over, and later I called him and said, "Break the jug." The assumption in such a case is that the owner of the jug did not mean what he said, and therefore the one who breaks it is liable - for he was entrusted to guard it and not to smash it. But if I handed my friend my shirt and told him, "Do me a favor and tear the shirt," and he tore it - he is exempt.
The fundamental principle here is that there is a difference between damage to a person's body and damage to his property. With an ordinary person, it is clear that when he says, "Break my belongings," he means it, whereas when he says, "Injure me," he does not truly mean it. Therefore, regarding property, on the condition to be exempt - he is exempt: if the damager said, "I will break your item if that is indeed your wish, I will throw it into the toilet, as you wish, provided you agree to waive the claim," and at that moment the owner waived his claim - the damager is exempt, since we assume the one waiving his claim meant what he said. This is not comparable to inflicting bodily harm.
"Asei chen le'ish peloni" - "Do this to so-and-so" - there is no agent for a transgression:
The final part of the Mishnah deals with a case involving three people: Mr. A, Mr. B, and Mr. C. Mr. A says to Mr. B, "Go and strike Mr. C," and Mr. B goes and strikes him. Who is liable? And what is the law if Mr. A added, "I take the responsibility upon myself - if they sue you, if they bring you to Beis Din, if you are fined, it is all on me"? In all these cases, it makes no difference, because we have a fundamental rule: there is no agent for a transgression. A person cannot act as another's agent to commit a transgression, and therefore Mr. B bears the full responsibility.
And so we learned: "Asei chen le'ish peloni al menas liptor - chayav, bein begufo bein bimamono" - "Do this to so-and-so on condition of being exempt - he is liable, whether to his person or his property". If Mr. A said to Mr. B, "Go and injure him or break his belongings," and Mr. B went and injured Mr. C or broke his belongings - Mr. B is liable, and he cannot claim that he acted as Mr. A's agent. Even if there was enticement, a threat, or a promise of reward, it does not matter, and there is no practical difference whether it involves damage to Mr. C's person or his property. Mr. B did it, and Mr. B is responsible - he and only he will pay the damages determined in Beis Din, and he cannot even return to Mr. A and demand reimbursement, because Mr. A is entitled to refuse.
It should be briefly noted that even though Mr. A emerges almost completely exempt in Beis Din, this does not mean he is not a bad person. On the contrary, he is wicked for telling Mr. B to break Mr. C's nose or his property, and he violates the Torah prohibition of "lifnei iver" (placing a stumbling block before the blind). Nevertheless, a monetary fine will not be imposed on him, since Mr. B is the one who actually caused the damage, and there is no agent for a transgression.